European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - November 5, 1990, Darmstadt, Hesse                                 by Nick Cook Jane a defence weekly combat pilots with the multinational Force in the persian Gulf know that the course of any Battle to retake Kuwait will be determined initially by the War in the air. In the hours preceding any fight against Saddam Hussein one question May be uppermost in the mind of the Allied commander in saudi Arabia Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Will the iraqi air Force s combat experience during the Long War with Iran give it the Edge in kuwaiti skies analysis of the eight year Gulf War offers plenty of Consolation. Despite Baghdad s propaganda claims the iraqi air Force never achieved its full potential. The iraqi air Force should have inflicted a crushing defeat upon its iranian counterpart ravaged As it was by spares shortages and purges of its personnel by the Khomeini regime. At the height of the Gulf War in the mid-1980s, Iraq enjoyed a 5 1 superiority Over the iranian air Force. Yet Baghdad never pressed Home its advantage and was often guilty of glaring operational errors. During a visit by this writer to Baghdad in August 1984, diplomats spoke of their amazement at Iraq s failure to press Home attacks at critical moments of the War. They Laid the blame to a Large extent on Baghdad a poor intelligence and deficiencies in its strategic and tactical reconnaissance capabilities. They cited Many examples. One in particular illustrated these shortcomings. During its 1984 summer offensive the iranian army was Able to construct a Long Pontoon Bridge across the marshes East of Basra. Apparently unaware of the Bridge the iraqi air Force stayed on the ground. Foreign observers deduced from this and  missed opportunities that Saddam was a and undoubtedly still is a hampered by poor communications Between his army and air Force and among the various air Force commanders. It is also Clear that Iraq has Little experience in fighting an air Force As sophisticated As that represented by the multinational task Force despite the air combat advice it used to receive from the soviet Union and elsewhere. The allies have far More top of the line warplanes ready to Fly against Iraq than nato had standing by in Europe for use against the soviets. The unofficial count a Iraq 520 combat aircraft of which Only one Quarter Are first rate aircraft about 70 modern soviet Mig-23s and 64 French Mirage f-1 fighters. A . And multinational forces 1,350, including about 20 f-117 stealth fighters deployed at 30 airbases in the Region and aboard aircraft carriers. But like the North vietnamese of the 1960s and 70s, Iraq has formidable soviet built surface to air missiles that could take the Edge off the allies air Power. 1 the iraqis also have sophisticated highly accurate . Hawk anti aircraft missiles and radars that were captured in Kuwait. Iraq could also disrupt air bases in saudi Arabia by raining Down chemical tipped scud missiles. Air Power can slow Down but not Stop an iraqi tank invasion. Iraq has so Many tanks that the allies warplanes simply might not be Able to kill them fast enough especially if Iraq fires Poison Gas on the  but is there enough coordination Between the iraqi forces for such a two pronged attack during the War against Iran iraqi air bases were under regional control rather than a unified command Structure. As a result targets of strategic importance were often allocated to strike and bomber squadrons not necessarily suited to the Mission. In addition so obsessed were Saddam and the High command with secrecy that rarely was information passed on to divisional commanders making All out attacks a virtual impossibility. Given Saddam a autocratic tightening of control since then this situation has probably gotten worse rather than better. Frustrated in its efforts to successfully strike ground and air targets Iraq turned its attention against shipping during the Gulf War. In 1987 an iraqi Mirage launched two exocet anti ship missiles at the Stark an american frigate on patrol to protect Oil tankers. The Stark unprepared for the attack was gutted and 37 Crew members died. The iraqis insisted the strike was an Accident. This is probably the truth. As far As is known not one iraqi exocet attack a and there were scores of them against shipping during the Iraq loan War was preceded by anything approaching adequate reconnaissance. Iraqi maritime strikes were indiscriminate As was evident from the variety of targets struck by exocet fired from French built super Stendard strike aircraft Mirage fighters and super Frelon naval helicopters. Iraqis unwillingness or inability a to carry out adequate reconnaissance led to the exocet achieving a performance in the persian Gulf far below the 60 percent hit ratio achieved by Argentina against the British Durina  1982. Air combat during the eight year conflict with Iran was almost non existent. Some do fighting did take place in the Early stages of the War with several documented kills by iraqi Mig-21 s armed with French supplied Matra magic missiles. Air combat advice to Iraq has come in Many different guises Over the past 10 years. Soviet Indian British and French advisers have trained the air Force in one capacity or another. 3 in some cases the multiplicity of advice has led to problems. In the mid-1980s iraqi pilots lacked Confidence experience and the right training to attack targets at Low level even though such skill is essential for successful prosecution of the air to ground Mission. One theory offered for this deficiency was that the advice of some 50 Indian instructors reported to be in Baghdad at the time was being overruled by their soviet counterparts. Since the indians were supposed to specialize in Low Altitude bombing and the soviets in medium High Altitude operations an impasse was inevitable. Soviet practice appeared to win the Day. Observers noted shortly afterwards that iraqi Low Altitude fixed Wing close air support operations were All but halted just As the conflict with Iran reached its height. In its place the iraqi army relied heavily on helicopters to fulfil air to ground missions. It is in Battlefield helicopter operations that Iraq excelled in Aerial combat. In 1981, when the iraqi army air corps was formed the Mi-24 Hind gunship was iraqis principal attack helicopter. Today the iraqis can fall Back upon a number of foreign supplied helicopters for Battlefield operations. For example some helicopters intended for evacuation of casualties a like the German made mob bo.105s have been modified by the iraqis and armed with hot anti tank missiles. The Mi-24, notoriously effective during soviet operations against rebels in Afghanistan became the Long Range Mobile artillery of the iraqi army during the Gulf War using its awesome rocket armament to soften up ground targets. Gazelle helicopters made by an Anglo French consortium and armed with hot missiles also were used successfully against ground targets from iranian Battle tanks to coastal patrol Craft. O 1990 Jane s defence weekly the Jane s information group. Page 16 the stars and stripes monday november 5,1990