European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - March 13, 1948, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Report from Czechoslovakia. Continued from Page -19. In the nationalized Industrial plants where communists and left Wing social democrats were in control the strengthened their hand by making party membership a prerequisite for the Good jobs. They concentrated on the leftist members of Trade unions As their greatest Reserve of mass support squeezing opposition elements out of the top posts in the Uro Trade Union federation. The Uro was organized As a task Force for demonstrations general strike or even military action if  these Means the communists had already oiled the machinery of revolution when the hour for the coup was finally decided. A master plan had Bee developed to use All the apparatus at communist disposal with maximum Speed and efficiency. A secret weapon communist action committees organized to seize the reins of local govern ment Vas devised. When a Day finally came there fore everything was in the greatest readiness and it was virtually impossible for the non com my nist majority to fight Back to save their democracy. There were Only two unknown quantities the communists had to reckon with when they launched their coup. The first was presiden Eduard Benes. The second was the social democratic  is difficult for a foreigner to appreciate the preeminent position Bene Sheld in Czechoslovakia at the opening of the revolution. Chief executive for along As most czechoslovak can re member he had become a living Symbol of his country s love of democracy. It was with this immense moral prestige plus a definite if limited number of constitutional Powers that Benes could have confronted the communists As they massed their forces for revolution. There was a whole series of Steps which the communists knew and feared he might take. The first would have been to have called Gott Wald to meet with the Cabinet ministers who had resigned in protest against communist control of the Security police. He might have demanded that they immediately compose their differences within the framework of the then existing National front coalition. It would have been almost impossible for the communists to reject this de Mand if they hoped to retain an popular support. _ Benes might have told Gottwald that he would not approve any Cabinet which did t include the resigning ministers. When the prime minister. Maintained that the ministers no longer represented the progressive elements of their parties Benes might have insisted that these parties Call congresses to elect of their own free will substitutes for the men who resigned. He was duty bound to demand that the minister of Interior disband the action committees which were constituted entirely outside the parliamentary democracy he had vowed to uphold. Benes might have called for new elections As the. Opposition leaders pleaded with him to do. This was definitely one of his constitutional prerogatives and it was the last thing in the world the communists would have wanted to happen. Failing in All else Benes might have played his final card. He could have resigned spoken out clearly and forcefully against the communists As usurpers As he once spoke out against Hitler and by so doing United three fourths of the country in opposition to the communists. However even with the president the communist leaders had played their cards carefully. They knew that he feared almost above All else perhaps even More than dictatorship a civil War in his country. They reckoned on the fact that he was a sick old Manfor whom a decision any decision would not come easily. They Gamble that under threat of bloodshed and violence he would come to their  Gamble was Correct. The second unknown which remained at the beginning of the Revo Lution was the social democratic  until last november the social democrats led by a left Winger Dene Knierlinger had collaborated very closely with the communists. However at their party convention in Brinn the social democrats had booted Zierlinger out of office As chairman gone on record for greater cooperation with the  parties and elected a Moder ate Bohumil Lausman As the new party chairman. But once again the communists mad their calculations shrewdly. When the social democrats did not immediately join the other opposition Par ties in the Cabinet walkout the communists immediately  Initia Tive. They figured that the social democrats would succumb to the Promise of powerful representation in a hew socialist government. So they combined this Promise with Blunt threats that so Cial democrats would be branded along with other parties As reactionary unless they joined the communists. The combination of threat and prom ise worked perfectly on Bohumil Lausman. Ignoring the mandate that the party s rank and file had Given Himin november he gave in to the communists. The second Uncertain element had been dispensed with. With both Benes and the social democrats taken care of the communists moved ahead with the precision of clockwork. What they did and How they did it is history history that will certainly be taught to communist tacticians of the future As a lesson  a. Model  the coup began on Friday. By tues Day the opposition had been silenced. By wednesday a new government clothed in All the forms of legality had been approved by the president. It was Quicksand Slick a grim Monument to communist thoroughness and efficiency i destroying the democracy of a people who cherished but could no longer defend that  City Square in Prague was scene of communist rally and speech by prime minister Gottwald demanding president Benes s acceptance of coup. My fight for democracy continued from Page 7 were wringing us. I spoke  and without diplomatic formulas. We do not want War i said. We know that if you should be the ones to win the War you would want to Takeaway As much of our territory As pos sible and purge All the so called Ger Man districts in Czechoslovakia of All czechs we Are Well aware of this and we Are preparing for it i told Hitler s representatives that the German proposal would inevitably Force us to cancel our treaties wit France and the soviet Union and resign from the league of nations. But added the czechoslovak government was determined to fulfil the obligation sit had taken on itself at All costs. Hit Ler s delegates with ironic smiles immediately replied that after All signing a pact with Germany would not require such a step from   had not done it. Czechoslovakia in Case