European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - February 24, 1990, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Accord on Europe Anatomy of a decision muscular Bonn prevails on the big four by Thomas l. Friedman with Michael r. Gordon new York times arly tuesday morning. Feb. 13, As foreign ministers from the 23 nato and Warsaw pact nations milled around the main Hall of the Ottawa Congress Center the soviet foreign minister Eduard a Shevardnadze and Secretary of stale James a Baker Iii stood off in a Corner whispering to one another through a russian translator Shevardnadze reported that the soviet Union would Back Down and accept president Bush s proposal Lor troop cuts in Europe which would leave the United states Wilh a 30,000 Man advantage this conversation in Canada was the culmination of several Days of behind the scenes diplomacy that was kept secret not Only from the Public but from Many Allied governments As Well the talks resulted in a new United slates soviet understanding on troop Levels in Europe. But probably More important they also resulted in an arrangement for How the four world War ii allies Britain. France the United states and the soviet Union would Deal with the other major development on the cont enl negotiations Lor a seemingly inevitable reunification of Germany in these latter negotiations the big four once the undisputed overseers of Germany s Fate found themselves having to negotiate with Bonn As a real equal West Germany used its weight in world affairs As Well As the political momentum of change within its Borders and in East Germany to help shape Many of the terms of the Ottawa framework Tor determining How a United Germany will fit into a Post cold War european order a reconstruction of the negotiations based on dozens of interviews in recent weeks found these Steps Bush administration officials worked behind the scenes to consult separately with British French and West German leaders to forge a consensus on dealing with German unification before discussing the matter with Moscow Britain. France and the soviet Union initially preferred that the four Allied Powers discuss the future of Germany among themselves and not. At first with the germans but Washington talked them into bringing the germans in from the Start. Once the germans were brought into the process Bonn insisted on excluding the other nations of the 16 member North Atlantic treaty organization from these discussions the West germans in a bit of muscle flexing wanted to make it Clear thai they would Deal Only with those Allied Powers that had postwar Legal rights in Berlin setting the stage the Wall Falls the allies respond alter the opening of the Berlin Wall on nov. 10, administration officials assumed that the unification process would unfold gradually and that no serious moves on their part would be required until the East German elections then scheduled for May. But on Jan 28. With nearly two thousand East germans still flocking to the West every Day East German authorities announced that they were advancing the election Date to March 18. They simply could not hold the country together until May. Since pro unification parties were expected to sweep the elections. Administration officials realized that a unified Germany was no longer a possibility it was All but a certainly. So the administration decided to come up with its own plan to manage reunification. President Bush consulted with his National Security adviser Brent scowcroft and the Deputy adviser Robert m. Gates and Baker with his key aides Robert Zoellick. State department Counselor Dennis b. Ross the department s director of policy planning and Raymond g h. Seitz. Assistant Secretary of state for european affairs. Seltz eventually produced a version of the plan adopted at Ottawa. It became known As the two plus four concept. Under this formula after the East German elections were Over the two Germany would get together and discuss their economic political and Legal unification. After that the United Stales Britain Franco and the soviet Union would sit Down with the two Germany and discuss the size of the army their unified state might have its relationship Lonato and Security guarantees Lor its neighbors Baker and president Bush decided thai they would keep the iwo plus four idea closely held and begin secretly polling the three other allies one by one. They would not Tell the other members of nato until and unless there was an agreement among the Lour plus the two Germany. The first serious discussion of the idea took place on Jan. 29, when the British foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd met Wilh Baker in Washington. Hurd who had been thinking along similar lines indicated that his government s preference a Ould be four plus Zero that is the four Allied Powers getting together to discuss the Fate of Germany at first without the germans nevertheless he gave London s backing to two plus four. Four Days later the West German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher hew to Washington for a private Chat Wilh Baker during which Baker first Laid out the two plus four idea to him Genscher liked it but he wanted