European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - July 19, 1991, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Friday july 19, 1991the stars and stripes Page 13 Leslie h. Gelb Bush the real blundered in the fateful weeks before iraqis invasion of Kuwait was not ambassador april c. Glaspie but president Bush a and or top Ahab acting in his name. The senators who Are investigating the matter should look beyond the weak messenger to the senders and their message. Here is what is now evident based on the previously secret telegrams that flashed Between Washington and Baghdad one year ago first As Saddam Hussein a threats against Kuwait mounted the state department instructed Glaspie to give the iraqis a conciliatory message punctuated with a few indirect but significant warnings. Second Glaspie apparently omitted the warnings and simply clobbered All Over Saddam in their meeting july 25, while he threatened Kuwait anew. Third on july 28, just Days before the iraqi attack Bush responded to Saddam with an Echo of the weak Glaspie line. The response lacked even the hints of steel present in the original state department instructions and inexplicably did not mention the 100,000 iraqi troops spotted on the Border. This All becomes Public now As the Senate foreign relations committee with the Long sought telegrams finally in hand was poised to skewer Glaspie on Friday. The confrontation was triggered last fall when Iraq released a transcript of the Glaspie Saddam conversation that contained no . Warnings. Summoned before the committee to explain Glaspie denied the transcripts accuracy and insisted she had been Tough. Today she will stand by that line and say that her Telegram which often contradicts her testimony focused on Saddam a thinking and not on her Tough rejoinders. The committee will find that hard to believe. Her Telegram is virtually identical in substance to the iraqi transcript. And she never flagged the incompleteness of her Telegram in previous testimony. Glaspie deserves a Strong reprimand for her misleading testimony but the More important Story is in the other telegrams. On july 19, the state department asked Glaspie to stress Friendship with Iraq but also say the . Was a com commentary fumbled the Ball with Saddam fitted to ensure the free flow of Oil from the persian Gulf and to support the sovereignty and integrity of the Gulf  indirect but Good. It went on a we will continue to defend our vital interests in the  better still. It added a Nice touch about being a strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self defense of our friends in the Gulf. These Points had All been made the Day before by a mid level state department official to iraqis ambassador in Washington. A second state department Cable july 24 called on Glaspie to reiterate the Standard line about the United states having a no position on Arab Border disputes and to warn that settlement of disputes by Force was a contrary to . Charter  an unexplained softening from the july 19 Cable. Then came the Glaspie Cable of july 25, in which she apparently neglected to note . Readiness to support the sovereignty of Gulf states and its vital interests there. A in the spirit of Friendship a she asked Saddam Why his troops were on the Kuwait Border. Her toughest line. On july 28, the state department wired what it identified As a message to Saddam from president Bush. The departments Arab experts wrote it but no one seems to remember who approved it or if Bush saw it. A we believe that differences Are Best resolved by peaceful Means a Bush said. A we will also continue to support our other friends in the  nothing about vital interests Protection of sovereignty the 100,000 iraqi troops hovering Over Kuwait. Why Why this further softening in the presidents name just As things were heating up Why never once in this period did a senior administration official deliver a Tough warning on feb. 11, almost a month into the War Secretary of state James a. Baker Iii was asked if War might have been prevented by Strong warnings. Quot maybe you might be Able a yes absolutely he answered. But that would take �?o20-20 Hindsight a he put in. Or maybe Bush and his top aides were blinded by their a Friendly mind set and by their inattention to a situation they did not comprehend a until there was no Choice but War. C the new York time Maureen Johnson even the band played a Gorbachev song like Banquo a ghost in Shakespeare a Mac Beth Mikhail s. Gorbachev haunted the group of seven Summit entering late but always on the minds of a wealthy successful cast. President Bush and his colleagues doggedly ranged Over familiar terrain a stumbling negotiations on Trade liberalization drugs global wanning inflation arms control. But always the conversation came Back to what to do about their soviet guest and the embarrassing subject of Money. If anyone wanted to forget the soviets made certain they did no to. On monday hours before the Summit opened Gorbachev a adviser Yevgeny Primakow was on bbl radio warning in an interview that Gorbachev had put his Job on the line by coming to London. A everything depends on the move from the opposite Side a Primakow said turning up the heat on the West. On tuesday Deputy prime minister Vladimir Shcherbakov appeared on Independent television saying that $20 billion to $30 billion in Aid would be very useful. Throughout their three Day Summit the leaders of the United states. Canada Japan Britain France Germany and Italy insisted Gorbachev was not a Mem Ber of the club just coming along for a talk after the gathering was Over. A the Hasni to been Here a observed Canadian finance minister Don Mazankowski fending off the umpteenth question about Gorbachev on tuesday night. And then at dinner at Buckingham Palace the massed bands played if i were a Rich Man and everyone thought of Gorbachev. The London Summit belonged to Gorbachev and his Long letter to the seven nations with its promises of economic Reform its mind numbing terms such As a Odesta Tiz Ationo and its heavy hints of impending disaster. Quot we say we re analysing the letter a a British official remarked. A but really we re just trying to make it out a the pages Arentt even  but they All got the message. A what you hear in the corridors and in the lunch meetings and Over dinner is that everyone is very much aware that the soviet Union is going through a very difficult period of transition a said dutch foreign minister Hans Van Den Broek. A but there a a lot still unclear and its even unclear what we can do with maximum effect to support political and economic Reform Over there a he added. His country was invited because it holds the rotating presidency of the european Community. The other new boy at the gathering British prime minister John major who succeeded Margaret Thatcher seven months ago was doing his Best to show Gorbachev a Good time and invited him to the opera thursday night. Even that was an awkward Choice. The opera was Rossini a Cinderella at covent Garden. A was if a commented the times of London a it Wasny to bad enough coming to a party where you have to explain to the Doorman that although your name Isnit on the official invitation list you Are sure the Host would let you in if he knew you were waiting  and there was the final irony. The big seven know Well the delicate balance Between Public Espousal of Tough economic decisions and private fears of the electoral Cost. Post perestroika Gorbachev has joined the club. Hugo Young columnist in London a Liberal guardian newspaper commented a that or. Gorbachev of ail of them should be the most enfeebled by an unmanageable popular opinion is an irony which Only a heart of Stone could fail to  c the associated press