European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - January 05, 1990, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Page 10 the stars and stripes Friday january 5,1990 columns George Gedda Noriega Ceausescu shared Rise and fall in . On the surface Panama s Man Uel Antonio Noriega and Romania s Nic olae Ceausescu had Little in common aside from the heavy handed Way in which they ran their respective countries. One was a tropical tyrant for whom ideology meant nothing. The other irreverently described As the Butcher of but. Arest viewed the world in terms of the marxist philosophy he had embraced As a teen Ager. But there Are some eerie parallels be tween the two not the least of which was the Way the  and Downs in their relations with the United states reflected the fluctuations of . Policy Between expediency and morality. One historical oddity was that both Ceausescu and Noriega had their Defini Tive falling out with the United states on the same Day feb. 26. 1988. Yet their tyrannical rules ended within two Days of each other. When both were Riding High there were periods in which the United states overlooked their More disreputable qualities in Pursuit of its anti soviet policies. In the end once their usefulness had been squandered both were widely re viled in Washington for the Way in which they had brutalized their respective peo Ples. Ceausescu had been an admired figure in Washington during the 1970s. Presi Dent Nixon visited Bucharest Early in his first term and Ceausescu was Given a red carpet Welcome by former president car Ter at the White House in 1978. All this was Washington s Way of showing gratitude to a Man viewed As a Maverick in the Warsaw pact for his willingness to adopt stands Independent of the soviet Union. He denounced the soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia maintained Normal tics with Israel at a time when no other pact member did refused to take part in Alli Ance military Maneu vers and extended the hand of Friendship to China when Moscow and Beijing were at loggerheads. The United states offered Romania Trade concessions and Export credits As part of a strategy to encourage other Alli Ance members to show Independence from Moscow. Caus Csc s stalinist internal policies were a secondary consideration. Noriega meanwhile also was being cultivated by the United slates during the latter part of the 1970s when he was Panama Schick of military Intelli gence. He was viewed As an intelligence asset providing the United states with information on cuban activities in Central America. In the 1980s, Noriega was considered a potential asset for the Reagan administration in its Effort to topple Nicaragua s leftist government. How much assistance he actually provided is not Clear. . Officials were aware that Noriega was involved in drug smuggling activities but fell to was a minor figure before becoming head of the defense forces in August 1983. In that same year. Then vice president Picq rec hush met with Noriega during a visit to Panama. The deterioration in relations with Panama accelerated after Noriega s indictment by two Florida grand juries on drug smuggling charges in Early february 1988. The definitive break occurred feb. 26. When his allies in the panamanian legislature impeached president Eric Arturo Dflvalle just hours after he at tempted to fire Noriega As defense chief. On that same Day hours later the state department disclosed that Ceausescu had unilaterally renounced the Trade privileges Romania had enjoyed for More than a decade. If Ceausescu had not taken that action. Congress would have done so primarily based on Roma Nia s tight restrictions on emigration. In any Case. Romania s usefulness As a Warsaw pact Maverick had steadily diminished with the Rise of Mikhail Gorba Chev in the soviet Union and the waning of the cold War. When Caus Sci fled dec. 22. On the morning following the Calendar s longest night of the year he was increasingly looked on As an anachronism. A final parallel Between Ceausescu and Noriega at the precise moment Ceausescu was fleeing the presidential Palace the organization of american Stales after an All night session was by an overwhelming vote expressing regret Over the . Decision to oust Noriega by Force. George Edda has covered foreign Alfairi Lor the associated press sine 1968. Edward n. Lutwak just cause both Good bad from military Point amid much self in granulation from president Bush on Down operation just cause is being presented As a splendid Model of expeditionary warfare. And that justifies at least a first look at what went Well in Panama and what went badly. One thing that was done very Well was the Overall planning of the operation. Unlike the october 1983 invasion of Grenada just cause did not begin with a fundamentally flawed plan that had to be redeemed by unnecessarily hard and prolonged fighting. In Grenada the marines initially landed at one end of thai Small Island and the rangers at the other. That nibbling approach gave full warning to the opposition while leaving the Core of the Island untouched even though it contained both the bulk of the enemy and All the student hostages. In the Panama operation by con Trast the format was that of an All Al once coup de main with the simultaneous insertion of units walk ing driving parachuting and Landing to Block hostile movements attack major targets and seize key facilities. A second very important thing that was done Well was the size of the . Force. The aim of a coup de main is to overwhelm the defenders to make any Resis Tance seem hopeless. In the Grenada invasion additional battalions of the 82nd airborne had to be flown in Day after Day As the fighting unexpectedly continued. In just cause by contrast More than 20,000 troops were sent in from the Start against a few thou Sand panamanians thus minimizing casualties on both sides. Where just cause was far from satisfactory was in the details of its execution. One can always second guess specific tactical moves but that is not the Issue the extensive destruction of civilian housing seen by to viewers around the world was not caused by specific tactical errors. It resulted rather from an entire style of fighting that is based on abundant firepower in place of tactical skill a style that might be suitable for Large scale conventional War but which was utterly inappropriate in Panama. The political costs of the invasion were undoubtedly increased by several things the casual use of Field artillery against targets with crowded civilian apartment blocks immediately behind them. The Liberal firing of machine guns in the general direction of any sign of resistance and by the manifestly frivolous use of weapons of All kinds. The totally unnecessary bombardment carried oui by unsophisticated Al 17 stealth attack aircraft. The shooting out of the Street lights around the papal Nuncia Ture. This grossly excessive use of firepower was panty the result of questionable command decisions but mostly it reflected the state of training. Even though . Troops arc now All professionals they arc still the product of a shake and bake training system de signed to quickly mass produce Large armies of draftees for Large scale Continental War. Instead of the 30 weeks and More of Basic training for new British recruits instead of the 22 weeks of the israelis . Army and Marine recruits have 10 weeks or less. In theory advanced and in unit training Are supposed to remedy All inadequacies. But because of constant troop rotation skill Levels and tactics remain rudimentary. Instead of the Catlike movements of the Well trained infantryman instead of the sparing use of firepower that Marks the Well trained Force that can rely on Tacti Cal skill to viewers around the world saw the results of an outdated system of mass production training troops certainly Brave and willing to do their Best but visibly Clumsy and much too ready to fire with any and All weapons. Just cause May thus prove the opposite of what has been claimed. Far from demonstrating that the United states now has the ability to carry out surgical interventions it has revealed the need for profound structural reforms. The claim that Panama demonstrates a rapid expeditionary capability is also hollow the difficulty of most expeditionary interventions arises from the Lack of secure arrival bases bulk supplies in place and ancillary facilities from radars to Field hospitals. All those things were already available in Panama but they Are not Likely to be present elsewhere. Edward Lutt Wah now me sust figy chair left Center he strategic an International stud