European Stars And Stripes (Newspaper) - October 16, 1986, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Page id coir runs the stars and stripes thursday. October 16. 1986 George will a demonstration of presidential decisiveness it was the president s finest hour. In an Odd place at an inauspicious moment he gave a watching world the most important moment of presidential decisiveness since president Truman picked up Stalin s Gauntlet and committed the nation in the policy of containment. And he gave the nation a clinic in leadership with his mind on future generations nol the next election he spurned the Short term applause that comes automatically to any president who signs any arms control agreement Iceland where surveys reveal that 55 percent of inc population believe in elves was a suitable place for a Summit clamoured for by people who believe in arms control As the key to Laming the soviet Union. The Iceland Summit was inc most successful . Summit. Al though Llic air is thick with lamentations from arms control enthusiasts the presi dam May almost havi1 made she arms control process palatable to people who Are sceptical atom its Utility and of n ils safely. Us did this by demonstrating w my thing thai inert were abundant reasons for doubling  a president can go to a Summit and dare to return without an agreement. Sum Mitry is i part of he arms control  summits have come to be regarded As events where arms control agreements Are consummated. A danger Ous asymmetry in this process is thai Western Public opinion is the Only pub Lic opinion that matters in this process and Western Public have never met an arms control agreement they did not like. Never mind that they have never rect an arms control agreement that seriously controlled arms ii May be Llic Case that by venturing to Iceland for thai fast food Summit the president strode into what the soviet Side fancied was a Clever Imp a Heads we win. Lails you loss situation. They would either kill the strategic defense Pinili Oilive or Vilish it in the Only impediment to arms reductions so comprehensive As to constitute inc termination of the fold War. However it is almost certainly wrong James Reston of i  the Mac Beer of missile the eduction Ajo on of of Nykl ski Subt Garlt Les. Nov its your term to think As Many even in the administration May think that important agreements really were within reach re Garding intermediate Range and strategic Missilli. It is probable that the soviet offers and expressions of interest were designed in Large measure to contribute to the orchestrated euphoria the collapse of which was counted on to deepen resentment of ski. And if the president had. To the soviets Surprise killed ski to gel soviet agreement to cuts it is probable that Many of the cuts would have been vitiated in years of negotiations about details in cheating and in deployments of new weapons not Cov ered by any Iceland agreements. 9nc reason for believing that the ice land outcome was the one the soviet Side aimed for is that their crucial demand was an act of Brazen overreaching. They sought a revision of the abm treaty a strengthening of the treaty that would have suffocated ski by confining re search to the Laboratory. The soviets could not seriously have expected the president 10 eviscerate his presidency by suddenly scrapping a program that he has advocated with the most Interne moral and Prudential argument but then brazenness is not in Short Supply in the soviet regime that Speaks of strengthening an abm treaty it is flagrantly violating a regime that stigmatized ski As highly imprudent and immoral yet has spent far More on defensive systems than has the United Stales. Certainly the Iceland outcome will enable Gorbachev to fan the names of Ami americanism among the european led. But it is equally certain that no president can make policy hostage to the hopeless and squalid project of trying to Dampen Europe s appeasement relies. In inc networks Rush to judgment on Iceland the editorializing was As Clear As it was unconscious. The outcome was called a collapse of the Summit a col lapse thai dashed Hopes of Progress and knocked .-sovict relations off the  the word collapse implies calamity the word Progress is defined exclusively in terms of the achievement of agreements. And what is one to make of the rails metaphor what rails were inc relationship on before Iceland collapse implies disorder. The ice land outcome was an orderly result of an orderly assessment. Thai is Progress of the High Cal sort Progress toward real  the Iceland outcome will con Fer the ancillary Blessing of putting an end Louic nonsense about the president and the first lady being mesmerized by arms control agreements As guarantor of his place in  born he and she know that every president since the Onset of the .-Soviel arms control process 17 years ago has achieved an arms con Irol agreement count inn As one should the Ford Brezhnev agreement at Vladivostok. Or. And mrs. Reagan know that ii is nonsense on slits to say that arms control agreements sealed for Nixon Ford and Carter enviable places in his  the arms control process has in deed now Given this president the High place in history thai was waiting for the first president who would show that it is possible to just say no claws Ringlon Post a Neil Loup results of Iceland Summit meeting not a disaster the Reagan Gorbachev meeting in Iceland should be judged by the immensity of the task. Seldom have two leaders of divided nations tried to do so much in so Short a Lime. Maybe this Effort to negotiate inc dangerous intricacies of the nuclear balance of Power was a Blunder. Bui it was not As so Many Are saying a disaster. Everything was attempted without Success but nothing was irretrievably lost. In a Way the practical proposals they agreed about substantial reductions in strategic and intermediate weapons some limitation on testing and the right to on site inspection were More surprising than their disagreement on the president s strategic defense initiative or Star wars program. But while their agreements on the former were vetoed by Mikhail Gorbachev s disagreement on the lat Ter they Kepi these negotiations on the table for future talks by experts who have More knowledge and time for analysis. It s fairly obvious from the reaction to the outcome of the Iceland meeting that the United states is still divided Over president Reagan s Star wars program. Ever since he announced in on March 23, 1983, even his own people have differed Over its Racli Carly. Some have agreed with the president that ski is the key to a world without nuclear  Oiler have thought of it to a bargaining Chip to get Gorbachev Back to the negotiation table and Force Bim to offer major cuts in nuclear weapons systems. The president won the argument and does t seem to know ii said sen. Sam Nunn d-ga., a supporter of ski and a member of the latter group. He said for example that the president at Iceland had made ski the principal objective of his policy rather than the reduction of nuclear weapons thus according to Nunn he preferred the Bird in the Bush to the Bird in his hand. So while most of the criticism has come from advocates of cutting nuclear weapons at the expense of testing and deploying ski. There Are Many on the other Side who think the president s miss in Iceland was a Relief. In is pointed out that Reagan did t go to Iceland expecting a detailed negotiation of the nuclear prob Lem. He intended merely to establish an Agenda and & favourable atmosphere for the main Summit meeting in Washington later on. Instead he did t talk philosophy but allowed him self to become involved in a highly complicated mis Sile numbers game that produced what Secretary of state George Sulu called some breathtaking proposals but ended with stardust in eve body s eyes. What has surprised Many observers is that the president did not listen to the new soviet proposals and say they were so important that they required serious study and consultation with the allies and the leaders of Congress. Instead he insisted on a confrontation with Gorbachev on the Star wan Issue. Which produced the Stalc Maic. This is regarded by Many As bad diplomacy and bad politics. In the first place Gorbachev and later the president himself were arguing about proposals that affected the Security of Many nations not Only in nato but in Asia As Well. Gorbachev could scarcely have objected if the president had insisted on Lime to think things Over and consult with other interested parties. On the political front with control of the. Senate Riding on neat month s congressional election it would have been helpful to the republicans if the president had come Home with Gorbachev s new proposals in his pocket and the ski Issue postponed. Instead he Drew the ski line gathered up his papers and walked out in disagreement. He was careful however to avoid any Sharp break with the soviet Leader. His invitation to have another talk with Gorbachev Stilt stands he said adding somewhat to the bewilderment of Many observers in Washington that we Are closer than Ever before to agreements that could Lead to a safer world without nuclear  the nato allies meeting with Shutz in Boiu Els have also muted their criticism. But they Are under pressure from Public opinion for an arms Deal and with elections coming up in Britain. West Ger nutty Tod France they we Likely to be urging the president to Amend Hii ski program and try. Ito in for arms Redue lion before he ends nil term in office. .-.-,