European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - September 21, 1994, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Wednesday september 21,1994 commentary the stars and stripes Page 15 David Broder president Clinton now has put an american occupation Force into Haiti and by doing so has made his presidency hostage to the Uncertain Fate of a badly divided backward country that no one could have imagined was a vital interest of the United states. The Early euphoria Over the Success of Jimmy Carters negotiating team in eliminating the threat of organized armed resistance is understandable. But it must be tempered by the realization that the real danger is that . Troops May be caught in an ongoing civil War Between heavily armed gangs Bent on revenge or determined not to yield Power. Then they must prop up a president whose own commitment to democracy is unproved and provide the resources to rebuild a shattered Economy. The moral High ground that Clinton claimed for his action has eroded. The military men he called a a thugs will remain in office for the next month and have become our de Facto partners in this phase of the american occupation. The first a achieve Mentz of the . Intervention is to guarantee Blanket amnesty for it Gen. Raoul a dras and his followers who May remain in the country to organize opposition to president Jean Bertrand Aristide. After making so Many threats that he could not Back Down Clinton sent in the troops in order to protect his own credibility and that of the nation. Credibility is important and by sticking to his guns in the face of Strong Domestic opposition Clinton has shown his tenacity. But he is like a kid who jumps from a seventh Story window ledge into a firefighters net. After you know he has not cracked his Skull you have to ask a what the hell was he doing on the ledge a the intervention defies almost every Rule of political prudence that we thought our government had Learned during the Post world War ii world. The lesson of Vietnam is that you done to commit troops until the country is committed to the Mission. Even now there is no evidence the Public has endorsed the commitment in Haiti. A second Rule is that if the commitment is Likely to be i thy expensive and substantial. Congress better be ii on the Takeoff and not just the Landing. Amazingly Clin a a a a Famili lengthy expensive and substantial. Congress better be in on the Takeoff and not just the Landing. Amazingly Clinton went to the United nations for approval of military action inside our a sphere of influence but evaded Congress a because he knew support was lacking. When an american military occupation of Haiti was first suggested Why did no to Clinton throw its advocate out of the Oval office i put that question last week to a Democrat who has dealt with National Security issues at High Levels since Vietnam War Days. What he said was disturbing but i find no reason to disagree with the four key Points of his analysis. . Pact with Haiti to emf to rxw5 off a a 1 Effie so a to fax v i Quot u first he said remember the Campaign. Clinton a main focus was on the Economy and Domestic issues so he did not want to debate National Security policy in any Broad context with president Bush. His advisers suggested he could put his opponent on the defensive a and show a toughness which his personal history did not suggest a by vowing to take a hard line against the serbian aggressors in Bosnia and the generals who had ousted Aristide. The stance worked Fine during the Campaign but caused endless headaches once he was in the White House \ the second Factor is that for Clinton As my Friend said paraphrasing Karl von Clausewitz a foreign policy is Domestic policy conducted by other  Clinton has built his Domestic program on the Core democratic base which is the political left. Human rights issues in general Are important to liberals. Haiti has particular salience for the congressional Black caucus and for african american voters the most Loyal of Clinton a constituencies. Their Agenda became his Agenda. The third Point my Friend said is that Clinton a would rather be sympathetic than  he empathize with Peoples feelings and when political allies said they thought Aristide deserved to fill the office to which he had been elected Clinton s response was not to say a maybe but in be got bigger fish to  a  a a a a a a the fourth Point closely linked to the third is that the president and his advisers Are singularly lacking in any Long term policy perspective. Each step of haitian policy a from the initial offer of an american Haven for refugees to the fateful decision to threaten the use of Force a was taken As if it would somehow resolve the problem by itself. No one in the inner Circle was forceful enough to ask a Are we prepared to act on this threat if our Bluff is called a it was called and now Clinton has followed the idealistic president Wilson in sending american forces to Haiti. The last such occupation lasted 19 years. Washington Post first the tank on his right exploded in flames said the iraqi tank battalion commander after the persian Gulf War Battle of 73 easting. Then the tank on his left went up in flames but he still could t see where the shells were coming from and no enemy tanks were in sight. That a when he surrendered his battalion. Gen. Frederick m. Franks jr., who As a lieutenant general and Vii corps commander led the largest armoured attack since George s. Patton in world War ii recounted the Story with some empathy for the iraqi commander for he knew from personal experience what it was like to be under enemy fire. As the operations officer for the 2nd so 11th army Cav regt in Vietnam then maj. Franks lost his left leg below the knee. But Franks told the Story to make a larger Point. No american Soldier ought to Ever be put in the position of that iraqi commander a outgunned outraged and out fought. Since his assignment three years ago As commander of the . Army a training amp doctrine come making sure that never happens has been. The primary focus of his efforts. Fortunately he had a firm foundation upon which to build. The command was part of the Post Vietnam revolution within the army marking a return to professionalism hard hands on training and formulation of War fighting doctrine to enable the army to fight and win on the Battlefield. Called the airland Battle doctrine it was the instrument of Victory in the Gulf War. One of Franks major tasks at the command was to look again at the Gulf War doctrine to ensure that it was still valid for the smaller Post cold War Force. The army today is charged not Only with War fighting in the information age but also with peace operations and a operations other than  but just As the Best military to and equipment Are so much useless june without soldiers who will stand by their guns so doctrine is just so Many empty words without soldiers to execute it. One of the commands major successes has been the development of soldiers who will do that. Recently the Washington Post chronicled the breakdown in the District of Columbia police Force because of the abandonment of standards training and Harry g. Summers discipline when the police Force was enlarged in 1989 and 1990. Five years later the effect of that breakdown still plagues the District where in All too Many cases the police officers who rape Rob and steal Are More to be feared than the criminals. The army went through that same grief a Quarter Century ago when such social experiments As a project 100,000�?� brought in recruits of marginal intelligence and even More marginal standards of behaviour. Training was a a dumped Down a standards were compromised and discipline eroded almost to the Point of anarchy. The military was fast becoming an armed mob. Correcting that situation was the commands first Challenge and together with the expeditious discharge of those who could not or would not measure up a rigorous Back to basics training program was initiated. And to prepare for the future a formal progressive training program was initiated for the officers and noncommissioned officers As Franks commented in a recent interview it takes More than 20 years to develop a colonel who can Lead a brigade 18 years for a lieutenant colonel who can Lead a battalion and several years to develop captains and lieutenants who can command companies and platoons and sergeants who can Lead squads. While format officer education has Long been part of the army a Leader development program a major Advance of the Post Vietnam army has been the creation of a formal noncommissioned officer educational system where sergeants also receive progressive professional development. The Effort that began in 1973 with the formation of the command and its emphasis on training and education paid off 17 years later in the Gulf War. And it will continue to pay off. In a program called Force xxi operations the command is examining the conceptual foundations of. War and operations other than War in the Early decades of the 21st Century. A at the Center of the concept a says Franks a Are Quality soldiers and leaders. Whose full potential is More closely realized by information age technologies and continuous development and training in units and in our land warfare  members of Congress charged by the Constitution with Quot raising armies a should pay particular heed to this need for Quality soldiers. They need Only look out their windows a taking care to avoid drive by shootings a to Sec what happens when Quality is ignored. C los Angeles times