European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - January 11, 1995, Darmstadt, Hesse Wednesday january 11, 1995 commentary the stars and stripes Page 15russia s military found wanting in Chechnya by Dave Carpenter Moscow a graphic images of charred tanks and distraught troops blare the message russians offensive to a restore order to rebel Chechnya has become a military debacle. An operation that defense minister Pavel Grachev declared on nov. 28 could be polished off in two hours has foundered at All Levels from the highest ranking commanders to the Rawest recruits. Russian commentators and military officials blame the failures on political and tactical blunders that besides causing hundreds of deaths have exposed glaring weaknesses in one of the worlds largest armies. A a a the failure of the military operation in Chechnya shows Russia docs not have a combat ready army a Deputy prime minister Sergei Shakh Rai acknowledged last week. In soviet times ideology Iron discipline and giant military budgets kept the army together. Today All that is gone. A free press reveals everything from military gripes to government lies and corruption. Grachev has pushed unsuccessfully for three generals to resign and a shake up that May include the minister himself is expected after the operation is concluded. Since the War in Chechnya began dec. 11, the army has been exposed As not Only inefficient but also dangerously out of control. Generals have ignored commands troops have walked at being sent into a a meat grinder a and the military itself wonders whether president Boris Yeltsin Grachev or unseen forces Are in charge. After a bloody Blitz on Grozny failed to subdue the chechen capital last week one analyst cited military sources As saying the russian military command had a lost control of the troops in Chechnya. A the country was on the verge of a full scale military catastrophe a Pavel Felic Ngaue wrote in the daily Segodnia on thursday. A at any moment the russian army simply could have stopped obeying orders issued by politicians and generals and could have turned the weapons against its own no outright Mutiny has occurred but dissension is spreading at the highest Levels. Top generals Carp at one another publicly and lament inc botching of the Taj Tiwe we a j. Reinventing russian government poorly conceived offensive. Alexander Lebed a top russian Gener Al said the military and combat abilities overestimated its own abilities,1 and put., insufficiently skilled leaders in charge. The operation to seize control of secessionist Chechnya has been plagued by several tactical errors generals and analysts say a a a troops were rushed into Chechnya with Only minimal planning immediately after the failure of secret efforts to oust the chechen government _ a the United states in desert storm spent half a year concentrating forces before launching them against the forces of iraqi Leader Saddam Hussein said Alexander Konovalov military analyst at Moscow Susa Canada Institute. A we acted like going into Chechnya was a sunday j / a i a soldiers were not trained to fight against irregular troops. As a result a a big Folly has been committed in Chechnya Quot it. Gen. Leonid Ivashek Secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent states defense ministers Council told Komsomol Skaya pravda. A Young inexperienced conscripts. Made up the bulk of the attacking Force. _ pilots whose bombs killed hundreds of civilians in what were supposed to be precision bombing attacks were badly in Der trained. A commanders did not anticipate Strong civilian resistance a Factor that bogged Down the Advance and crippled the russians morale and will to fight. A when you have to think about civilian losses. And when democrats Are crying in the papers that you Are killing innocent civilians it is very difficult to expect reasonable efficiency Quot Konovalov said. A commanders scramble jets into Grozny even As infantry troops were mov ing into the City during the new years eve assault resulting in the bombing of their own Side. A tanks also were sent into Grozny in that assault Only weeks after Grachev said a Only an idiot would Send tanks into a City. Scores were captured or burned to death a situation reminiscent of the soviets ill fated intervention in Afghanistan. But As Andrei Piontkovsky director of Moscow a Independent strategic studies Center said a Grozny is not an afghan = c Tho associated pros3 a t Perry is est Hope for a Crystal Ball what does 1995 portend for the american military not an easy question for predicting the future is always Chancy. During the persian Gulf War my prediction that Allied ground forces would suffer enormous casualties confronting iraqi fortified positions was proven spectacularly wrong. Thank god for my Daugh tar in Law was with the Lead brigade of Vii corps 3rd. Army div As it spearheaded the attack. And last year my prediction that military operations in Haiti would turn out to be a disaster have so far at Leash also not been borne out by events. A yet i had both on Good authority for history would have supported both conclusions. And Given the same circumstances i would make the same Calls again. As a cynic once observed while the races not always to the Swiff and the Battle to the Strong that is still the Best Way to place your there Are those like self pro aimed fut urologists Alvin and Heidi Toffler reportedly among those influencing incoming House speaker Newt Gingrich who would take a More Tadica approach. Their 1993 work War and anti War 5urv/va/ of the Dawn of the 21st Century advances the notion that the a information age will totally transform warfare and that third world Low intensity conflicts will be the wars of the future. But such prognostications Are hardly new. Their portents of a Brave new Post cold War military strategy Mirror the a wizards of armageddon in the 1950s who intoned that the a atomic age had rendered All past military thinking obsolete and the gurus of the 1960s who preached that the a Page of the guerrilla rep resented a a new kind of was to prove both notions wrong but not before they had caused enormous damage and grief. The Toff Crsp Book said a review in foreign affairs a contains any number of inaccuracies or Sloppy generalizations. About wars past and present and probably therefore about its future. . Soldiers in remarkably Large numbers however Are Reading the Book which suggests two things first military people sense that some Large change is afoot second the usual Constellation of defense analysts has not characterized it very to a a a a futurology said a reviewer in the new scientist a is a Messy and. Intellectually dangerous Job but someone has to do it if we Are not constantly to be overtaken by increasingly Chapt. In the Toff cars Are Correct that a knowledge is now the Central resource of but that is hardly a new insight two thousand years ear _ Lier the roman poet Horace wrote a Force without Wisdom Falls of its own those searching for signs and portents of the direction of military strategy in 1995 will not find it in the writings of fut urologists like the Toff cars. A much More useful guide was provided by defense Secretary William Perry in a november 1994 address on the rules of engagement. Beginning with Horace a observation Perry Laid out a the thinking behind our decisions about where and How to use Force in the Post cold War world.�?�. A i Start a he said a with this fundamental fact the United states will remain a global Power. Protecting our interests requires us to have Security commitments around the Globe. A a 7 Harry g. Summers _ a was Secretary of defense in this new Security environment in be defined my task in terms of three challenges. The first Challenge is to Lake every action we can to prevent a re emergence of the. Nuclear threat that at tended the cold War. Quot a Quot the second Challenge i face is to properly manage the Post cold War draw Down of our armed forces. If we done to get the draw Down right we wont have the necessary military capability to meet the third Chat Lenge a determining How to use Force or the threat of Force effectively in this Complex world. A there Are three Basic categories where Force might be needed Perry said. First is where vital interests such As National survival or critical economic interests Are threatened. In such cases a we must be prepared to risk a military conflict i.e., go to War to protect our vital interests a he said. A the second is where we have important but not vital interests at stake a Perry said. There Quot our use of Force will be selective and limited. The decision of what to use a whether its a c-130 transport or an army division a will reflect the Cost we Are willing to pay to achieve the outcome we want. A the third category is. Humanitarian concerns ordinarily the defense department will not be involved in humanitarian operations because of the need to focus on its War fighting missions. We Field an army not a salvation.army.�?�. Tough talk indeed. Unlike the pie in the sky pronouncements of the fut urologists Perry has provided hard headed rules of engagement to carry the military through the. Coming Quot Quot c los angdo3 Tinoa ,
