European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - March 20, 1948, Darmstadt, Hesse At postwar ceremony Benes chats with . Envoy ste1nhardt in rear is late Jan Masaryk the Price of appeasement by Eduard boxes in the second part of his memoirs the czech Leader relates his futile efforts against the Munich tra Edv and his forced exile. In u. S. He warns Roosevelt that a War is inevitable with the formation of the Daladier government in 1938 and the sub sequent reorientation of French policy away from Central european Alli ances my country and the soviet Union were left completely alone in the political Camp of those who were basically openly and decisively anti fascist andante nazi after we concluded the 1935 treat of Alliance with Russia we kept in con Stant Contact. Nothing interrupted our Exchange of opinion and coordination of May 30, 1935, a czechoslovak military delegation left for an official visit to the soviet Union and inaugurated the first air Force cooperation with Moscow. In August of the same year a soviet army delegation headed by general Shaposhnikov participated in our first Large scale a Nevers. In september 1935 a delegation of the czechoslovak army headed by the chief of our general staff Genera Krejci attended the big Maneu vers of the soviet army and returned enthusiastic from the military standpoint Over what they had seen in the soviet Krejci declared that the red army its discipline its High moral and its equipment compel the Admira Tion of every military expert / in the West at this time they refused to be 7e our evaluation of the soviet army. I n october 1935 we arranged an official trip of soviet newspapermen to Czechoslovakia. During the visit both i As minister of foreign affairs an soviet minister Alexa Drovsky referred to our new treaty of Alliance which was to halt the preparations of those nations among our neighbors who , by military adventures in the grand style to break the peace an attempt to conquer their peace Loving similar speeches and manifestations came More and More often providing German hungarian polish1 propaganda with frequent excuses for abandoned9 attacks describing us As the chief spreader of bolshevism in but we had no other intention except Cost what it might to prevent weekend March 2, ims the outbreak of a second world War by Germany we tried several times from Prague to arrange closer political and military cooperation Between the West and the soviet Union. For example in 1938 we were asked by the soviet minister in Prague to help persuade the West especially France to contribute to the equipment of the soviet Navy. I tried insisted again emphasized the importance of such Aid All in vain. I was forced to conclude that the people then making French decisions obviously had no desire to contribute. Seeing the feverish War preparations of Germany we arranged important deliveries of certain special arms from our armaments factories which the soviet army was unable to obtain or elsewhere. In the summer of 1937 another soviet military Mission came to Czechoslovakia. Certain Meas ures were taken and we reached several accords especially on soviet air Aid in Case of Art attack by the soviet military Mission s visit a similar czechoslovak Mission was sent to the soviet Union. The written report of that Mission on the military situation of the soviet Union was during the second world War a invaluable reference Aid for our important evaluations of the military potentialities of the soviet diplomacy made several Strong efforts to arrange meetings Foran Exchange of views on the common defense of european East and West against the fascist attack. We were always ready to join any such , the soviet efforts with the French and the English failed completely up to the end of september 1938. After the May mobilization in 1938 agreed that our chief of the general. Staff general Krejci should approach general Gamel n directly on Concrete measures for coordination of the czechoslovak and French mobilization. General Gamelin replied that he had no instructions. No further news and no invitation for our soldiers to Cometo Paris Ever arrived. Thus shortly be fore the Munich crisis we became con Vinced that the French either did not wish or could not prepare the matter of military preparations for direct defense against nazi attack in september 1938 we stood completely alone with the soviet Union. At this moment Europe was Ripe in every respect to accept without protest the diktat of Czechoslovakia decisively rejected that diktat it received from Britain and France on september 19, 1938, a joint note demanding that we accept the capitulation arranged be. Tween Hitler and Chamberlain sep tember 15 in Berchtesgaden. When we. Refused there came from France in England an ultimatum that if we did not accept their plan they would aban Don us. It was Clear that France and England would not go to War merely to keep the sudeten germans in there were few per sons in France and England who under stood that the question was More serious than keeping the so called sudeten germans