European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - May 20, 1989, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Page 10 the stars and stripes columns Anthony Lewis Bush blinded by disarmament visions of fhe pc ref last year s treaty on intermediate Range nuclear forces required the soviet Union to dismantle the 239 ss-23 missiles it had in Europe. Soviet officials had argued that the ss-23 s Range was just below the 300-mile threshold set in the treaty but to meet american concerns they agreed to include it. Suppose inc United states had Learned last week that the . Planned to modernize its Short Range ss-21 missiles to Europe. The present 72-mile ss-21 would be replaced by a new version with a Range of 280 Miles. That modernization would be within the letter of the inf treaty because the new ss-21 would go less than 300 Miles. But would the Bush administration be Content with that Legal justification of course not. It would be outraged. It would Sec the soviet move As a Tricky Way of replacing the dismantled ss-23s with a new missile that can hit tar gets almost As far away. The imagined scenario May help us to do what we find so hard understand the soviet reaction to . Plans to modernize the Short Range Lance missile. The replacement would extend the Lance s present 72 mile Range to 280 Miles. The soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze took a Tough line on the Lance plan while visiting Bonn last weekend. If the modernization went ahead he said Moscow might Stop dismantling ss-23s thus violating the inf treaty. The soviet objection to a new 280-mile Lance has no apparent basis in the inf text. The treaty allows either party to deploy new missiles with a Range under 300 Miles. More Var the threat to violate the treaty is an unconvincing tactic and a foolish one. To break the out standing Concrete result of .-sovict negotiations in inc Gorbachev Era would hardly fit Gorbachev s Calls for negotiation on Many additional arms cuts. But if you look at the Lance modernization plan from the viewpoint of soviet generals and politicians their reaction is not hard to understand. Here we arc destroying our ss-23 missiles the soviet leaders might say. We included them in the inf treaty As a gesture to the americans. Now they repay us by proposing to deploy a new missile with a Range almost exactly the same As our prohibited is 23s" there is no reason to believe that the . Officials who planned inc Lance replacement thought about How it would appear in soviet eyes. The plan bears the signs of something produced by William Safire not1he . Ift the vow reduce. Military momentum without careful thought about inc political consequences. The existing Lance missiles have Long been scheduled for replacement in inc 1990s. But it is Only in recent months thai the increase in Range to 280 Miles has become part of the plan. The Bush administration has been equally devoid of pm pathetic understanding of How our nato allies feel about the proposed Lance replacement. This inability to Sec the problem through others eyes has led to conflict with the West German govern ment and the developing crisis in nato. Unlike Many arms questions the Lance Issue docs not Divide on Hawk Dove lines. Thus Paul Nitzsc. Who was president Reagan s senior arms control adviser warned the Bush administration against its strategy of insisting on deployment of new lances in West Germany while flatly rejecting Bonn s idea of negotiating with the soviet Union to reduce the number of Short Range nuclear missiles in Europe. I cannot think of a German who would agree to that Nitzsc told Michael r. Gordon of inc new York times. Many of the allies think it is a crazy propose  president Bush and Secretary of state Baker argue that it is dangerous even to talk to Moscow about Short Range nuclear weapons while the Warsaw pact maintains conventional superiority to nato forces in Europe. But Here again there is a difference in our allies perception that we do nol seem to understand. Many political and military leaders in Western Europe now question the Assumption of Warsaw pact  today they ask can conceive of the polish and hungarian divisions included in Warsaw pact num Bers joining in an attack on nato How can it Hurt nato to negotiate toward a lower balanced deployment of Short Range missiles when that would require far deeper cuts on the Warsaw part Side the world of International Security is in a time of fundamental change. But Bush and his officials offer Only a blinkered vision of the past.  Gorbachev visit to China a blow to Freedom have you noticed How everybody confidently asserts thai inc end of the 30-year ideological War Between Moscow and Beijing is a great Boon for Mankind slate department spokesmen say we would Wel come any Steps that would reduce  sound biting members of Congress join the Clurus to reassure us that the red reunion is not detrimental to  the new York times headlines thai the . Is unfazed by Soviel chinese  hordes of journalists swelling the throng at Tiana men Square eagerly spoon out or. Gorby Deng s not to worry strategic soothing syrup. Even Henry Kissinger consulting architect in Rich Ard Nixon s triangular diplomacy which daringly exploited the chasm in the communist world writes in Newsweek that we should not be unduly alarmed by the visit marking the end of the end of the affair. I la co along with not being unduly alarmed if Cangel a Lew Hardy souls to join in being duly alarmed. For free nations the sino soviet rapprochement is not a net plus. We should Slop smiling bravely and pretending that our hand is stronger without the China card in in. Example since the fall of inc Shah in Iran Chinakas been our main land source of Elc chronic Intelli gence about the soviet Union As useful to our Cia As Cuba with its big ear is to the Kab. We pay too Muchin technology transfers to China for these super secret bases but our military apparently insists the information is vital to our National Means of verifying the extent of soviet cheating on arms treaties. With the end of Active hostility Between Moscow and Beijing you can be sure Mikhail Gorbachev privately raised with Deng Xiaoping the subject of curtailing or compromising this american . In regional politics the new cordiality bids foul to consummate the most cold blooded miscarriage of jus Tice in our time the soviets and their Vilna Misc allies arc under pressure to accede to chinese demands Hal Cambodia be returned to the self genocidal Khmer Rouge. This is analogous to bringing Hitler Back to Europe. The rapprochement of soviets and chinese also paves the Way for the reunification of Korea. The Sovi ets support North Korea but have quietly been encouraging the hungarians to Irac heavily with the South koreans. Object merger of the Peninsula and the ejection of  american troops. The pc Gorbachev chinese liked having the americans around in South Korea we arc their asian counterweight to the russians who arc projecting their strength into the Pacific from inc Cam Ranh Bay naval base provided by China s rivals the vietnamese. It is no Accident As asian communists say that our troops have been Welcome the unstated but primary purpose of our military presence in South Korea is to protect Japan from soviet intimidation. In a few More years of sino soviet cooperation we May be finessed out of the far East entirely and Japan will be militarily Iso lated. Now we re into the military fallout of the reunion. An end to sino soviet hostility should mean a reduction in soviet troop strength in the far East. If those men arc mustered out of the red army or transferred Westward As replacements the economic pressure on Moscow to reduce conventional forces in or near the european theater is lessened. And economic pressure is the name of the arms reduction game. Let us not delude ourselves then into believing that this Long demarche is inconsequential or is somehow Good for the Wesl on the naive Assumption that Power politics is no longer a Zero sum game. A continued communist split would better serve the cause of peace and Freedom. What May be Good in the Gorbachev visit and what May overwhelm the misgivings of realists and justify the conventional euphoria arc the unintended consequences the chinese students excuse to Wel come glasnost in a sustained rally More effective than a Riol and Deng s need nol to crack Down on a million protesters with inc whole world s eyes on Beijing. If a big if the crowds of Freedom seekers were to reach a critical mass or if repression were triggered that spills blood without gaining control the great chinese counterrevolution might soon be under Way. In that Case reverberations would be Felt in Warsaw Budapest Tbilisi Kiev and Moscow. That is Why Gorbachev castigated chinese  by All rational standards the sino soviet Summit meeting is a historic Advance for communist leaders i both countries and a setback for Freedom unless it leads to communism s crack up. Only in that unlikely Case would it be not detrimental to our  c no Yolk tymm