European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - February 26, 1991, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Tuesday february 26, 1991 the staffs and stripes Pago 13 commentary David Hoffman allies determined to penalize Saddam Iraq with the liberation of Kuwait considered a certainty by the United states and its allies the main questions about the enormous land assault presi Dent Bush has launched Are How severely it will punish Iraq whether it. Will end Short of a fight All the Way to Baghdad and what the Cost will be to the coalition forces. How much punishment to mete out to iraqi president Saddam Hussein was the real focus of differences Between . And soviet initiatives to end the War. Both plans called for Iraq to leave Kuwait a either in seven Days As Washington demanded or 21 Days As Moscow and Baghdad agreed. But while the soviets wanted to shield Saddam from further damage in Exchange for withdrawal the United states and its partners have insisted that the economic penalties outlined in 12 United nations Security Council resolutions be imposed along with iraqis ejection from Kuwait. At the same time a ground assault will inflict far More permanent damage on iraqis military strength. Washington and some but not All of its allies also Hope the ground offensive will help achieve the far More elusive goal of making it impossible for Saddam to remain in Power. But there is no sure calculation of How to attain such an objective How much the Pursuit of it would increase the risk of casualties or How far to go before turning Back. A a a a a. A a a a \. Some members of the Alliance appear willing to live with an outcome in which Saddam is forced out of Kuwait but remains in Power however weakened. A this is a Guy not prepared to say surrender even if we Force him out and even if his forces surrender a said a senior administration policy maker. A the May Well try to maintain a state of belligerency and keep on fighting for the a Arab  what you re going to see is him defiant but less and less capable of doing any thing about  within the administration the worst Case scenario is that Saddam will use chemical weapons to provoke the allies into taking the War deep inside Iraq in an Effort to destroy the regime. Ideally officials Hope that the pressures of the War and the humiliation of a forced ejection from Kuwait will Lead forces inside Iraq to remove Saddam from Power and end the War. They Hope that the destruction of Basic services in Iraq such As electricity and water along with the punishment already inflicted on Saddam a troops from the air and the damage done to civilian infrastructure such As Bridges and communications facilities will Lead some elements in the military to conclude that Saddam must be ousted. A. Officials noted that the mayor of Baghdad said recently that the City had been so badly damaged that its future was at stake. A a. A. A a a since the Early Days of the crisis tire administration has contemplated Covert ways to Aid Saddam a downfall but none has proved practical so far because of his tight internal grip. Many predictions that he would be overthrown a and even Bush a open invitation to iraqis to do so a have not had any visible result. But senior . Officials said they Are More confident now than before the War that they have weakened Saddam and made it More difficult for him to survive for Long after the War. If he remains in Power Saddam will be a vulnerable on the inside a according to a senior administration policy maker. Another analyst with extensive knowledge of Iraq who is familiar with administration thinking said there Are clearly a divided councils a in the iraqi military. Quot the military is a  Dent institution a this analyst added. Quot they can be under no illusions us exit what a  despite Saddam a Well known insularity. The analyst said a in critical situations people have confronted him Quot including his generals during Iraq s War with Iran Quot i could believe the military is doing that now a he said v a for some time Saddam seemed to he trying to entice the allies into a land War in the belief that the costs in casualties would be intolerable and would Force the coalition eventually to lose heart and give up. But the air War appears to have weak Ned his military to the Point where Iraq offered a series of major concessions including agreement to withdraw totally from Kuwait in soviet brokered talks. This shift seemed to indicate that Saddam had lost Confidence in his ability to inflict such casualties on the Alliance the senior administration policy maker said. By t o  Ide analysts and and m i n i so a Iralien officials acknowledge that the chemistry of fac it Muliet would change if it became a fight Over iraqi soil while Saddam a military May be weary of defending Kuwait according to these analysts and officials a ground Battle inside Iraq would be much More complicated  sense that Iraq was defend Quot ing itself from  this re i