in Munich on september 30, in the night our. State and our people were clubbed on the head. Without our participation and in spite of the mobilization of our entire armed Force the four great Powers forced on us the Munich act fatal for. Europe and the whole october 1, 1938, the Day after Munich Marshall Goering officially informed the czechoslovak minister to Berlin that Germany allow me to continue As president of the Republic. They would not eve Deal with me any More. He indicated that if i did not resign immediately Germany would act with Complete ruthlessness toward Czechoslovakia in put Ting the Munich agreement into effect. A similar declaration was made tour foreign ministry Delegate by Secre tary of state Weizsaecker of the Berli ministry and similar threats were sent me in Prague during this period brother unofficial Means. So we had not yet had enough. The whole of fascist Europe regarded me As a Symbol of democratic and anti nazi policy. Hitler himself on sep tember 26, in his Savage attack in the Berlin sports fast publicly proclaimed me to to his unyielding opponent an stated that it was a fight for life and death Between himself and me. It was one of. The rare times when he spoke the truth. As a result of All this i Felt it Neces sary to leave it would be in the interest of the state and it would demonstrate my personal judgment of the situation and provide a Clear lesson for the Western europeans who achieve appeasement at Munich. Also i could already sense a change of attitude indy own country. I acted accordingly. On october 5 i sent a letter to the new Cabinet informing them of my de parture. Then i took leave of the czechoslovak people in a radio speech. It was discreet and moderate an looked at from the perspective of today it completely fitted contemporary events. I asked my fellow citizens to maintain a Reserve and Calm despite the catastrophe to refrain from recriminations and anger to avoid quarrels and not to lose Confidence in them selves or Faith in the Justice of our cause. I. Indicated that further events Ere still to come and that i would go on working for the nation in another place. Few of my listeners perhaps understood clearly at that time the meaning of my words. " on october 6, completely exhausted mentally and physically my heart filled with indescribable emotions with heavy thoughts on the terrible political an moral catastrophe that had descended on Europe and which might eventually destroy it i left the Prague Castle with my family for be Zimolo Busti. There tried to recover from the heavy blows i had desired to remain in my country for a few More weeks certainly at least till october 28 czechoslovak i dependence Day and then leave either for Switzerland or England and later for the United states where i had accepted an offer to become professor of sociology at the University of Chicago. But the tension Between Prague and Berlin continued. The Berlin government informed Prague that its plans could be no More than Tenta Iveas Long As i remained in Czechoslovakia. The Cabinet terrified by new threats sent me special messages begging me to leave the country As soon As i could simultaneously my Nephew Bohus Benes arrived from London with serious warnings from my friends urging me to leave As soon As possible. In spit of my poor health i decided Princi Pally to relieve the Cabinet to leave for London october 22. 1938. Before leaving i shared my vie son the situation with my official contacts and with some of my political friends and warned that they must make immediate preparations for a renewal of the the second european War begins i told them we must again Fagin Many sided resistance such As we had during the 1914 War. We will have to prepare the organization of resistance at Home establish permanent Contact with anti nazi Europe and prepare an army both at Home and abroad to fight against Germany alongside the rest out Europe which will be obliged to go Towar in spite of the Munich treachery or even directly because of it. We will need Many political and military emigres who must get away from the country in Good time. You must be prepared for All this. And definitely for next october 1938 i expected that Mili tary conflict would begin not later than mayor june 1939. I was convinced that it would begin by an attack on Poland and i expected and feverishly hoped that Post Munich Czechoslovakia would manage to maintain at least some in dependence up to that moment. I n London Jan Masaryk and i consulted about our future plans for co. Operation and i organized under ground contacts with my Homeland. The first political messenger came in the. Middle of november. I kept inactive Contact with my political friends at Home and. Wrote them hundreds of letters urging them to hold out and to keep Faith. The Post Munich government _ m Prague sought rightly or wrongly som sort of modes Visendi with nazi Berlin. The majority of its members did not believe that War was just around the Corner. Even i did not regard As completely worthless at least morally the continued on Page 17 11
