European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - August 13, 1990, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Page 10 the stars and stripes monday August 13,1990 Les Aspin Only i Bush or Saddam con survive Quot Topay Kuwait tomorrow Saddam Hussein invasion of Kuwait has done More to change strategic realities than any other military action of the postwar Era. Its Odd that some third world dictator could do this. The reason is simple however. It s Oil he has gotten our attention by putting several divisions adjacent to half the world s Oil reserves. Figuratively he has placed a knife beside our jugular. Now what arc we going to do about this the outlines of our policy Are emerging. Politically a a Campaign to isolate him and to convey to him that he is playing with fire and could set off a conflagration. Economically a an Effort to squeeze him through sanctions and a blockade. Militarily a an evolving commitment to defend saudi Arabia. Fine. But where docs All this Lead us what is the outcome we desire what is the minimal result we can accept it is important that we define our goal for two reasons. First it will soon become Clear that this Campaign against Saddam Hussein is going to be costly. An embargo Means we will be driving up the Cost of Oil and with it gasoline at the pump. Of course if we have no embargo Saddam will push up the Price a and enjoy the fruits of expensive Gas a sustained military buildup in the Region would eliminate for the moment the peace dividend everyone has been looking Forward to. Finally if push comes to shove and we end up in a War the costs will be measured in body bags. Second we will soon be hearing the approaching footsteps of people trying to broker compromises. Right now both George Bush and Saddam Hussein sound like they Are ready to go to the mat. Soon that will make a lot of people nervous. Arabs from the persian Gulf Are already bickering with Saddam trying to buy him off. Egypt a president Hosni Mubarak is talking of finding an Arab solution hinting at a Compromise under which Saddam a Power would not be clipped. The embargo will soon prompt others to complain that Kuwait is just a Little country far Lar away and not Worth the Effort. As talk of costs and compromises fill the air foreign and Domestic pressures will mount on the Bush administration to strike a Deal. A lot of deals Are Possi Andrew j. Glass ble. What can we accept the absolute finite Bottom line mini mum we need to extract from All this is that saudi Arabia emerges As an Independent actor one Able to set its own Oil policies without first telephoning Saddam Hussein. We Are scrambling now because Saddam threatens to control half the worlds Oil reserves either by physically seizing them or by so intimidating the saudi Royal family that it voluntarily accedes to his demands. We cannot tolerate either. Saudi Arabia must remain Independent in fact As Well As name. The in. Security Council Resolution establishes As its Bottom line the restoration of the status quo Ante. It demands the withdrawal of iraqi troops from Kuwait and the reconstitution of the kuwaiti government. But that wont do. The status quo Ante can to be completely restored. Saddam a resort to Force is history and cannot be wiped from the saudi psyche Saddam showed he is both willing and Able to resort to Force. Those two genies cannot be put Back in the bottle and will continue to rattle saudi Arabia. Thus guaranteeing our Bottom line boils Down to ridding the world of Saddam Hussein or his army. We can tolerate Saddam Hussein without a million Man army and we can tolerate iraqis army without Saddam Hussein. But we cannot live with the two together. Getting rid of one or the other is the Ideal outcome. The iraqi army May decide that faced with this Choice it would prefer to Jettison Saddam. Or the iraqi Public May find the pain of a blockade so displeasing that it will Rise up. And of course the action of Only a single disenchanted person could Send Saddam to his ultimate Reward clearly any outcome that leaves Iraq in control of Kuwait is not acceptable. Nor is it acceptable for iraqi troops to remain positioned to intimidate the saudis into adopting whatever Oil policies Saddam dictates. This is the defining event of George Bush a presidency. For that matter this is the defining event of Saddam Hussein a presidency. The outcome will determine which survives politically. 1 support the administrations policy and expect that the Public will support it As Well a if it understands the stakes involved. Simply put if we allow Saddam to control half the worlds Oil reserves he will control our Economy a determining our rate of inflation our in Crest Rales our rate of growth. That cannot be permitted. Of course there san alternative we can avoid the risks. We can let Saddam clearly our deployment involves h?icn�auliu5, risks. There is a Chance of War. Rep. Aspin d-wis., is chairman of the House armed services committee intelligence not foolproof even when it works could president Bush have averted the need to Send american troops into saudi Arabia had he known in time of Raqu a plans to invade Kuwait the president dealt with the sensitive question of a possible intelligence lapse even As he Drew a line in the Sand against the ambitions of iraqi president Saddam Hussein to dominate the a Arab  As the first chief executive in the nations history to have personally directed the Cia Bush understands better than most High Public officials the secrecy shrouded Workings of human espionage and spy satellites. �?o1 Don t feel let Down by intelligence at All a Bush told reporters. A when Sou plan a Blit Krieg like attack that s launched at 2 in the morning its pretty hard to Stop particularly when you have just been Given the word of the people involved that there  be any such  a what the president could not say in a Public Flyum is that he and top policy makers a consumed by tether pressing concerns by a constant Stream of travel by an insatiable diet of meetings and appointments and by voluminous official reports a May indeed have failed to locus on timely warnings that went no further than their subordinates desks. It would be even harder for the president to openly discuss the customary character of Arab diplomacy which often results in a catch-22 stalemate. Kuwait a Sabah family which had ruled the Sheik Dom for the past 234 years had been paying billions of dollars in tribute to Baghdad. If past actions serve As a guide Kuwait a Emir Jabir Al Ahmed Al Sabah would have spurned any Bush offer to Send forces because he feared that the ruthless Saddam would regard any such step As the necessary a a provocation to invade. Moreover it was widely thought that Saddam could always be bought Olf. In the event there was no such offer and the time for bribes had ended. It was Only after the invasion when the kuwaitis world had suddenly been turned upside Down that their Melody changed. Asked if he would accept military Aid from the hated but powerful israelis if by doing so he could get his country Back Nasir Al Sabah a member of the ruling Elan and Kuwait s envoy to Washington replied a a that a something for you to evaluate and for the  it appears however that once intelligence analysts gained the full attention of . Policy makers events quickly moved in new direction. As the week began defense Secretary Dick Cheney flew to the saudi capital of Riyadh. He carried with him both satellite and human intelligence that argued persuasively that Saddam was prepared to Roll Forward until his soviet built main Battle tanks had seized that entire Southern flank of the Oil Rich persian Gulf. After an hour Long briefing and three cups of Sweet Tea King fahd apparently fearing the same Fate As kuwaitis Emir issued a request for direct . Military support. Would Saddam have indeed moved against the saudis had Bush dithered such questions lie at the outer limits of intelligence estimates. A intelligence can frequently Tell you what a in an enemy a hand a said sen. William Cohen of Maine the ranking Republican member of the Senate select committee on intelligence. A but it cannot As frequently Tell you what a in that enemy a  As Cohen sees it Bush had put great store in a Call he had received a just 18 hours before the iraqi assault a from president Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Mubarak who had been mediating the kuwaiti situation assured Bush that no invasion would occur. Co so Vico