European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - April 03, 1948, Darmstadt, Hesse The late resident Roosevelt encouraged Benes to seek a treaty with the russians the East West dilemma by Eduardi � Zeeh Leader explain How Bis three policy at Teheran led to Europe s . He Eon eludes is memoirs will belief Hal de Moelte a.1 soviet systems can live toothed after a ceremonial dinner at the White House on May 12, 1943. A which were present most of the Cabinet a number of congressmen an senators and some of president Roose velt s military advisers we went into the president s study and remained there till 2 . In a Lively and Frank the problems of the Day which we discussed were polish an soviet relations. This was at. The time when the quarrel Between the two was reaching its Zenith. Millions of Amer ican poles were intervening strongly m. The quarrel and their influence on the coming presidential elections in America played an important role Here. From Roosevelt s views and even More fro Harry Hopkins saw that the United Stales had already made a decision. I principle it accepted the soviet stand on changes in the former Eastern polish frontiers and had agreed that there must be some Accord on further co operation Between Poland and the soviet Union. Otherwise the unite states had no particular desire to sup port the attitude then being taken by Poland. I became convinced that. The opinions of the London poles regarding support by the United states of polish demands " against the soviet Union rested on sheer illusion or Wishful of state Sumner Welles formulated this View to me the next Day. During this discussion i also took up the question of our own relations with the soviet Union. In preparing myself in London for the trip to Washington i had informed Moscow through ambassador Bogomolov that i thought it would be Well to know some of the fundamental views of the soviet Union concerning Germany France Poland and had Given Bogomolov a series of questions and had received specific replies. In particular i had already Wekkend april 3, ims negotiated in principle with Bogomolov the text of our proposed treaty of Alliance. I thus came to Washington with a very Clear Conception of our re lations with the soviet discussion with Roosevelt Duvel oped along these Linos he informed he was aware of the future plans of the soviet Union and i told Roose velt frankly that we could not permit a second Munich that this obliged unto depend on a treaty with the soviet Union. I told him that it was Clear Tome that we would be neighbors of the soviet Union and that this would have some influence of our Domestic policy and on social and economic develop ments within our country. I said that after my return from America i in tended to visit Moscow and come to a definitive Accord with the soviet Union and that i believed that Poland should adopt the same a Long discussion. Roosevelt expressed his entire comprehension of this policy. Harry Hopkins Roosevelt s intimate political Collaborator an Sumner Welles expressed similar views. While i was still in Washington. Received word from Bogomolov in Lon Don of the soviet. Union s affirmative attitude toward the Transfer of our germans after the War. 1 explained to Roosevelt How we and the soviet Union regarded the Transfer of our germans. Roosevelt replied that Munich was Sucha lesson for the whole world that the question of our germans must be care fully studied. I therefore expected with certainty that when the Transfer question should be discussed the United. States would support our views. And this did result at Potsdam a y trip to the soviet Union was prepared at the same time As my decision to go to the was to be our final decisive political step of military and diplomatic charac Ter during the struggle for liberation and before the Allied Victory. It was closely connected with the negotiations for our treaty with the soviet Union against possible future German imperialism. Ever since the soviet Union had entered the War had planned to renew the treaty we had signed with Moscow in 1935. In june 1941 i stated the com either a new world catastrophe or else a second Munich for us in a new. Form and after it again world catastrophe. It was Clear to me that this real world catastrophe is avoidable through devoted labor for a solid an permanent Accord Between the Anglo saxons and the soviet Union and that our own chief task was to work for this Accord. View of my trip to the United states 1 wanted to get beforehand Clear idea of the soviet Union s policy both War and postwar toward both the. Great Powers and the smaller states particularly on the question of non interference in Domestic affairs recognition of full sovereignty soviet attitude toward postwar Germany and above All toward our permanent re lations both to the East and to the West. I expected that this would bring All the allies especially the great Powers much closer together would weaken or remove inaccurate suspicions of the soviet Union and thus help to prepare what did actually happen later at the Allied conferences in Moscow and Teheran. Therefore. I began conversations with soviet ambassador Bogomolov in London along these lines in Early 1943. I informed him of the Aims of my Voy age to the United states and said during my visit to the unite states i must justify our entire policy toward Germany Poland and the soviet Union. Before i leave i should like to ask Moscow some fundamental questions questions important for both yourselves and us. From the replies anyone among the allies will be Able to see where our policy is heading especially with regard to Poland. This question is the most burning of Althere in London and in the reply arrived april 23. Bogomolov announced his visit to Aston Abbotts the same Day. He came unhappy and very moved it seemed to me Tatjie regarded Success in these negotiations As a personal achievement. He brought positive replies to All my Basic question is and emphasized How important this was both for Moscow and Forus. He formulated Moscow s reply thus the soviet government will i principle not give a negative answer when it receives an exact text of the proposed treaty which we have been discussing. accept a clause in the treaty expressing the principle of Mutual non interference in internal affairs and it will have no objection to postwar cooperation with Poland in the manner expressed in the czechoslovak question. The soviet government there fore requests that you present a draft treaty text in your own i n Washington i found immediate understanding for our policy toward the soviet Union. Roosevelt Cordell. Hull and Sumner Welles All agree with it in principle. Our treaty appeared. To the american government As an example of what the other neighbors of the soviet Union should do. In London the situation was some what different Winston Churchill rather inclined toward our attitude but in the foreign office there were two different schools of thought. Some agreed Withus. But others regarded our attitude As. Leaning too much toward the East an especially As regards the poles who. 4 were it was said being isolated As regards the soviet attempts to Settle. Frontier questions with the Curzon line. The London poles were in great majority very decidedly against this policy. They a w the end of their former plans for constructing a Central european federation under polish Leader ship against both Germany Ancl the soviet my return from Washington i met Anthony Eden three times for Lon discussions. At the beginning Eden rather inclined toward those who were not actually opposed to the treaty or to my trip to Moscow. Nevertheless., he held the opinion that though i might immediately go to Moscow and negotiate the treaty we should not Actu ally sign it till later in View., of British Public opinion possibly not till after an armistice with Germany. I did. Not agree with this said it was in our interests and in the interests of All the others to show the whole world by our treaty what the soviet Union wanted and what kind of policy it intended to follow that it should and could bring the soviet Union closer both to great Britain and the United states and relieve the other allies As to the soviet \ Union s , above All it would also contribute to a settled tranquil development of the soviet Union in its relations with Europe and the world. I said emphatically that i accepted what the soviet Union was promising us As an actual reality and that from my previous experience i had no reason at All to doubt i sword. Was i mistaken in my judgment and my expectations at that time Only the future can answer this question. At first there was considerable Dif Ference Between us even though and i emphasize this again great Britai never opposed our treaty in principle. It was merely a question of when it should be signed. On the other hand the soviet Union once we had agreed continued on Page 16 11
