European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - March 13, 1948, Darmstadt, Hesse In 1 Days foreign minister soul its red Carpi my fight for democracy continued from Page 5 for a peaceful development or Clashin a terrible conflict i wanted to have our state located in the very Center of this conflict and a Brand new state not yet sufficiently integrated in the world by tradition development or. Knowledge to be Well anchored and pre pared so that it could emerge Success. Fully from either diplomatic negotiations " or a military , i tried so far As it was within our Power at All costs to main Tain. The european Allied Camp of 1918 in Unity and cooperation alongside our alliances with France and the states of the Little entente in the conviction that a peaceful solution could be reached Only if Germany should at. The critical moment be faced with a whole coalition of states Only if Germany should fail in its to fort to destroy that Alliance an do Battle against each of us separately one after the other. This was the chief reason Why i worked so steadily from 1922 to 1938 and again during the second world War. For cooperation arid agree ment Between Western Europe and the soviet Union. I n october 1933, when Germany left the disarmament conference and the league of nations i realized that this probably meant that Europe was headed almost inevitably for a terrible military conflict. Germany s representative at a the disarmament conference ambassador Nadolny openly admitted this to me when he was leaving Geneva in october 1933. He added that this latest step of Hitler that is Germany s departure from Geneva was insanity that it meant the beginning of a fearful new tragedy and another terrible defeat of my diagnosis was confirmed by the development of nationalism and nazis min Germany.,the open undisguised pan germanium the uncompromising life and death fight against democracy the purposeful propagandizing of All. Ger mans abroad and their utilization As revolutionary organs against the states where they lived the slogans of Cen trial european Lebensraum and the Herre Volk the bestial anti semitism and the whole primitivism of expression used by its so called Fuhrer to Meall of this was evidence that it was no longer a. Question of two political amps Defeated Germany against the victorious allies but of two totally and irreconcilable worlds which 1 had different ideas Aims and Legal con copts and which would eventually come into open conflict. I added to this the problem of the soviet Union. How would it fit into this european struggle and there would it finally find itself i never agreed with the policy of the Western democracies which isolated the soviet Union for a Long time and excluded it from euro Pean and world cooperation. It seemed to me. That the whole struggle would be decided in favor of the Side toward which the soviet Union finally inclined. Therefore we. Entered into Contact with the soviet Union As Early As at the Genoa conference in 1922 and tried inspire of the opposition of our own right wingers to maintain Friendly cooperation up to the year 1938. Therefore too from the moment when the soviet Union realized the danger of the fas Cist dictatorships and altered its re -4.atiwjs and tactics with the Western democracies and the league of nations. We did everything possible to make the soviet Union the ally of the Western democracies and ourselves. Actual trea ties of Alliance Between the soviet Union and France and Czechoslovakia became a reality in 1935. 1 wish to emphasize that during the first world War and during the entire period up to 1938arid up to today behave never been influenced in this policy by ideological motives deriving from Domestic politics. Our judgment on the necessity of agreement with the soviet Union always has been deter mined exclusively from the viewpoint of Over All european International peace was personally familiar with conditions in the soviet Union. I knew that for some time the regime had. Been very Strong and that any talk about the possibility of an internal revolution fro whatever Side was either simply naive nonsense or malignant purposeful propaganda. I knew the soviet army was. Strong Well organized and still growing. Finally in 1935. I knew thai. The two five year plans had so Funda mentally altered the economic Structure of the soviet Union had become. One of the strongest Industrial states in Europe. Our Conception of european inter National policy and of cooperation wit the soviet Union against aggression and reaction in Germany necessarily required that Western Europe understand the need of adjustment of its social policy in relation to the soviet Union which had undergone a revolution. At the same time it required that the soviet Union seriously consider the adjustment of soviet political and revolutionary elements to the concepts of political Freedom in Western at the very least it required that the two systems exercise Mutual meant to me that Western Europe would be obliged to permit a definitely progressive and truly democratic development in its social and economic policies and that the Western european bourgeoisie would have to be led to Grant considerable social and economic concessions to inclined working it seemed to me that european and world ally demanded this and that it was Well i Worth these n especially grave sign of coming events was the German polish pact of january 26, 1934. It greatly in creased tension Between France and Poland created new tensions Between us and Poland and Between the soviet Union and Poland. This contributed to France s Retreat from Central european to the creation of the Laval Bonnet and Petain cliques thence to Munich tothe terrible defeat of Poland and finally to the capitulation of France itself in june 1940. When polish foreign minister Grzybowski informed me on january 28.1934, of the polish German pact i told him something like this i. I View the signature of your treaty Vith Germany As a grave blow to european policy. It Means that you help Germany avoid any further i to nations on disarmament and Aid Tarm freely. It Means that you abandon the Geneva front and give Germany a Hance to justify an expansionist anti Geneva policy. This Alliance with Gar Many completely vitiate the so Callas French system of european Security and makes a common Eastern from against German aggression impossible minister Grzybowski replied that the four Power pact forced Poland to look out for its own Security and that France and England must let Poland go i s own Way. I said that this Way would Lead solely to the strengthening of German and of Germany s preparations again my Poland and against us. Grzybowska answered that the poles knew that Germany was preparing against . And the pact would certainly not. Last ten years. But he added it might Lead France to the right Road where i would pay More attention to Poland and thus give Poland time to prepare against replied that this calculation v completely wrong. Germany too need time to prepare its expansionist a i Derous plans would be aided in t1"preparations by the pact with to and being twice As Strong As pol. Would gain twice As much time Prei itself twice As thoroughly and to proceed against us All. 1loh March 7, 1936, Hitler dealt Rapean peace a decisive blow by occupying the Rhineland. Czech Oslo Kia and probably also Poland a weekend March 13, fully France French would la draw a Hitler a which to go to democracy Germany i time. I March i done so. Franc error the Termany very Cas acted decision this a cause i Tii Marc thus ill septem Wilh dictated Polis right to even i arranged again while tits Favori in a move me Prince Stojadin rent a this,1936,. In Bui he Wiley Roll Rol. Felted against by
