European Stars And Stripes (Newspaper) - September 4, 1978, Darmstadt, Hesse Page 12 the stars and stripes monday september 4, 1978 Tom Wicker stationing gis in Israel would solve nothing the Carter administration in its preparations for the Camp David Summit beginning sept. 5, has been toying with the explosive idea of using american troops As a sort of last ditch Means of resolving the Middle East impasse. That s a ditch that president Carter an expert at getting him self into holes might better avoid digging. The Washington Post quoting sources reported that or. Carter would carry proposals to Camp David for an american air base in the Sinai desert and for posting . Troops on the West Bank if these Steps would break a deadlock. That May have overstated the Case somewhat because when or. Carter was questioned about it he said he d be reluctant to take such Steps. But he added ill have to wait and the state department immediately la bleed the report speculative and Prema Ture although a spokesman conceded that supplementary guarantees might at some Point be useful to supplement and underwrite any agreement Between the parties to Middle East negotiations. Press Secretary Jody Powell further roiled the Waters by remarking that the question of a generalized american pres ence has always been he declined to explain what he meant by a generalized american All this suggests that the president s National Security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski who has been reported to favor an expanded american military role in the Middle East May be pushing the notion further than the state department likes even to floating a trial balloon. However that May be the israeli government immediately took its usual Cool position on the idea of american troop assistance saying that israeli personnel must be the main Center pillar of Security arrangements on the West Bank. The israelis were somewhat warmer to the suggestion that americans might take Over an israeli air base in the Sinai after the return of that area to Egypt. Even so the idea of american military forces in the Middle East seems to go far beyond any thing that could be described As a generalized american presence or supplementary what for example might happen if american troops attempting to maintain order and Security in the volatile West Bank were to suffer costly terrorist at tacks under the pressure of Public opinion both in this country and in Israel they could easily be drawn into conflict with palestinians even with other Middle East nations. At the least such conflict would tend to make the United states look like Israel s protector even More than the presence of american troops would in any Case. While palestinians now living in the West Bank might rather have american than israeli Security forces militant and terrorist organizations would not necessarily share that View and might even see american troops As a greater threat to their own plans. Introducing american troops into the Middle East moreover seems bound to in crease the risk that any local conflict would quickly involve the major Powers. On the face of it the idea seems provocative to the soviet Union one that might Lead Moscow to seek some countering presence of its own. Those might be risks Worth taking if it were not for the fact that putting in Ameri can troops would be unlikely to solve any of the underlying issues if for example prime minister begin and president Sadat cannot agree Between themselves on terms for the return of the Sinai an american takeover of the israeli air base there would Only delay Resolution of the such a possibility is even in the air i the opinions expressed in the columns and cartoons on this Page represent those of he authors and Are in no Way to be considered As representing the views of the stars and stripes or the United states government. Ther or both sides might More quickly re treat to it than make politically difficult compromises of their own. Once american troops were in place moreover the parties might find it More convenient to let them stay there than to work out the Basic unresolved issues that would be responsible for their presence. Finally since the Middle East does not exist in a vacuum deployment of Ameri can troops there would surely increase pressures for an american presence elsewhere. Saudi Arabia for example with its fears of communist penetration of Africa might Well intensify its efforts for american countering action and once americans forces planted themselves anywhere in the area the saudis probably would be reluctant Ever to let them leave. Undoubtedly the administration fear ing an end to the so called Sadat initiative and a total breakdown of Middle East negotiations has in mind nothing More than deadlock breaking proposals. But last re sorts can sometimes be worse than what they Are intended to present. And or. Carter s primary Job at the Summit for which he is so greatly responsible is to encourage or. Begin and or. Sadat to Compromise sacrifice and agree on Basic issues such As israeli Security Andi ultimate sovereignty on he West Bank. Offering american troops however Well intended seems More Likely to pro vide an excuse for not taking the difficult Steps that a real agreement must impose on both sides. C new York times hot for balloon George will Helsinki like Kellogg Briand pact fifty years and Many wars ago the . Took the Lead in an Effort to make War a thing of the past. On aug. 27,1928, representatives of 15 nations met in Paris to sign the Kellogg Briand pact thereby renouncing the use of War As an instrument of National policy. Today the name Kellogg Briand is like the memory of wind whistling in a Chim Ney in an old House Long ago. But it is wrong to regard the pact Banning War As just another example of the Feather headed Ness typical of a nation that was simultaneously trying to enforce a ban on alcohol. It was More than a Pale flame of idealism in the closing dusk of american innocence. It expressed aspects of the american temper that still exist. Warren g. Harding the first postwar president declared Don t know any thing about this european stuff and left All such stuff to his Secretary of state Charles Evans Hughes whose successor was Frank Kellogg. In the mid-1920s, the state department s staff of just 600 professionals had a budget of just $2 million. In Europe the most ominous figure was mus Solini who preached the Virtues of War to an inattentive nation. Most americans did not care about for eign policy in the decade after the War to end wars but there was a significant peace movement two ornaments of which were Columbia University presi Dent Nicholas Murray Butler and professor James Shotwell also of Columbia. Shotwell suggested to Aristide Briand the French foreign minister that the . And France should sign a treaty to outlaw War. Briand fastened upon the idea As a Way of beginning to bind the . In a bilateral relationship with France. But Briand did not anticipate Kellogg s deftness. Kellogg disdained the peace move ment but Briand s offer compelled him to act and he knew a political Opportunity when it was handed to him. Kellogg turned it into a Multi nation extravaganza. And by 1934, 64 nations had endorsed its provi Sions. A decade later most were at War. Prior to 1928, the last event that had stirred Public interest in foreign policy had column Sand comments been the first Salt talks the Washington naval conference of 1921. The open ing of the conference coincided with inter ment of the unknown Soldier a ceremony broadcast nationwide by the magic of radio. The Assumption sustaining the naval conference was that naval limitations were the key to peace. A few years later when the Senate ratified the Kellogg Bri and pact 85-1, that body promptly voted to authorize 15 new cruisers. The pact banned Only aggressive War it lacked enforcement mechanisms and the Senate foreign relations commit tee tacked on an interpretation which affirmed the . Right to enforce the Monroe doctrine. Nevertheless the pact satisfied those and there was always Many of them we believed that diplomatic Parchment could do the work of blood and Iron in guarantee ing National Security. Kellogg received the Nobel peace prize in 1929. As today s president understands to Well there is always an american Audi hence for the theory that a particular prob \ Lem is the intended result of scheming by5 this or that special in the 1920s a significant audience was eager to believe that the great War had been caused a munitions makers and other merchants of people who believed tha were prone to believe that conspiracies o ill will would be blocked by open express ions of Goodwill. The Kellogg Briand pact accorded will three beliefs that recur in America to world is in the mood for peace mood Are decisive moods last. Anyone we thinks that those beliefs died Long ago a not been paying attention to More Rece history. One critic who had a Way with wound ing words dismissed the Kellogg Brian pact As an International but it i not obvious that the pact was More Vaci Ous More of an exercise in deception if eluding self deception or More of a Deij letter than is the .-soviet document explaining the principles of detente 1972 o than Are the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accords 1975. In the year 2021 the assessment of these May be similar today s assessment of the Kellogg Brian pact worthless but not harmless. C Washington Post
