European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - September 5, 1968, Darmstadt, Hesse The stars and stripes s theory the so Vlf ugg Mout that length and in particular of a German military resurgence sup ported by the United states under the Guise of nato. Remove that fear by Desman to log nato Sunj the Jovet grip on Eastern Europe would Evaro Rafe even faster according to do Gaulle. He men proceeded to demonstrate hit Faith in his own me of Eatonl nth by withdraw "9 Franco from nato s military de and retaining Only the most Nous connection with the Al Liance v so confident were the owl that the no Unity of Western and latter Lureze Wasluk " around the Mer that they i Law Mold a. _. Slovakia de Saulle put the blame in Tho continued exist once of blocs in Europe it originally established by his Bete Nelre the Yalta agreement. He thus deftly managed to Moke the americans at Well As Tho Hussion responsible for what happened a Way of reasoning that would probably provoke seme astonishment in Prague. I toy be right As far As he 9001. It Tho analysis As tame it Frt wore very Quick to Point out failed the make a number of important distinctions. Tho two pc oct i Hii no True sons com pliable a fact he Choso to in France in fact did what were merely accused russians of secretly contemplating it when do Gaulle withdrew from the nato command and ordered Allied troops off his soil the response he received was net on Anglo american italian West Gorman armoured column occupying Paris and shooting up Tho place vendome. in t96t can not be equated with Hungary in 1956. The latter happened Only Oge f three years after Stalin death. It was possible the contend that a new and still basically raw rus Sian leadership in a state of transition was caught badly off guard. Elements of counter revolution Woro present in Hie hungarian situation. However brutal their riposte the russians May have genuinely misread the danger. At Toast in the succeeding years it was possible to Arguo so. In Czechoslovakia no such excuses or any others Are really thinkable. What is now Clear beyond doubt is that Tho russians have no intention of loosening their decisive control within their bloc oven at the Cost of bloodshed and Universal reprobation. Brezhnev and Kosygin Are no More influenced by Public Opin Ion either their own or other Peoples than was Stalin. Do Gaulle must now face the consequence of having pushed is Pursuit of with Moscow too fast and far beyond Tho limits of the tangible evidence of its viability. C North american newspaper Aji Tanct ill admit the democrats they put on o better show ars Messier but can put pressure on Russ czechs still have cards to play used it at an a juju Rejano to t 11 jul Imol Lureane t 7 further Progress a to within alone. In his declaration a toll is Fth soviet intervention in creche by Victor Zorza in spite of to gloom in Frague Over the temporary stationing of soviet troops in the country the czechoslovak Lead ers appear to have won on Points. Even if the russian Promise that the troops will be with drawn eventually is not to be readily credited hand few peo ple would to prepared to be Lieve any russian promises these Days Tho important fact is that there is now in Czechoslovakia a government and a party leadership which will be in a Posi Tion to demand the withdrawal of those troops at the earliest politically suitable Opportunity. And the russians having suffered a major political and psychological setback by allowing themselves to be branded in Tho eyes of world opinion As Aggro sors will to hard put to it to resist the diplomatic pressure from Prague to make them live up to their Promise. The czechoslovak leaders have great reserves of political Power which they have not oven begun to Uso especially in Tho support for their cause among most of the world s communist part Fot apart of course from Russia s immediate satellites. When Tho time comes to mobilize this support the present leaders in me Kremlin will have to do Clde whether they Are really pre pared Tertnik Tho Tomuo of the world communist movement for Ihu a what Tho debates and arguments Over the occupation of Czechoslovakia might Well bring about. The official communique n sued in the name of the leaders of both countries said Only that agreement was readied on the term of the withdrawal.01 the Tiu than w becomes to thl presi Dent Vobeda added in a define then which reflects something of rhe tortuous negotiations in mos cow that the conference achieved fundamental agree ment on the gradual implementation of the Complete de parture of the troops and every one of these phrases must have been fought Over tooth and Nail in Tho Kremlin. But Complete departure Means Complete departure and or. Dubcek in his own broadcast urged the nation not to mistrust the agreement reached by its representative with Tho russians on this Point. He clearly cannot at this stage say that he proposes to mobilize world communist opinion to help Tho russians to decide that they must go Home or that he has some other cards up his sleeve. But he does have them. He hinted As much when he told Tho czechoslovak people that their determination to pre vent bloodshed does not mean that we want to submit passively to the situation that has Boon this Means that Hoen visage action of some kind or other As indeed the nation will expect him to provide the leadership and Tho policy that will got the russians out. Normalization by itself undefined in the communique can do Little to ensure their withdrawal for what is Normal in Tho View of Prague h Likely to to highly abnormal in Tho View of Moscow As was for instance the Case just before the invasion. Of course the czechoslovak delegation promised to fulfil the country commitments to Tho Warsaw pact and saved or. Malik s face at Tho United no. Tint by toying that it had not the of Ortlani Yard in the column Tot i to msgr Jerf Ere. It no Wurte to teens lowered a reme Tetti Plewe of tote store i ten meet fee ve4 to Tiee or asked for Tho Security Council debate but the really rolling verbal concessions were made by the russians. Tho russians have formally declared their understanding of the support for Tho position of Tho leadership of Tho czechoslovak communist party the very position that their troops had gone in to change the very leadership that Only a Short while ago they were determined to overthrow. The czechoslovak Side has declared no support no under standing for the russians actions or motives or Good Faith Al though Tho soviet leaders must have pressed hard and Long in the four Day negotiations for a Little Crumb of Comfort however cautiously phrased which would have enabled Thorn to claim that Tho czech delegation admitted that they were Good communists after All. It is signs such As this which add to the impression of a czechoslovak Success at the talks. In the Light of what happened subsequently it May be surmised that president Svoboda said on arrival that he was not empowered to negotiate in the absence of or. Dubcek and the other loaders arrested by the rus sians and that he announced that he would have to go Back to Prague for now instructions from the National Assembly which was in session in a build ing ringed by soviet tanks. Tho appearance of or. Dubcek and hit associates in Moscow at this stage Mado it possible for the serious negotiations to go Forward. However in the course of Tho next few Days authoritative statements from the Clande Stine radio on behalf of the czechoslovak government and communist party announced the rimmed late return of the Dele Gate irrespective of whether Tho talk had encoder net which meant that the czechs in mos cow had threatened to pack their bags. It was the soviet leaders who confirmed in the communique their readiness for the Broad est sincere cooperation but there was no acknowledgement by the czechoslovak of this sincerity although it would have been easy to say at the begin Ning of this paragraph As was said at the beginning of some others that this was an attitude taken by both delegations. It is the Burden of this anal Ysis that what happens in Czechoslovakia next is not going to be determined by what was agreed in Moscow but by rhe Way in which the internal Situa Tion develops. No secret under takings Piedade by the Czecho slovak leaders can be considered binding on them because they Woro Given under duress. At this stage those soviet leaders who made up the Polit buro majority that pushed through the decision to invade Are evidently still Strong enough to insist on Tho vindication of their action. But the concessions to the czechs in Tho wording of Tho communique show that Tho strength of the Kremlin hard liners is already beginning to be eroded. And the wording is important. It was the wording of various communist announcements and speeches and articles that indicated in spite of surface impressions to the contrary that the russians Woro Likely to in Vade Czechoslovakia. And now in spite of the widespread Opin Ion in Czechoslovakia and out Sido that the forces of Progress have Boon Defeated there is much reason to believe that on balance they have emerged victorious although h May to some time before this becomes evident. 1c North anglican Ntim Palmr All to
