European Stars And Stripes (Newspaper) - September 30, 1987, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Page 10 the stars and stripes wednesday september 30,1987 columns George will hard to find something Good about arms Accord the search for Good reason Tor rejoicing about inc  agreement on intermediate Range nuclear forces is like inc 19th-Century search for the source of the Nile difficult. It is however unlike that Isth Century search because explorers knew the Nile had to have a source. The agreement will retire fewer than 4 percent of the worldwide inventory of warheads. The retirements arc concentrated in Europe and will magnify he importance of inc enormous soviet conventional Force advantage there. It is preposterous to say thai Domestic exigencies drove he Kremlin in this direction. The Kremlin did not seek this agreement to achieve economic respite. The agreement will have no measurable effect on either Side s defense spending. The agreement removes from Europe the weapon the soviets fear most the Pershing. They can penetrate the soviet Union with certainly and can strike targets accurately in 13 minutes. The soviet will Dis Mantle no weapons that could strike America All the american weapons that will be dismantled could strike soviet territory some defenders of the agreement say the weapons to be scrapped were too vulnerable to be valuable. These defenders have a Point. There Are two ways to reduce the vulnerability of weapons Armor or mobility. Missiles Are soft weapons a Bullet can Pierce them. The Pershing and cruise missiles were supposed to be quickly Dispersible during crises. But Host countries have put unreasonable restraints on the movements of inc weapons which because of Pentagon maladministration have cumbersome Logis tical accessories. In a crisis . Requests to Host countries to disperse the missiles probably would be rejected As provocative. Restraints on the movements of the weapons reflect Europe s haunted memory. The Specter in America s historical memory is Pearl Harbor a Light Ning strike. Europe s obsession is understandably the pint world War which began with mobilizations that became inexorable. Firshing and cruise missiles immobilized by Europe s historical anxieties could be destroyed at their bases by soviet conventional weapons. The administration hails the inf agreement As nit agreements Are hailed As a first step toward grander things. But Wiser Heads Hope it is a last item a prophylactic measure to enable the United Stales to declare an end to arms control in Europe. They Hope it will Anes Thetie Europe s peace movement and America s Amis control Clensy. It is supposed to be arms control to end arms control. It is supposed to ease the pressure on Western parliamentarians who Are under constant Andrew Glass pressure to Cut defense budgets in order to enrich Wel fare stale benefits. But arms control agreements Wocl the firsts they Are supposed to slake. The inf agreement will energize the forces pushing for  of Europe. President Reagan s recent rhetoric a contributed to the Sigma ligation of nuclear weapons the inf agreement will require the soviet to de stroy Many More warheads than the United Stales but that asymmetry is a so ill Price for the soviets to pay Lor the consequent enhancement of conventional forces. To enhance Huron ten Sia Hilly min would require soviet consent to another a metrical reduction this Lime of conventional forces they have no incentive for thai. Military historian Julin Kiegan says the agreement May recover fur i he soviet Union much that it lost in Europe through two postwar blunders. In 1945. The soviet Union withdrew from Yugoslavia thereby forfeiting Access in the Mediterranean. After the austrian treaty it withdrew forces from Hungary tic Ruby igniting the revolt that Cost communism its ideological Elan. But the constant soviet aim Mili Tant dominance or the continent requires neither Mediterranean Access nor ideological Elan. Soviet military dominance is advanced by agreements hat reduce nuclear forces without reducing conventional forces. The inf agreement rest on the fallacy thai any subtraction from nuclear inventories makes the world safer. The soviet approach to arms control has nothing to do with control As the Western Public understands in nothing to do with reducing wit importance of weapons in Trie relations Between nations. Rather the soviets use arms control to impede the West s procurements and deployments to Channel arms Competition in directions disadvantageous to the Ecsi and to produce detente the climate conducive to soviet parasitism he theft and subsidized Purchase of Western technology. The closest one can come to Good reasons for accept ing the inf agreement is this arms agreements arc inevitable. Democracies demand them. This is minimalist arms control it is strictly speaking the least we can do. And perhaps the Recrudescence of detente can be minimized. Wuhl Rutan pail Worms g Oua soviets would have Europe behave like the finns the Hardy finns live in a capitalist style democracy sharing the same Basic values As embraced by inc Ameri can Constitution. Yet the finns won t Lead the charge at the United nations in condemning the soviet atrocities in Afghanistan nor will they complain about soviet violations of human rights accords underwritten by the soviets in Helsinki the finnish capital in 197j, strict finnish neutrality follows Ituk finnish geography Finland is the Only democratically governed nation to share a major Border with the soviet Union. Russia actually ruled he country from 1809 10 1917, and. In the l4 h. He russians beat the finns in two separate wan a calamity thai the finns won t soon forget. Now a pome soviet goal is to hive no Western Europe behave Itle finns. De spic the billions of Julian Hiji the United Stales and us european Illin put into nato every year such an outcome can l be dismissed. For nearly four Draun. Nato has served As a needed defensive bulwark needed by Caw both communist theory and common i tanks remained poised to pounce in response 10 weakness Lenin and Stalin us inc capitalist sys tem As doomed ready to crumble under a red tide both sought to roil the Waters so a u move the inevitable destructive proc so along. All that changed in Mikhail Gorba Chev s Russia Gorbachev rejects the Leninist do clime of historical inevitability. Yet the critical implication of that revert a has l made a Dent on he Rote formulas driving policy in a tired Washington Alexander Roy in a key Gorbachev Man. U i. Above All in should be acknowledged that the ability of capitalism to adapt to the new historical Selling has surpassed our . The Prospect of socialist transformations in developed capitalist countries has receded Indef  this profound ideological shift helps fuel an apparently successful Kremlin drive to conclude an arms pact one aimed at excluding . And soviet medium and Short Range nuclear weapons from Continental Europe. Those mis Siles comprising about 3 percent of the world s nuclear arsenals Are political weapons with no bearing on the Strate Gic balance. That s precisely Why they serve As such a potent Index of change. Richard Nixon the very Model of a modern cold Warrior privately fears that Gorbachev will soon propose gelling rid of Battlefield nuclear weapons As Well. Nixon knows such a notion is api to gain a sympathetic response from anti nuclear european voters. Both Nixon and hem Kissinger be Lieve efforts to Denu Clarize Europe would weaken rather than enhance. Western Security because the soviets would then hold he High cards while tacking their current constraints against playing them1. Sen. Sam Nunn wit More constituents in his native Georgia than the entire population of Finland shares similar concerns Over he soviet bloc s massive superiority in conventional weapons. But they miss he thrust of Gorba Chev s next european Gathil an offer to disarm with verification in the conventional Arena As Well the sour Leader has already tested his build Dawn plan on his communist cohorts in Warsaw and Prague. As a first step Gorbachev would have each Side destroy its surplus stocks in whatever category of weapons in sur passes the other. The goal would be Genu Ine parity and equal Security fairly de fined. Thai notion could catch on quickly Eyen though until recently it s been a fanciful dream since the russians had no desire to buy in. Now. When Gorbachev Speaks of taking a real i in v Lew of what is. Happening around  he Means Long standing soviet military doctrines no longer make Siruc. For 40 years Moscow s threats failed to cower Western Europe. It s Only As those threats recede that europeans might begin thinking Ike i inns