European Stars And Stripes (Newspaper) - September 18, 1967, Darmstadt, Hesse                              A reporter s assessment editor s note in the following article Peter Arnett a s pulitzer prize winning War correspondent with the help of other associated press reporters american and vietnamese takes a close look at the fighting efficiency of the South vietnamese forces. Arnett who has spent More than five years in Viet Nam devoted months of research and travelled thousands of Miles to gather the Story. A by Peter Arnett a staff writer the vietnamese army shot through with inefficiency often lacks the will for combat and is increasingly prone to let the americans do the fighting. Fighting statistics and a detailed sur vey of Field operations Bear out this observation. In much of the country the vietnamese military Effort has steadily tailed off As that of the americans in creased. The size of the South vietnamese army has doubled since 1962, yet the number killed has held constant at about10,000 a year. In the first six months of 1967, the army lost 5,495  contrast . Forces having lost 2,532 killed in the first six months of Riveness costs american lives in the ambushing of convoys on roads sup Posedly cleared by vietnamese troops in the mor Taring of . Installations by squads which slip past sleeping Viet namese sentries in sniping by guerrillas who move freely past vietnamese out posts. Troops insist on a a Day week taking saturdays and sundays off while their allies and the Viet Cong go on fighting. American battalions seeking to break up enemy units operate through the night hours. So do the Viet  South vietnamese quit when the Sun goes Down. Many South vietnamese operations Are staged in areas where no guerrillas South vietnamese Ranger crosses flooded Rice Paddy in Delta. A 1966, lost 4,909 in the first six ninth of 1967, when the number of americans engaged had doubled. Nowhere in the country can the South vietnamese military be said to have made real gains against the  Allied forces including the americans the koreans and the australians have wrested vast areas from direct communist control. Events have shown clearly that the vietnamese army must play its role and play it Well if there is to be an Hope of lasting Success against the communists. The american army is clearly limited in the depth it can reach into the Countryside to crush the foe handhold ground. In no instance however have the Al lies been willing to hand Over surveil Lance of any of the territory won to vietnamese units. Allied commanders fear the communists would be in charge again within weeks. An extensive Survey of the Situa Tion established these Points South vietnamese military Ine Fec Are known to be. Huge troop concentrations Are deployed in areas where Small numbers of the enemy Are hidden. Out numbered the communists decline to stand and fight. Only two of the 44 generals in the South vietnamese forces in 1963 Are still holding their rank. The others have been purged. This has sharply impaired morale in the command echelons. Desertions from the South Vietnam Ese army Are running at the rate of 10,000 a month and Are expected to total More than 400,000 by the end of the year. This is twice As Many men As the service lost to Battle casualties. Corruption is common at All Levels of the army. The loss of american lines traceable to vietnamese inaction or incompetence is expected to Rise in proportion to the depth . Forces deploy in the country Side. American battalions already Are operating independently in districts and  americans Are demanding that the United states be Given a command role Over the vietnamese army similar to that held Over South korean Force during the korean War. Frequent visits to the Field with vietnamese units talks with vietnamese and american officers and men and close examination of results of operations give no indication that the Viet namese military has changed much since the Days when it was fighting the communists alone and getting beaten. A typical week of the War shows this trend All too clearly. In this particular week ending aug. 5,the 80 american combat battalions in Vietnam suffered 186 dead and 1,064wounded in operations that ranged from just South of Saigon to the demilitarized one. The 100 battalions of vietnamese regular troops operating in these same regions lost 32 dead and 60 wounded. In that same week . Marine operating in the 1st corps Region lost 110 men killed. The 30 vietnamese battalions in the corps area lost 6 killed. More than 60 per cent of vietnamese killed that week were not in the Viet namese regular battalions. These death occurred at the lowest level of the War among the neglected Low paid Region land popular forces. The Mission of these forces who com prise nearly one half of the total Viet namese armed forces is to defend towns villages and Bridges against the Viet  perform this Mission from mud Brick or Concrete outposts often Cring ing in fear at an approaching enemy Only occasionally attempting to fight Offan attacking Force and usually dying after throwing their weapons away an attempting to run hide or surrender. Such an outpost was overrun three times in this manner on route 4, major artery from Saigon to the Mekong Delta in three nights in late july. Casualties often Are taken without inflicting any upon the enemy. The 479th regional Force company in thu thu District in Long an province has not killed a Viet Cong in its two years of existence. Yet frequent attacks on the company s position have resulted in 12dead and Many wounded among the regional Force men. He statistics indicate that Only one third of the vietnamese killed in the War lose their lives in offensive operations against the enemy. This one third comes from the regular vietnamese units arrayed in 10 infantry divisions one armoured division an airborne Divi Sion and 20 Ranger battalions. These total 285,000 men. The remaining losses come from the283,000 regional and popular forces who live and die in their thousands of out posts scattered across the face of Viet  All american losses Are taken on offensive operations. The official kill ratio of 1 . Dead to 10 of the enemy reflects this aggressive  regular vietnamese army claims a 1-3.6 ratio against the enemy and the popular forces about 1-1. These ratios Are based on enemy killed counts that often Are  battalions stay out in the Field at night As a matter of course to achieve their results. All the battalions of the 2nd brigade . 25th division based out of cd Chi Northwest of Saigon were out 28 nights each in  of the battalions of the nearest regiment of the vietnamese 25th Divi Sion stayed out a single night that month. The americans have proven that Only sustained pressure at All hours can dislodge the Viet Cong from his aggressive stance in the populated regions of the Central vietnamese coast in the Saigon area and in the Delta. No Viet namese unit is prepared to put in that kind of Effort. One of the Best regiments in the Viet namese army the 33rd of the 21st Divi Sion in the Southern Delta spent Only 46battalion Days in the Field in july out of a possible 120 battalion Days that is,30 Days for each of the regiment s four battalions. At no time did a battalion stay out at night not in the operational area anyway. Night duty for a Vietnam Ese battalion is guarding the perimeter of an outpost or a town. A reluctance to come to grip with the enemy has characterized the vietnamese military Effort since the War began in Earnest in 1961 with 15,000 armed Viet Cong guerrillas exploding into action terrorizing villagers blow ing Bridges and overrunning outposts. In the Days of president Ngo Din diem Field commanders were recalled for suffering too Many casualties. The practice of operating judiciously to keep casualties at an acceptable figure Maywell have continued. Whatever the reasons there Cah Beno question that the vietnamese army has failed completely in its Mission of overpowering the communist guerrilla movement. The official statistics Over the year would have you believe otherwise. But there Are statistics and statistics. The statistics Don t say that the ene my was Given the Field of Battle each evening because government forces inthe Delta like to get Home before dark. How then can Progress be measure Din a place like the Mekong Delta still mostly in the Bailiwick of the Vietnam Ese military one Index is the estimated enemy strength 80,000 at last count half of Pacic vietnamese have 20 Ranger battalions. Page 12 stars and stripes monday sell