European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - January 16, 1992, Darmstadt, Hesse Thursday january 16, 1992 the stars and stripes a Page 13 commentary George f. Will one year later desert storm and its legacy on the first anniversary of the Gulf War we see that the War triggered a burst of triumphalism that was self refuting if that War in which the United states and a largely rented and Potemkin coalition of allies smashed a nation with the Gnu of Kentucky could As was then said make America a feel Good about itself a then America should not feel Good about itself. Twelve months later it does no to. The War which had Many rationales in the run up to it seemed in the aftermath to have been intended therapeutically. It was supposed to banish a the Vietnam syndrome a meaning doubt about americans ability to project Force effectively. It was also supposed to rekindle american Confidence technological and governmental. A tall order for a Short War. The War is the jewel in the Crown of Bush a foreign policy which is his Strong suit. But How Strong the military performed Well in the War. However it will not do anything similar any time soon. Deficit driven defense cuts that have already been agreed to and other cuts coming Are incompatible with such a Large Quick operation. Desert storm was an unrepeatable use of vanishing cold War capabilities. The War diplomacy has left lingering anxieties about sovereignty and constitutionality and about the process and substance of Bush a foreign policy. Although the War was a demonstration of . Military strength a lasting political consequence May be weakness a disabling dilution of . Sovereignty. Bush made . Policy subservient to the United nations at a moment when the United nations was pleased to be subservient to the United states. But there May come a time when the United states will be t held hostage to a desert storm legacy the idea that the legitimacy of . Force is directly proportional to the number of nations condoning it. As desert shield began and became desert storm its rationale was Given variously As the defense of saudi Arabia or restoration of the Kuwait regime with the help of our new ally Syria which has done to Lebanon approximately what Iraq did to Kuwait or preservation of the regional balance of Power or preventing the moral equivalent of Hitler Wane Rimes trials were hinted from getting nuclear weapons. Each rationale was better than the impression Bush gave of improvising rationales. The War reflected Bush a penchant for personalizing foreign policy in several senses. He believes less in the steady interests of nations than the personal relations Between leaders. And he tends to translate his visceral feelings into policies. A the War displayed Bush at his Best but it is a problematic Best. He is happiest when dealing with foreign policy because then he is dealing with a few foreign leaders and he does not need to Muster the patience and persuasion required in the Domestic politics of our turbulent democracy. He has reversed the advice in George Washington a Farewell address he avoids Domestic entanglements. His impatience with Domestic problems and institutions is the obverse of the pleasure he derives from dealing with the International fraternity that conducts the game of nations. His preference for any established order abroad explains the Gray Leaden spirit of Secretary of state James bakery a remarks in Belgrade june 21, 1991 urging preservation of the doomed yugoslav state. It explains Bush a Kiev speech aug. 1, 1991 telling ukrainians in effect that their proper future was in a soviet Union run by Mikhail Gorbachev. It explains Bush a appeasement of his acquaintances from his ambassadorial Days in China a bloodstained Geron Toracy. Bush a preference for order before Freedom is apparent in his Neo mercantilist approval of a a managed Trade with Japan. Desert storm was supposed to serve a new world order but Bush has not seriously tried to translate Kuwait a moral debt to America into something truly new a an Arab democracy. Instead Bush a itch to tidy up the Middle East has translated into an adversarial relationship Between America and the Only democracy in the Region Israel. There is to say no More room for argument about foreign policy a Bush a Strong suit such As it is a in the coming Campaign. C Washington Post Waltors son or dfrddy1 m1wrs desert storm Stouck Santhony Lewis president s War making Power is worrisome a the Constitution supposes what the history of All governments demonstrates that the executive is the Branch of Power most interested in War and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care vested the question of War in the a James Madison a year ago the United states went to War against Iraq. How much the War achieved at How great a Price in human devastation remains a matter of debate. But one thing is not in doubt. The Way we went to War marked a new High in the unilateral Power of the president of the United states. From aug. 2, 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait to the first bombs falling on Baghdad Jan. 16, 1991, president Bush mane Vered the country toward War. Deception obscured the process then. Now we can see the steady skillful March to War. And it was intensely personal George Bush a decision. On the morning of aug. 2, Bush told reporters a a we re not discussing intervention a but later that Day he met then British prime minister Margaret Thatcher in Aspen colo., and she filled him full of Munich and Churchill. That afternoon the president condemned iraqis a naked Over the next few Days Bush and his aides pressed saudi Arabia to ask for american troops. On aug. 8, the president announced that a the saudi government requested our help and i have responded to that he said a the Mission of our troops is wholly John Sununu Bush a chief of staff at the time briefed the press that 50,000 troops would be sent. The number actually planned was 250,000. On oct. 31, the president decided to double the deployment to open the Way for offensive action against Iraq. He did not announce the increase until nov. 8, after the congressional election. On nov. 14, he assured congressional leaders that the troops Mission was still defensive a i have not crossed any on dec. 29, Bush gave the order for War. He told Gen. Colin Powell to attack starting at 3 . Jan. 17 Middle Eastern time if Iraq had not withdrawn from Kuwait. Never at any moment in that process did the president doubt his Power to take the country into War. Just before Christmas he told ambassadors of the 28 coalition countries that if he decided to go to War he would do so whether Congress and the people agreed or not. Congress finally got around to a debate on Jan. 10, but by then the Issue was virtually foreclosed. With that Many soldiers on the ground with the Public aroused by the presidents talk of Saddam Hussein As Hitler Congress had no real option but to ratify the undisclosed decision for War. The record of the March to War is compellingly described in a Book to be published by Henry Holt amp co. In March. It is George Bush s War by Jean Edward Smith an american political scientist and biographer who is a professor at the University of Toronto. His subject is Power and he makes it a gripping Story. The framers of the Constitution set out to deny to the president the English Kings Power to make War on his own. Over the years presidents have used troops on their own for Brief actions a but not for such a massive offensive War. President Dwight Eisenhower said he would never take a any kind of action that can be interpreted As War until Congress which has the constitutional authority says now by the precedent of the persian Gulf War the american president has More personal Power to make War than the Leader of any other significant democracy. How did that happen How did the United states stray so far from the intentions of the framers the cold War did it Smith rightly says. The presidents singular responsibility to reply to nuclear attack led us to focus on him As a the supreme decision maker on All issues. On his word alone the machinery of government was set in there was no Structure for the voicing of alternatives. To that i would add that the theology of modern conservatism has clothed the president with the very majesty that Madison and Hamilton and the rest thought they had denied him. Smith is respectful of Bush even admiring. A it was a superlative performance a he says of the deceptive March to War. But he worries about a the profound implications for american so should we All. C the new York time
