European Stars And Stripes (Newspaper) - July 26, 1988, Darmstadt, Hesse . Joint chiefs fight for command by Bernard e. Trainor new York times nobody wanted unit Darab emirates n Seaman at the Bow of the frigate Fahrion keeps a watch out for mines while escorting a Convoy of tankers in the Gulf. The Central come which includes the Gulf is a misfit in the Pentagon s organizational charts. Thing Perks up the Pentagon faster than news of a disagreement within the joint chiefs of staff particularly if it is a division Over which service will fill a vacancy in the senior command. It s like the army Navy football game. The outcome is viewed As a matter of service Pride by officers of All grades. This summer has been particularly hot in Washington and so has the Competition Between the army and the Navy to provide the replacement for Gen. George. Crist of the marines who will step Down this fall As commander of the . Central come. Crist oversees All . Military activities in 19 countries of the Middle East Africa and the persian Gulf. A longstanding gentlemen s agreement Amono the service chiefs called for an army general to relieve the Marine. But reality intervened in thl form of the Iran Iraq . With the re designation of 11 kuwaiti tankers As . Vessels a year ago the Central come was transformed from a land oriented organization into a major naval command. After that it was no secret around the Pentagon that Many admirals were unhappy that anybody but a Navy Man was in Overall command of what they saw As a Navy show. So this summer the Navy challenged the army s turn at Bat. Army officers responded testily pointing out that there is More to the command than the persian Gulf. How Many ships can they sail into Jordan asked one colonel outraged at the Navy s Challenge forgetting perhaps that the hash emite kingdom has a port City Aqaba opposite the israeli resort port of Eilat at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. Tradition it seems will prevail. A senior Pentagon official said in mid july that Secretary of defense Frank c. Carlucci intends to recommend to the president that it. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf Deputy chief of staff for operations and plans on the army staff become the next commander. Regardless of who leads it the Central come is viewed As something that grew like Topsy and is a misfit in the Pentagon s organizational charts. According to those familiar with its history it is a command the joint chiefs of staff did not want. It has few military forces of its own and must Call upon those in the United states or from other Heaters such As the Pacific and european commands when it faces a military threat. Unlike the other geographical commands which have Headquarters in their areas of responsibility Central come s Headquarters is at Macdill fab fla., because no Middle Eastern nation was willing to be its Host. The origins of Thelt. Gen. H. Norman Centra come go Back to Schwarzkopf. 1979 when the Shah of Iran was overthrown and his country was in turmoil As a result of the islamic revolution. Fearful that the soviet Union would take advantage of iranian instability and try to gain control of the persian Gulf oilfields president Jimmy Carter declared the persian Gulf of vital interest to the nation and announced that the United states would use Force to protect its interests. To provide a military capability to Back up the Why the Pentagon s procurement system does t work by Richard Halloran new York times during the last Pentagon procurement scandal in the mid-1980s, Karl g. Harr the head of a lobby for arms makers pointed to fundamental contradiction of the arms Industry. It is free Enterprise that must serve two masters he said the government customer and the corporate Harr did not elaborate on the consequences of such a system when there is a conflict Between the taxpayers who want their soldiers and sailors equipped with Well made weapons produced economically and corporate shareholders who want handsome returns on investment patriotism often takes second place to profit. In the current scandal most of the alleged fraud and bribery seemed driven by a thirst for profit to get inside information so that companies would have an Edge Over their competitors in bidding for contracts. In a hearing on Capitol Hill in june Robert b. Costello the defense department s under Secretary for acquisition was asked Why. He said he had a one word answer costello who came to the Pentagon 19 months ago after a 33-year-Long career in the arms Industry and at general motors added that As orders for military hardware become More and More lucrative people Are going to do anything to get that but if greed is the Root cause it is far from the Only problem with the american Way of weapons procurement in which unlike Many other nations arms Are made by private Industry instead of government arsenals. Sen. Sam Nunn chairman of the armed services committee cited among others the inability of the acquisition system to provide our men and women in uniform with Quality equipment on a timely and Cost effective the average military production line in this country is running at less than half of production capacity the Georgia Democrat added wasting billions in overhead costs. The average weapons program he noted is running three years behind few would disagree with that catalogue of flaws. There is also general agreement As to the causes though there is dispute about there to rank them. High on almost everyone s list Are congressional priorities. Senators and representatives often vote for arms programs with jobs in their electoral districts As much in mind As efficiency in the National interest. But if congressmen say Cut costs but not in my Back Yard the military frequently Falls prey to what is known As a not invented Here syndrome. The air Force and the Navy have Long insisted on having their own fighter planes even though their missions Are similar. Thus the Navy has the f-14 tomcat made by Grumman and the air Force the f-15 Eagle made by Mcdonnell Douglas an example of duplication rather than Economy of scale. Another common complaint of numerous panels and experts including the presidential commission led by j. Peter Grace chairman of the . Grace co., in 1984, is that Pentagon management is inefficient. The Grace commission