Ger Many should go to War with any of these states would simply fail to put it treaties into action they said. I was astounded by their meter predation and especially that they  seem in the least ashamed of their. Cynical proposal that we prepare in and Vance to break treaties we had signed. After a Short discussion during which i stated that under these Circum stances we could come to no agreement both negotiators asked me to give them my own proposal. I replied at once that the Accord should be based on the Al. Ready existing German czechoslovak arbitration treaty signed at Locarno october 16, -1925. I proposed to prepared draft text and Send it to Berlin. Both delegates accepted my proposal expressing satisfaction on their discussions. But they did not return to Prague again and no reply was Ever received to my draft text which assent to  later ascribed the stoppage of negotiations to1 indiscretion i Czechoslovakia. It appeared that von Neurath who opposed an agree ment with Czechoslovakia had found out. What was going on. The truth however was that my Conception of the proposed treaty was never acceptable to the leaders of the third Reich. Under my proposal the Ger mans would also not gain any new possibilities for the Legal penetration of German fascism into Czechoslovakia. On the contrary my draft emphasize respect for our democracy and indeed completely blocked the goal toward which Hitler s proposal aimed. In the Middle of january 1937 i received unofficial information from Ber Lin to the effect that the negotiation were considered there As having failed together with a strictly confidential remark that Hitler was now carrying on other negotiations which if Success Ful might have some effect on our affairs As Well. As we discovered from an unconscious slip of the Tongue by Trautt Manns Dorff these other negotiations were with the soviet anti Stalin conspirators marshal to Kachevsky Rykov and others. Hitler fully believed these negotiations would be successful an therefore for the time being had no further interest in pressing conclusion sin our Case. It would truly have profoundly altered the whole european situation had he succeeded in Over turning the soviet regime but Stalin acted in time. I immediately informed Alexandrovsk soviet minister i Prague about what i had Learned from Berlin from the  Czechoslovakia we watched the events of 1934-37 with mounting fear and worry. I Felt horrified at this spectacle of Europe s collapse. Again and again i asked myself where it All could end. I Felt almost physically How piece by piece the life work of Masaryk and myself was crumbling. Yet until the Day of. Munich i never gave up my Hope that somehow it would be pos sible by some act to reverse the trend and prevent a new european War. I therefore did everything within my Power to prevent the catastrophe. In 1935, when president Masaryk resigned and i was elected president i Felt that Europe was Rushing toward great conflict i knew that we could not avoid being drawn in for it was. Certain that the conflict would arise in Ger Many. , decided to give firs place to building up our army and began to throw myself into this work with More Energy than i had Ever Given to anything else before. It is a fact that in the summer of1938 our army in spite of. Its Short comings which we never concealed was one of the Best in Europe both in spirit and equipment. Our officers corp was second to none. Even the experience of the second world War has change practically nothing in its main con " cents its practices or military  was always proud that when we mobilized in september 1938 we were really prepare d for War. I have sometimes been reproached that All this was use less that after Munich we got to Good out of. It anyway. True but what Wouldhave been said to us if we had been As unprepared As for. Example France an England. My second task was to strengthen and Rescue what could still be saved in our system of. Alliances. As president i made three official trips to Romania Yugoslavia and France. I went toromanian for the Little entente session in june 1936. I found there the firs open break in the Little entente made by the yugoslav Regent Prince Paul on my official trip to Yugoslavia in aprim936,1 was received with enthusiasm by the yugoslav people but dryly and confusedly by the yugoslav dictator and his soldiers formerly so enthusiastic about the Little entente. I became con Vinced that official Belgrade was Al ready completely Over on the other . Declared that if there should be War among the great Powers Yugo Slavia would remain Neutral. I asked whether they could for one moment think that they could avoid being drawn into a War in which Germany and Italy fought. I added that in Prague we cherished no such naive illusions. The remained Neutral exactly As Long As it was convenient for Germany and  France was already oriented toward appeasement. The critical moment came on april 10, 1938, with the formation of the Daladier government with Bonnet As foreign minister. This government reoriented French policy away from its Central european alliances. Already the whole of Central Europe except for us no longer had any common policy with  was a Man who Long before this had never failed on various Occa Sions to Point out that he was not present at Versailles that he was no tone of the 1919 peace treaty makers that it was necessary to adjust to new developments that France could not. Afford to worry about the collapsing Central european states. His personal openly negative and contemptuous even derisive remarks about Poland and. Romania were at that time know everywhere. Georges Bonnet was known As apolitical Gambler and a cynical political compromised for whom any Means was Good if it led to the desired end. Hews a typical politician. It was a com Mon practice for him to have several or at least two policies at once. As minister he sent out telegraphic Handwritten instructions in Accord with official declarations of his  the same time  gave Oral orders in a completely opposite sense betray ing his own Public statements. He nor Mally kept in a country with which hews negotiating both an official Dele Gate for his first policy and a confidential representative for his second. He was a Priori opposed to any sort of Deci Sive or military resistance to Hitler s expansionism. He would have liked almost to see a military conflict Between nazism and bolshevism. This is the first of a series office articles by or. Benes. 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