European Stars And Stripes (Newspaper) - March 5, 1987, Darmstadt, Hesse Page 10 the stars and stripes thursday March 5,1987 columns James Reston Reagan unlikely to change Way of operating de music summarized the critical cause or the fran Contra scandal when he declared hat in was a failure of responsibility and the Tower commissioned no doubt thai this responsibility and this failure was the president s. He will undoubtedly accept that responsibility no mid try to restore Hij credibility but this is a Lime tar Clear thinking and Plain speaking. He has lost the Confidence of Congress and this will not be restored by confessing error and promising to take charge in Hist iwo years. The situation is too serious for that. In tact under any other system of government the parliamentary system for example he would lose a vote of Confidence and we would now be racing an election. So changes will have to to made. Yet president Rea Gan is not now and never has been a Lake charge expect him suddenly id be a Strong president in command of the intricate negotiation thai tie be fore him would be unreasonable and probably unwise he May change i tune and change his team but he snot Likely in fits 77lh year to change his casual ways of doing , Congress would t follow him if he tried. He has completed six years in the White House wit the largest annual budget deficit and the largest Trade deficit 7n the history of the nation. In fact the United Stales is now buying More Agri cultural products abroad than in is Selling and its National debt is now not Only larger than any other nation s today but greater than the debts of All other american president , his conduct or misconduct of foreign policy with the russians and in Central America an the Middle East has divided Congress and confused the North Atlantic Alliance he never really persuaded Congress with his ideological Supply Side economics Al Home or hit Sta wars nuclear policy abroad but blinded the people and intimidated Congress with the magic of his per Sonal popularity which he has now lost in Iran. He lost it not because he delegated his authority but because he delegated if to me wrong people and did not keep his oath of office to see that the Law were faithfully executed. This difficulty he can still repair though the time i Short. He retains the Power of appointment which he has abused for six Long years but he seems to have Learned a lesson in the recent crash. By choosing Howard Baker of Tennessee As his chief of staff in the while House then withdrawing his nomination of Robert a gales As the Cia director and nominating William Webster instead he has recognized that he has no Lime for More unnecessary controversies with Congress. Bui he still Bat a Long Way to could begin by putting his own House in order since nobody elected Nancy. It would also be useful if he resolved the dispute in his own Cabinet Over the control of nuclear weapons. He has made a Start by welcoming Mikhail Gorbachev s offer on intermediate Range missiles and instructing our Geneva negotiators to present a draft treaty in response. This will require a new approach to Congress which Musl ratify whatever agreement is reached it is too late to keep his Promise to balance the budget but so Many unimaginable things have happened recently that it still May be possible to achieve anew balance of Power. This is the presiding problem of world politics an May still be within the president s reach. Franklin Roosevelt faced a similar situation near Heend of world War in mindful of he defeat of the league of nations at the end of the first world War he brought Republican Leaden into negotiations with the Senate to discuss postwar problems and establish the United nations by such foresight he avoided Woodrow Wilson tragic Battles with the Senate. It was Roosevelt s final All his recent troubles might still do the same. There Are Many problems still to be resolve Din the nuclear Geld but this is not a partisan Issue with the new democratic leaders in the House and Senate. In Sam Nunn of Georgia for example the chair Man of the Senate armed services committee the president has a knowledgeable ally in this Field an there arc Many others like him who would help negotiate and ratify a treaty before Reagan retires Only the president however can resolve the differences within his Cabinet and produce the bipartisan policy he says he wants. Nunn and the others can t help him unless they re invited. It it Thui Una so i Tom Wicker Gorbachev made an offer Reagan can t reject the european allies May retaking counsel of their fears but the Rea Gan administration has responded with alacrity 10 Mikhail Gorbachev s new offer to negotiate the removal of medium Range nuclear missiles from Europe. No wonder. Even Richard n. Perl this administration s or. No saw Promise in Gorba Chev s statement which freed the ques Tion of missiles in Europe from linkage to restrictions on president Reagan strategic defense initiative this brings an agreement close enough to touch since Gorbachev and Reagan had worked out in Basic provisions Al the Iceland Summit meeting. Such an agreement not Only would Shore up Reagan s beleaguered administration it would be one for which be could take much credit since his deploy ment of missiles in Europe probably did most to bring it so near to fruition. But the Gorbachev offer awakened the allies old fear of decoupling the concern that the . Intent to defend Europe Wilh nuclear arms if necessary might be weakened. European governments originally pushed for the deployment of american medium Range missiles even though it was unpopular with their Peoples. As response to the deployment of soviet is 20s. They reasoned that if Moscow use these medium Range missiles in an attack on Europe Only Washington might note willing to respond with its strategic missiles directly on the soviet Union but nato could respond it was argued Wilh missiles based in Europe. A soviet missile attack on Europe however would hit . Forces just As surely As a conventional attack thu triggering a certain . Response. Amer Ica moreover is not More Likely to re Spond Wilh intermediate Range missiles Iron Europe than with intercontinental ballistic missiles. That s not just because the penning us and cruise missiles can reach into the soviet Union itself and if used certainly would cause a soviet response against the United states just As would an icbms attack. It s also because the use of any nuclear weapon by either Side wouldst certainly evoke a nuclear response and rapid nuclear escalation that there would be no practical distinction in the consequences of firing a penning ii fro West Germany or a minuteman 3 from Wyoming. No first use advocates in fact in Sist that neither the United states nor in soviet Union is Likely to fire any size nuclear weapon at the other with deliberate intent because the certain result would be catastrophic. Each Side under stands that they argue so Public plans to use nuclear weapons like nato s flex Ible response doctrine have no real deterrent value. Thus the Only Ood reason for deploy ing . Missiles in Europe other than satisfying nervous european govern ments was to respond to the soviet deployment of ss-20 in such a Way a possibly to produce the result now at band agreement to remove from Europe the medium Range missiles of both sides. So deep nevertheless Are Europea Feare of decoupling thai they May be a serious problem in forthcoming negotiations on the Gorbachev proposal. Those fears Are real and May ultimately be justified by events. But intermediate Range missiles Are not in fact a Barrier to de coupling and the unrealistic idea that they Are cannot be allowed to stall a agreement thai deployment was designed 10 produce. That agreement would Lake whole category of nuclear weapons Oft the Board within five years and eliminate 93 percent of soviet medium Range warheads Moscow and Washington each would be allowed to keep 100 such War Heads the russians in Asia the United slates on its own territory. And since agreement might Breed Mote Trust a medium Range missile treaty could Lead onto More important developments. That s reason enough for Gorbachev to have made his shrewdly aimed and timed proposal. Ronald Reagan after All nol Only first proposed the Zero option on which the Iceland terms arc based his administration pushed through the mis Sile deployment in Europe that finally brought Moscow in accept i Host terms. He can hardly reject them now thai they re separated from the ski particularly since he so badly needs the kind of achievement an arms control treaty would represent. Tough verification measures will be imperative because of the mobility of the ss-20s, and something will have to Bedone about soviet Shaner Range missiles. Bui the possibilities make the require hard bargaining Well Worth the Effort he vim tiny Huntt so vet n m Canum and comm m i