to make certain that it was two plus Lour and not four plus two that is he wanted to make sure that the two Germany would first determine the nature of their unification on their own and then Deal with the other Powers on external Security issues. Genscher also told Baker that his government would have nothing to do with a "2-plus-15" arrangement the two Germany and the 15 other members of nato deciding the German future. Nor would he accept four plus  he also said that West Germany would not put its future in the hands of the 35 members of the conference on Security and cooperation in Europe. Two plus four he said was just right. On feb. 5, Baker began a rip to Eastern Europe and the soviet Union. At the last minute his schedulers added a Slop in Shannon. Ireland at 5 . For a meeting with the French foreign minister Roland Dumas during the one hour talk Dumas also signed on to the two plus four concept but Only alter saying that his first preference was also Lour plus Zero " As the reunification negotiations progressed pressure was building in the United states and in Europe for Bush to propose a deeper Cut in soviet and american conventional forces in Europe than he had presented to nato leaders in May. At the urging of scowcroft Gen Colin l. Powell chairman of the joint chiefs of staff developed the plan to Cut american and soviet troops in Central Europe to 195.000. Wilh the United states keeping 30,000 soldiers elsewhere in the Region meetings in Moscow visit by Baker a turning Point on feb. 7, Baker flew into Moscow. That night he had a private meeting with Shevardnadze and tried to bring up Germany but the soviet official said that topic would have to be taken up Wilh president Mikhail s. Gorbachev himself. The next morning Baker presented the two plus four concept to the soviet Leader As they sat around a huge table in the Kremlin s Catherine Hall. Gorbachev was intrigued by the two plus four idea but noncommittal. He too made it Clear that he shared the British and French preference for four plus  one of the things that is very striking about dealing with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev right now is that they will listen to your  a senior state department official said. These Are not stylized discussions. They tend to be very relaxed when you make a Case that they think is reasonable they will come right Back and Tell you Well you know that s reasonable and there was quite a bit of that in to discussion on the  but the German question was not the Only Issue Baker had to discuss with the soviets. There was also the question of How they would respond to president Bush s troop proposal Wilh its insistence on american troop superiority in Europe. This was to drive Home the Point that the soviets who were in Europe As occupiers might have to leave at the Behest of their allies but that the americans were there by invitation and would not be leaving entirely. Gorbachev accepted the Basic principle of lower troop Levels but gave Baker a counterproposal both sides would go Down to either 195,000 men or 225,000 men but not 195.000 for the soviets and 225.000 for the americans. Administration officials say they believe that this idea May have been generated by the soviet arms control bureaucracy and that Gorbachev decided he had nothing to lose by seeing if he could Bluff the americans into accepting it Success in Ottawa a Deal is struck on troop cuts Baker loft Moscow without a soviet answer to the German question and Wilh the troop proposal in limbo. Just As Baker was packing to leave the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his foreign minister Genscher. Were arriving for their own meeting Wilh Gorbachev. Baker decided that in order to avoid creating any impression of the United states and the soviets without the British and the French deciding the Fate of Germany he would avoid any personal Contact with Kohl in Moscow. Instead Baker sent Kohl a three Page for your eyes Only note laying out Gorbachev s reactions to the two plus four idea. Baker then look Oil Lor Bulgaria and Romania on his Way to a conference in Ottawa on the open skies proposal for air missions Over other nations territories. While in Ottawa Baker Genscher Hurd. Dumas and Shevardnadze who were supposed to be dealing with open skies were in fact simply going from one meeting with each other to another. Most of the other nato and Warsaw pact foreign ministers did not have a clue Aslo what they were talking about. Baker s private Secretary Karen Jackson carried around the schedules of each of the other ministers which were constantly being updated. For instance the soviets would Call to say that Shevardnadze was going to be at his embassy for 30 minutes and then in his suite for an hour and after that Back in the conference Hall so that Baker could track him Down at any moment. A Baker aide mused that if anyone was tapping the phone Calls Between the ministers they would have heard some of the most momentous issues in postwar politics being discussed with stunning frankness. At several Points Baker was logging Back and Forth Between meetings with Genscher and Shevardnadze. Page 14 the stars and stripes saturday feb