contended that the defense department could save $100 billion in three years. In 1986, another presidential commission led by David Packard the industrialist and former Deputy Secretary of defense in the Nixon administration was sharply critical of the military establishment but issued Only limited recommendations. Finally Competition in procurement is at base artificial. Because Many big companies have monopolies on certain kinds of weapons or other military equipment and the defense department is a Mono Sony or single buyer arms makers need not respond to the marketplace. Overpricing late delivery poor design bad engineering shoddy workmanship substituting inferior materials and inadequate testing Only begin the list of practices tolerated in a self enclosed system in which Many of the actors pass through a revolving door taking turns at playing the roles of buyer and seller. The current investigation into unethical and possibly illegal procurement activities provides far from the first evidence of fraud and bribery. Indeed it May turn out that wrongdoing has Only spread wider since earlier inquiries. A 1984 Pentagon handbook called indicators of fraud in Dod procurement better known As the red Book said bribes offered by arms makers Are a very real it reported that a file clerk for instance had taken $50,000 from various contractors to provide them inside information used to enhance their bid packages a charge remarkably similar to those appearing in court documents related to the present investigation. In Congress some fear that repeated scandals surrounding the arms Industry will erode already weakened support for sustaining military spending at its current Levels. The american people Aren t going to support the funding we need sen. John Mccain r-ariz., has said unless they believe in the integrity of our defense establishment and believe the guilty will really be in the Pentagon there Are other concerns about what some officials have characterized As a straitjacket of new rules. One measure has already been introduced on Capitol Hill to strictly govern the procurement process More Are expected. President s policy in the Gulf a command designated the rapid deployment joint task Force which was to be a precursor of Central come was formed. Because the new command was oriented toward opposing a ground invasion of Iran neither the Navy or air Force was interested in commanding it. The joint chiefs concluded that an officer skilled in ground operations should run it and agreed informally that command would alternate every few years Between the marines and the army. The air Force agreed to always fill the Deputy Billet and the Navy lukewarm to the whole task Force idea settled for some key staff jobs. Paul x. Kelley a three Star Marine general was the first commander of the newly formed rapid deployment joint task Force but aside from a few Small Navy ships in the persian Gulf there were no forces for him to command just a Small Headquarters. Nonetheless he was told to draw up plans to defend Iran against a soviet invasion with the Assurance that forces from the United states and overseas bases would be made available if the russians or others caused trouble in the Region. When Kelley was reassigned to Washington in 1981, it. Gen. Robert Kingston of the army took Over in accordance with the initial agreement. Against the advice of the joint chiefs of staff who viewed the command As primarily a contingency Headquarters Secretary of defense Caspar w. Weinberger in 1983 elevated the joint task Force to the status of a geographic theater command equal to the european Atlantic and Pacific commands. Weinberger assigned it the imposing title of United states Central come and also promoted its commander to four Star rank. Technically the command Billet was then open to nomination from any of the services but historically each theater is headed by an officer from the service having the Paramount interest in the area. The land oriented role of Central come had not yet changed but army officers contended that the original gentlemen s agreement was no longer binding. They argued that the greatly enlarged command was the natural province of the army which they said was better Able than the Marine corps to conduct Large scale operations and to oversee military assistance. The chief of staff of the army at the time Gen John a. Wickham jr., overrode those objections however and honoured the original commitment in 1985 when Kingston retired and Crist took Over. But then the situation within the Region changed dramatically and with it the role played by the services. The soviets who seemed such a threat to the persian Gulf Region in 1980, were bogged Down in Afghanistan and showed no appetite for a similar adventure in Iran. As a result Central come staff officers at Macdill no longer wrestled with plans to defend Iran s Zagrous mountains against soviet mechanized divisions. Instead attention shifted to the Waters of the persian Gulf As the Tanker Between Iran and Iraq heated up. A dispute developed soon after the Navy was involved in actual fighting in the Gulf. Stung by criticism of the Navy s performance including being caught Short in dealing with mines in the Gulf the . Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet James a. Lyons jr., headquartered in Hawaii expressed doubt that Central come had the ability and experience to command naval forces in the Inland Waters of the persian Gulf. Lyons who has since retired maintained that his command outside the Gulf should direct those forces. Crist of the marines countered by saying that All forces in and out of the Gulf were in support of his operations and that for the Sake of Unity of command his authority should be extended Seaward to include the Pacific Fleet ships offshore in the Indian Ocean. The Pentagon solved the problem with the Wisdom of Solomon. It named rear adm. Anthony a. Less As joint commander for All forces on either Side of the Strait of Hormuz. But it put him under the direct command of Central come at Macdill. The Navy and air Force each have their own fighter planes even though their missions Are similar. Here is the air Force f-15 Eagle made by Mcdonnell Douglas. The Navy has the f-14 tomcat made by Grumman. Page 14 the stars and stripes tuesday july 26,1988 the stars and stripes Page 15
