European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - March 27, 1948, Darmstadt, Hesse Benes takes part in a military review after his election to the czech presidency in june 1945. Why Russia flirted with Germany by Eduard Benes the czechoslovak president in the third part of his memoirs cites his attempts to convince Western statesmen the soviets would abandon their new non aggression pact. After the fall of France a real government became almost a sheer necessity and the provisional Czecho slovak government was recognized by great Britain july 21, 1941.the fall of France seriously demoralized Many of our political emigres an part of our army. Quarrels reached their Zenith at this time. Even More serious i had considerable trouble with the British government. The British conditioned their recognition of the provisional government on the inclusion fall our political elements especially the slovaks. I tried with All my strength to achieve this but it was a task almost beyond human Powers. Only when the British themselves the personal hatreds and political views of some four emigres did they finally g Ive us their full my own personal experience i cannot say by what initiative or through whom the negotiations for the German soviet Accord of August 1939 were started. According to Stalin s declaration the initiative came from the germans. I myself was informed of the economic negotiations Between Ger Many and the soviet Union both from Prague and from Moscow in May 1939. Rightly or wrongly i Drew very far reaching conclusions from these Indi cations. I regarded the soviet French English negotiations As definitively ended and believed that the soviet Union would now Orient itself Politi Cally completely independently solely according to its own advantage and Security. Not believing itself prepared it would seek to postpone War As Long As possible and at the same time prepare feverishly for the same time i was sure that. The soviet would not lose sight of it eventual revolutionary goal and Basic communist directives even though i might be forced into apparent or really illogical believed that the soviet Union after the failure of its offer to make an 10 anti German treaty to preserve world peace would Retreat Western allies toward temporary equilibrium Between the Western Powers and Hitler Germany. Toward the rest of the world this would be justified simply by the interests of the soviet state. Front the International communist viewpoint it would be defended on grounds that incas of War it was necessary to main Tain All the possibilities for a later world social followed step by step almost through microscopic lenses every act and motion of soviet policy. Early in the morning of july 19, 1939,general Ingr and colonel Moravec reported to me that they had information from Germany of very Active negotiations Between Germany and the soviet the 10th and 12th of August we received by the same route further important information that the decisive moment in the soviet German negotiations had been the night of August 3-4. There had been a meeting at the for eign office with Ribbentrop Goering Goebbels Keitel Jodl and a few others to decide whether Germany should sign the soviet agreement. Hitler was a Berchtesgaden and had a direct wire to the room in which the meeting was held. Berlin was not negotiating through its ambassador count Schulenburg but had sent a special negotiator to Moscow the latter had just returned from mos cow and described the state of the negotiations. " i the discussion lasted into the Early hours of August of with Hitler continuously participating by Telephone. Finally Hitler gave his consent and the German negotiator returned with this reply to Moscow by August 12, 1939, therefore when we received this information from Ber Lin in London i was absolutely certain that in a Short time the Public would learn the sensational news of a German soviet treaty. At the same time our intelligence service was receiving fro the same German sources detailed in formation on the development of the conflict Between Germany and Poland Over went to Paris at the beginning of october 1939, to negotiate the creation of a czechoslovak government and the organization of our army on French soil. A communist member of our Parlia ment j. Verma came to see me. Dementis was supposed to come with him but he had just Bee arrested by the French police so Verma came alone secretly by the Backen trance of the hotel. Both he and i were closely watched by the French police. Verma saw my difficulties with Daladier and tried to persuade me to abandon the West and move to Russia. I told him that i considered it Neces sary not to abandon the West. I was anxious above All Cost what it might to assure the Unity of the whole liberation objected that the situation in the West would press me towards the right away from the soviet Union and toss me into the sea of reaction. On the contrary i said it would be a mistake to leave affairs in the West to our emigres. It was vitally necessary from the very beginning to give our liberation action the Correct line progressive National and unifying an Western and Eastern at the same time. I said that this second world War was already world wide and revolutionary and that the soviet Union would undoubtedly be obliged to enter it. The talk with Verma made me real ize to the full the differences in the Way our communists under the in fluence of the russian communists regarded the forthcoming developments in the War and the Way i regarded both believed that the soviet Union would come into the War. It appeared however that the communists believed this would not be possible before the very end of the War obviously the soviet Union had signed the treaty with ". Germany to gain time so it could wait till the end of the War at the moment when both warring Camps would be that they would not have the strength to prevent or resist the Power of social revolution. However i was much More incline to believe that the soviet Union would i be drawn into the War against its Willby one or the other of the warring parties. I also completely excluded an possibility that the German workers could be pushed into revolution. T also did not believe that the soviet Union s participation would be merely revolutionary. I could not believe that either the Western Powers or Germany would fail to see through the soviet calculations and to behave accordingly. I believed that one or the other of the would do everything in its Power to draw the soviet Union into the War As soon As did not take up All these questions in detail with Verma but my talk wit him brought All these problems very clearly to my was therefore no surprised when i received information from Home during the Early years of the War on the reserved if not actually negative behaviour of the communists toward our National liberation move perceived the same influences calculations and idea seven perhaps instructions in our London communists decision in August and september 1939,to move into the background after an initial Elan in participating in the liberation struggle. Our communists in Lon. Don began at this time to Issue leaflet against us. For example copying British pamphlets against the British Munich ites they put out a brochure guilty men of. Czechoslovakia in which the attacked our alleged cooperation with from my friends in Prague i received similar news of communist propaganda in the same style at Home in particular some decisions by the party s Central committee which were published in the party s illegal newspaper an secretly distributed in the underground. Obviously the communists did not yet expect Germany s attack on fhe soviet Union. In the first months and years of the War the czechoslovak communist party also accepted the mistaken expectation of the russian communists that the soviet Union s neutrality would be maintained for a Long time perhaps. To the end of the War and that there would be world revolution at the very end of this imperialist conflict/1 in the instructions which i sent to Czechoslovakia. I continually warned our resistance groups not to be deceived by this communist attitude. I never ceased to exclude the possibility that the soviet Union would soon be drawn into the War and that then it and with if our communist parly would be obliged to change its attitude. In late december 1939 the soviet government informed our minister Zdenek Zierlinger that his Mission in Moscow was at an end. We had expected this for on september 16, 1939, the soviet Union had recognized the Tiso govern ment in Slovakia. However i took special note of the emphasis with which the soviet government underlined the meaninglessness of these various formalities As they described this to minister Zierlinger on is departure from Moscow. Therefore in my radio broadcast to the Homeland after the fall of France. I again expressed the conviction that. I was still counting on the entry into the War of that great Eastern Factor the soviet Union. V the soviet finnish War declared on november 30, 1939, Vas right in line 4 with my Overall Conception of worlds events. For me it meant that the soviet Union was heading directly for \ its own goals without regard to the German finnish Alliance or any Ger Jav Man desires that it wanted to insure itself against Germany both in Tern tory and in Power and that it was fully prepared to Bear the results of its action expulsion from the league of nations and Daladier s attempts to 1draw France and England into action j against the soviet Union. According to Daladier s plan France was to have j been removed from the War against Germany some time before. Germany was then to have been pressed to