son officials said they Hope the land combat will Stop Short of making deep thrusts into Iraq in his statement saturday night announcing the beginning of the ground of Tensive the president defined the objective of coalition forces As ejecting iraqi forces from Kuwait and did not mention the Prospect of fighting in Iraq itself. A a a c tto Washington port Thomas l. Friedman . Role in Gulf be a a a a a a a i a. T. A a. For one Brief moment As the clock struck noon saturday a certain clarity enveloped the persian Gulf crisis. The choices for iraqi president Saddam Hussein were Crystal Clear humiliating surrender or military defeat. A. A. A America and its allies were convinced their moral Case was Clear Good is evil. And the final outcome the coalition was promised would also be Clear the total liberation of Kuwait one Way or another. America and its allies would have done Well to savor that moment because once the fighting ends High noon saturday May be remembered As the last time anything about this conflict was Clear. Why because the clarity of this defining moment was produced by two very unusual and fleeting elements. First so much of the attention until now has been focused on achieving definable military objectives with High tech weapons. A. In that sense the clarity has been mesmerizing. Americans have been taken through their televisions into the nose cameras of smart bombs As they follow laser beams onto targets in Iraq. The enduring image is of perfect bulls eyes time after time. A a second As the Story evolved from one about defending Rich kuwaiti sheiks to one about defeating an evil dictator in Iraq it assumed a moral clarity Tor Many americans unlike anything since the War against Hitler. Saddam was a mail order despot right out of a catalogue. He not Only looked a bit sinister but at every turn acted the pure villain and finally managed to alienate virtually the entire world. \. Since the demise of the soviet a evil Empire a there has been a hunger among americans for a moral clarity to justify and shape their foreign policy and Saddam provided it in Spades. The physical clarity inherent in military action with its clearly defined Means and ends and the moral clarity provided by Saddam have made this a surprisingly popular War. But they have also been distracting in a Way. A they have obscured the fact that there is no comparable political clarity about what exactly we want out of this War and what we can expect to achieve a said Michael j. Sandel a political theorist at Harvard uni. A varsity a a. A a a a a a a i. A what kind of Kuwait do we want what kind of Iraq do we want will the Region establish its own Stu ability or will a permanent american military presence have to Supply it Quot he asked. Quot ther cts still an enormous confusion about our political Aims and there is no laser guided policy to help us. There is no night vision equipment that can Pierce the veils of Middle East politics and define the american role after this War is . Indeed just Over the Clear Cut horizon of this War lies a Forest of ambiguities and paradoxes bathed in Aji Alt  take the question of the Quot new world order a and the middie East. Fur Antei ieans allies saudi Arabia and Kuwait this War is not being fought to build a new order but to rebuild the status quo. W hat these societies want out of this War is not to give birth to jeffersonian democracy but to go Hack to their insular worlds where women cannot drive and no Western reporters roam the streets where Iraq will no longer be a threat and where everyone will abide by the unwritten rules and limits of the neighbourhood known As the Middle East without foreign policemen. There Are certainly Many worse governments and societies on the face of the Earth than those being pro acc cd in the persian Gulf so the fact that they will be strengthened or preserved by this War is no crime. But will it be very satisfying. Another Paradox that lies ahead arises from the tremendous resentment Between the haves and have not in the Arab world a resentment iraqis invasion of Kuwait exposed. The United states is expecting that after c the War there will be some sort of redistribution of wealth to help prevent a repetition. _ but the War itself is costing saudi Arabia so much that it has had to borrow Money on the world capital markets to finance it and the kuwaitis will need every Penny they have saved a and More a just to rebuild their  other words after this War is Over the haves Are not Likely to have anything left for the have not. And even if they did the fact that the have not a Jordan Yemen Sudan and the palestinians All supported Iraq in this War already has the Arab Oil states saying privately that they deserve nothing. C new York Tirres Quot. A t. The opinions expressed in the columns and cartoons on this Page represent those of the an hours and Are in no Way to be considered As representing the views of the stars and stripes or the United states government