European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - November 04, 1985, Darmstadt, Hesse                                The stars and stripes monday november 4, 1985 columns & comments James resign Secretary Shultz playing familiar role in Moscow president Reagan will celebrate the first anniversary of his re election while Secretary of stale Shutlz is in mos cow to set the Agenda Tor the Reagan Gorbachev Geneva Summit meeting on nov. 19 and 20, a meeting that could have an  on the historical record of Reagan s presidency. Nobody expects the leaders of the two major nuclear Powers to reconcile the political and philosophic differences of 70 years in eight hours of talk half of i devoted to translation. Shull s assign ment As usual is to keep things from getting worse than they already Are. The question at Geneva is whether Rea Gan and Mikhail s. Gorbachev arc going of talk s Csc privately about their problems or deliver More propaganda nonsense about their differences. Shultz went to Moscow to try to define a practical Agenda for future negotiations not Only on the control of nuclear weapons but on the easing of East West tensions in general. This is the sort of thing George Shultz has done most of his professional life. As Secretary of labor he tried to balance the conflicting demands of management and the unions. As Secretary of the Treasury he watched the . Move from isolation and protectionism into the tangles of the first worldwide competing Economy. He has worked in the academic world and has u sense of Hir Ory and has been in Washington Long enough to know something about the stupidity of political and person Al ambition. Accordingly unlike Many of his col leagues he has few illusions about Moscow or Washington or the allies or himself. The chances arc that he might just Tom Wicker he soft he wont a Gate Star Mars but f�5 we Ungto pi5cu5s Renoir Nothe m a met Matt 0ack, make some Progress in his talks with Gorbachev. Henry Kissinger May very Well be right in saying that it is wrong to base the Hopes for peace or reconciliation with the russians on the personality of new soviet leaders but occasionally even Henry has been wrong. Prime minister Thatcher of Britain and prime minister Nakasone of Japan have the impression that Gorbachev has so Many problems at Home that he is demanding new policies in his own country and considering compromises abroad. All this May be wrong and there s much evidence that it is but Shultz will have a Chance to Analyse this for himself when he meets Gorbachev. He can then Tell the president whether to go to Geneva expecting the worst or hoping for the possibility of Compromise As the allies have suggested. Such an approach to the Summit meet ing with Gorbachev will not be popular with other members of the Reagan cab inet particularly with Secretary of de sense Weinberger who thinks past agreements with the russians have been violated and doubts that any new agreements with them will be useful. In recent weeks the president has seemed to Side with Weinberger s pessimistic Analy Sis. He went to the United nations condemn ing the soviet Union s expansionist policies in Europe Africa and latin America and suggesting that he could Deal with Gorba Chev Only if Moscow agreed to abandon its political and military interventions in Region Al disputes. On this he had a valid Point for it s True that there can be no reconciliation be tween Washington and Moscow on the peace of the world As Long As either Vio lates its treaty commitments in the United nations charter. But the president seemed to be making the settlement of these regional disputes a condition of reaching an accommodation on the control of nuclear weapons. And on this Point not Only the allies but Mapy of the president s own advisers disagree. Including Shultz whose practical View As usual is that it s a bum idea to reject some Progress unless you can get every thing you want. The president May be coming around to accepting this approach to the Summit. He has agreed to respond to Gorbachev s proposal for a so percent Cut in some nuclear missiles and his More hopeful proposal for a comprehensive test ban on All nuclear weapons systems. And he s sending to Moscow not Wein Berger but Shultz to talk things Over with Gorbachev and Sec if at least they can arrange an Agenda in Geneva that will minimize the propaganda and keep the negotiations going not Only on the control of nuclear weapons but on . Treaty commitments to refrain from the threat or use of Force against the territorial integ Rity and political Independence of other nations. C new Yore my Gramm Rudman How nos cure worse than malady something has to be done about the  say those who support the Gramm Rudman Holling budget balancing Bill already passed by the Senate. But some things Are worse than the deficit and Gramm Rudman Hullings is one of them. This ill disguised flight from congressional responsibility would Force s36-billion reductions in the deficit in each of five fiscal years ending in 1991, ostensibly achieving a balanced budget by then. If the president and Congress fail to make such deficit cuts in the conventional manner the president would be required to impose the necessary reductions exempting Only social Security , contracts already agreed to and debt service. Aside from the expansion of presidential Power that might result Gramm Rudman Hollings is a cure worse than the malady for at least the following Rea sons it could increase the 1986 deficit. To avoid painful votes by members of con is running for re election next year. Gramm Rudman Hollings sets a 1986 deficit target of $180 billion is billion More than the congressional budget office is currently estimating u also adds an escape clause allowing the 1986 deficit to exceed even the $180 billion figure by 7 percent up to about $192 billion before any mandated reduction would be required Clever these politicians. It ignores the need for Adt cd revenues. This Cigis Bation would not Force Ronald Reagan if he had to make mandatory deficit reductions to request new taxes and those who think he would do so voluntarily need Only look at his resistance he s threatening a veto even to keeping the cigarette excise tax at 16 cent rather than reducing it to 8 cents As scheduled years ago. Nor would Gramm Rudman Hollings close tax Loop holes another major deficit villain. Philip m. Stern has pointed out in the Washington Post that such tax Breaks Many benefiting special interests Only Cost the government Over 5400 billion a year. The joint eco nomic committee estimates that the loss will increase by s40 billion each year $4 billion More than the mandated annual deficit reductions until 1991. It muddles the military spending Issue. If the he its were too Large. Reagan would have to Cut Fri Pitary As Well As non military spending. Intent on his military buildup he clearly does t want to be forced to make such cuts and Caspar Weinberger the implacable Secretary of defense already has said that the president would have to retain the authority to request the amounts that he considers vital to National Security. Here Are the seeds of a dangerous and unnecessary constitutional conflict one that Congress might not win. If Reagan evaded congressionally mandated Mili tary cuts on grounds of National Security would the courts Force him to comply in the past they be shown themselves reluctant to interfere with a president s exer Cise of his Powers As commander in chief. Better tha Congress if it sees the need should Cut military spend ing straightforwardly. It s bad economics. Very bad. In 1986, economic growth is estimated at 3 percent or More. Such a growth Here would be a Good time to reduce the deficit but As explained before no reduction will be required in 1986. In future however there could be a succession of stagnant or recession years. To Force s36-billion spend ing cuts in such years would be precisely he Wron economic Medicine. Worse the basis for doing so would be extremely shaky. The size of the deficit for a Given year can t be pinpointed months in Advance it depends on too Many such variables As the rate of economic growth Esli mated deficits would be the basis upon which it would or would not become necessary for the president to order the mandated deficit reductions. An actual deficit could prove so much smaller than the projection that harsh mandated budget cuts would turn out to have been unnecessary but the cuts and their economic effects would already be in place. A humic i Defice r,5mv�ch " he a Burden i Ted nth i. Pm in incr of be congressional Bud Foth unt Lle the Nice it would y old to much Power to the unelected bureaucrats who make the estimates one More Way in which Gramm Rudman ass  of congressional responsibility e on York to not Pimmit i askepy0u to but 7w bag Orick