European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - April 17, 1990, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Page 10 a the stars and stripes columns . Rosentha Lstill time for americans to stand up for Lithuania Tui Siam act distributed by King features Syndi it when you Are deserting a Friend the first step is a Little difficult. But pretty soon it gets easy. What makes it hard in the beginning is the Friend does no to seem to understand what is going on. He can to get it into his head you arc really walking out on him. The fellow comes up to you at the Start with a big smile on his face. He says he has a Chance to fulfil the dream of his life and he knows you will give him a hand because you have been promising him for years that you would. So would you just say a word to this new Friend of yours who is kicking him around and blocking his Way but things have changed. You have deals cooking with the new Friend and you done to want him mad at you. So you Don t really answer just mumble a few embarrassed words. But he keeps tugging at your sleeve not understanding and a crowd gathers. Then you have to come out with it. You Tell your Friend he is living in the past and what a More getting in the Way of the big deals by hanging around bringing up old promises. You turn to everybody and say leave it to me one of these Days my new big Friend wont be so Tough on this old character and in the end it will be better for him believe me. The crowd gets bored and everybody walks away. Just the old Friend is left staring at your Back understanding the dream is ending. Washington s decision to walk away from its lithuanian Friend docs not mean merely a delay in creating an Independent Lithuania. Washington wants us to believe that Sall it Means. But it really Means our government has adjusted its mind to an end of the dream. The evidence is before us. President Bush tells lithuanians and lithuanian americans to go along with Mikhail Gorbachev a idea of How secession ought to work. First there is a referendum on Independence which Lithuania might reluctantly accept even though it considers itself already free. But then there Are five years of negotiation. After that the dead end any proposal for Independence has to be approved by a two thirds vote of the soviet Congress of deputies. Soviet president Mikhail s. Gorbachev can easily make sure that will never happen. The quarrel of americans who believe in International decency should not be just with Gorbachev. Only the terminally naive believe he will give up parts of the soviet internal Empire without a struggle. The quarrel is with those americans who would rather help Gorbachev keep every Inch of the ragtag Empire than stand by americans pledge repeated for a half Century to support lithuanian Freedom lost to Hitler and Stalin. Bush directed the walkout. But he is being supported by some of the specialists journalists and sex bureaucrats who interpret foreign policy to the Public. Small countries of course can be annoying if you Are thinking Large global thoughts. But underlying almost All the arguments in favor of the Bush decision to walk away from lithuanian Independence is a belief frequently sincere that otherwise Gorbachev might fall. Sincere does not mean right. There is no proof Gorbachev is being Nasty about Lithuania Only because Nasty people made him do it. But if Gorbachev really needs supine american acquiescence to his bullying of Lithuania to keep him in office he will need More of the same for a Long Long time. Around the soviet Union other nationalities Are demanding Freedom. Gorbachev a economic policies Are a mess where they exist at All. His popularity is stronger abroad than at Home. And there will always be the Nastiest lurking. Sooner or later if the United states is to resume having foreign policies Independent of Moscow it will have to let Gorbachev try his Luck without us. How Long will Washington fight to save every Inch of the teetering soviet Union for its terrified leaders Bush and Secretary of state James a. Baker Iii both seem surprised and worried by Gorbachev s latest threat to Lithuania a Retreat or face a blockade of Power supplies. What did they expect with the United states looking on Moscow has been tightening the screws Day by Day. But perhaps there is still time if enough americans insist for the United states to speak out for Freedom of action a for the lithuanians and for ourselves. It is harder to walk Back to a deserted Friend than walk away but in the end the heart rests easier. C new York times Tom Wicker Bush s farsighted missile idea hits the target president Bush at last has seized the Lead in arms control negotiations by proposing the ultimate abolition of land based missiles with More than one nuclear warhead. It s to be hoped that the soviet unions first negative reaction will not turn Congress and the administration in the other direction. In effect. Bush would have both sides eliminate the most dangerous strategic weapons. They re that because a each multiple warhead missile can destroy several widely separated targets including an opponents missiles. Relatively few missiles can destroy Many enemy warheads. A because each carries several warheads such missiles make a tempting target for an opponent he can eliminate Many enemy warheads with fewer warheads of his own by destroying a relatively Small number of enemy missiles. A if multiple warhead missiles Are Mobile that makes such destruction less certain mobility also makes it harder to verify How Many Mobile missiles an opponent May have a and thus How Many warheads he has mounted on those Mobile missiles. Stage proposal a reported in the new York times by Michael Gordon but not confirmed by the White House a could Lead to elimination of the most destabilizing first strike weapons As Well As the most destabilizing fears on both sides. The first stage would ban multiple warhead Mobile missiles on land the second stage would eliminate All multiple warhead land based missiles. Thereafter each Side could deploy Only single warhead missiles in fixed silos these Are easily verified less threatening and less tempting As targets. Nevertheless its not hard to see Why president Mikhail Gorbachev has rejected the Bush proposal. The first stage would require the soviet Union at considerable expense to remove its 10-warhead ss-24 missiles from Railroad cars and redeploy them in fixed silos but the United states would merely have to forgo future deployment of its 10-warhead my on Railroad cars a actually saving Money not yet spent. The second stage Banning All multiple warhead land based missiles on both sides again would Force great expense on Moscow and cause considerable restructuring of its missile forces no for All these reasons or. Bush s two now concentrated on land. But it would leave the United states All of its multiple warhead submarine mounted missiles the heart of its strategic forces. Thus in both stages the Bush proposal a no matter How sensible in the abstract a is imbalanced in favor of the United states which would save Money while Moscow was having to spend it and which would wind up with the strategic advantage provided by its sea based missiles. Unfortunately some members of Congress and some officials in the Pentagon and elsewhere in the administration Are Likely to use Gorbachev a initial rejection As a reason to move ahead with costly and destabilizing my deployment on Railroad cars. That would stand the Bush proposal on its head and produce greater rather than less strategic instability. Or. Sidney Drell the Stanford University physicist and arms control authority has offered a better idea for dealing with strategic imbalances. In the los Angeles times for feb. 15 a before the Bush proposal was disclosed a he suggested that to achieve acceptance of a desirable but imbalanced proposal the Side that would gain advantage should share it with the other by entering into a jointly advantageous economic project. Specifically Drell said in an interview if effecting stage one of the Bush proposal were to Cost the soviets $1 1 billion and save the United states a similar amount the United states might offer to invest that much in a joint program to develop an inherently Safe a cd cd a reactor a thus enhancing for both nations the Prospect of nuclear Power generation that would pose no Sally or environmental Hazard and Breed no weapons Grade materials. A Job retraining program to help both countries move away from Reliance on military industries would be another possibility. Redressing the strategic imbalance the soviets would suffer from elimination o All multiple warhead land based m issues would be More difficult. But Sidney Drellos Basic idea economic compensation for military Dis Vantage a might make stage one fas bit and suggests a possible Way to Lead go Chev to ultimate agreement on stage two. That a far More in the National Intres than shuttling 50 mrs about on pm cars. C new York times