European Stars And Stripes (Newspaper) - December 14, 1988, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Viator next Frontier human frailty in the cockpit by Laura Parker Washington Poste Ach of the last hires latal air crashes in Iho United states involving major airlines occurred on takeout. Each involved lapses in Pilot Jittu aliveness shortly before tic pushed inc throttles to the Watt. The similarities raise troubling questions about the slain o airline Pilot discipline and raining Nifte ability of Iho government to oversee such programs and the Industry s Atchis ligation in coping wish pita error. Consider this1 in Dol Ioil in August 19b7. Two Northwest airlines pilots forgot to sol the Jet s Wing flaps. Their plane crashed onto a  the end of the Airport. In Denver two months later two Continental if lines pilots waiting to take Oil in a snowstorm chatted with a Light attendant instead of monitoring Hejcl s wings Tor signs of icing they crashed near the end of the run a in Dalian Las aug. 31, three Delta air lines pilots carried an a wide ranging and lengthy conversation with two flight attendants while taxiing to the runway. The plane slammed to Earth shortly after becoming Airboro a Public hearing by the National transportation safety Board a tsp into Tho Cau Soof the Dallas crash entered on haps the haps were found in the rear acted Pofi tinn and investigators Are exploring the disturbing possibility that the aviation system in one year suffered to accidents in which the pilots did not set the flaps. Tho Industry has known or years song before any it these to Nice cashes that roughly t to thirds of aviation accidents Are caused by Pilot error. Yet the study of human performance is Slilo in its infancy compared to the Advance of technology. Billions of dollars have been spent since the Dawn of the Jet age perfecting the machine while Little has been invested in exploring the dimensions of lha human mind. After 30 years the machine is spectacular some aircraft can literally take Oft Fly and land by themselves. But the Industry has had so much trouble grappling with human frailties in the cockpit that the problem has been Given a mechanical engineering Lila the study of human factors. In almost every phase of aviation we have pushed the frontiers of human Krott lads. But we have nol pushed the tron Liers of human  said Clark Onstad. An executive for the Texas air corp., which owns Continental and Eastern airlines. The Federal aviation administration Faa has known Lor More than a decade of Pilot training techniques to encourage pilots to act As a team to guard against blunders by an individual. But lha Agency has taken Only tentative Steps toward requiring airlines to teach it to their pilots. A plan to develop cockpit resource management. As the training is called was written by the Faa in 19b3 after a rash of Pilot caused crashes in the late 1970s, but the project was never funded. Research was nearly at a Sian Dolfl until the Detroit Accident in which 156 people perished rolled the Faa into resurrecting the concept. Last month the Faa launched a project with he. Airlines to refine raining procedures. But that program is still at least a year from becoming final. Among Many research experiments he government s aviation scientists invested five years in the Early t9sos trying to concoct a lire resistant Jet Luel to porn emf passengers from burning to death in a crash. Bui the Faa which employs 49.000 people still does. Not employ a human factors specialist with proper academic credentials. Eho Tito minimize Pilot error have resulted in computerized Coe Kila such a in this Boeing 757, there Are very Lew people trained in the human Sii of it said Joseph Tymczyszyn a psychologist who studies human error for the Boeing co s cockpit Desi engineers when you go to human factors meetings the vast majority of the people have no degree in psychology ii a Guy without an aerodynamics degree showed up at an engineering meriting he d be Launchi Oul of the place. Everybody i hunks he s an expert in human factors Tho general Assumption is we i m a human being therefore i know human factors. We re hiring people with a  who specialize in human behaviour and they re talking to people Al the Faa with no training in whatsoever. We see that As a big  Dan Beaudette the Faa s Deputy in charge of High standards concedes the Faa has been slow to move into this Arena. But he said Nifte government s inertia merely re Lleces a larger inertia thai extends throughout the Industry. Many people Are uneasy with human factors Beaudette said. It questions things like judgment an leadership in the cockpit re sighs Are difficult to measure. Avtalion is a conservative business run by engine and business executives who Are Lar More comfor lat dealing with cause and effect. Accident x was cause by the failure of system y. The research has naturally tended toward the clearly identifiable payoff Alti Tulfo Alert systems win Shear warning devices inboard computerized maps. It s very easy in 19bb to calculate the lilt on a win the drag on an air plane the thrust of an engine said Tymczyszyn. We Don t know Why a human being makes a mistake it s much easier to Analyse a mechanical air plane Inan the human mind no one can prove that the Captain of the continent Iii girl in it Thuei would have paid any More attention 1 Iho weather if he and the co pile had nol been talkie to a Light Alle nannt., no one can say with certainty thai in Detroit the Northwest air lines pilots would have remembered t perform Hal crucial checklist which would have prompted them to sol the traps in they had not Boon talking. If you be got a mechanical problem on an air plane the airline understands it the designer understands i said Haid Stoll who Heads a learn of 12 human factors researchers at Boeing. It is a problem we at throw Money and time at. These Are objective problems. If you have something very subjective you Don t know who should be doing what and you Don i even know whore to be throwing your Money 1 nevertheless Many in the business think it s time i the emphasis to shirt from the engineers 10 the shrink one of those is John Lauber a psychologist and Nosb member who has been pressing human. Performance study for a decade.  then on the research stall of the National aeronautics and space administration research cent in Ames calif., worked with United air lines in the la 1970s when United pioneered new training Lech Niqui alter the Aiti Ine experienced an Accident in. Portland i 1976 that became a textbook Case on Pilot error a Throe Pilot Crew preoccupied with a malfunctioning Landing gear allowed a oc-8 to run out of fuel while circling the Portland Airport Lor an hour. Ten of the in on Board were killed in the crash. Other airlines Havo since developed their version of cockpit resource management training although w varying dog ices of sophistication. The training is expensive it requires the use of multimillion Dollar High simulators and Complex computer programming to simulate dying conditions pc Crews who perform the exercises together nol ail airlines have such n pc Grain. Among those Page 14the stars and stripes