European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - April 09, 1991, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Tom Wicker a a hmm Emma /. A. Some critics of Gulf tuesday april 9, 1991 the stars and stripes Page 13 commentary policy foresaw dilemma  .1? s f v0x�?. A a a a. / the turmoil now convulsing Iraq was predictable before a single smart bomb was launched at Baghdad. It became certain when the . Air Force proceeded to blow that nation Back into the a preindustrial age a Bush administration statements before and during the War make it Clear that the president and his men never wanted to dismember Iraq. Nor did their essential Arab allies saudi Arabia Egypt and Syria. All had reason to fear the possibility of a fundamentalist Muslim state dominated by Iran on Parto what is now iraqi territory Egypt and saudi Arabia As Well As Washington recoiled too from the possibility that their odious ally Hafez Al Assad of Syria might pounce upon part of the territory of a shattered Iraq. This is not Hindsight. These were obvious stated possibilities and legitimate fears a that Iraq might become another Lebanon a from the beginning of the persian Gulf crisis yet it was also obvious that a War inflicting substantial defeat and destruction on Saddam Hussein a forces would take a major Factor off the. Middle Eastern Board throw the regions politics into disarray and open Iraq to the feared possibility of being torn apart by predatory neighbors Bush nevertheless went ahead with plans for the liberation of Kuwait which Iraq had wantonly invaded. Since the alliances Quick Victory its apparent that after the president ordered an offensive buildup in november he was Bent on a military solution unless Saddam withdrew which was unlikely. A coherent a not necessarily Wise a National strategy in these circumstances would have aimed at crushing Saddam a regime overthrowing him and occupying Iraq to protect its territorial integrity. But there were two problems. A that would have enmeshed the . Deeply in Middle East politics a choosing and supporting an iraqi government for example a and would have kept a sizable . Force tied Down indefinitely in that country. A the United nations had voted authority Only for a War to liberate Kuwait not to overrun and occupy Iraq or oust Saddam. Bush therefore muddled his strategy hoping to accomplish circuit ugly what he could not do directly. Intending with his own and Allied forces Only to expel Saddam from Kuwait a a Mission quickly accomplished a he nevertheless called repeatedly for internal iraqi forces to Rise and overthrow the dictator. At the same time he allowed the ferocious and disproportionate bombing of Iraq that destroyed its infrastructure untold numbers of its citizens and much of its Normal life. His incitements and the catastrophic damage inflicted on Iraq quite literally assured the internal uprisings that followed the Allied Victory in Kuwait. The iraqi dictator however was left with sufficient armed Power to combat fiercely the revolts that kurd shiites and others had entered upon largely owing to Bush Surg Ings and the expectation of Allied support. The presidents Hopes a a weak Reed upon which to base a War policy for the overthrow of Saddam proved vain. Nor had anything changed or eliminated the two problems cited above. They were the main reasons that despite his own ringing Calls to insurrection and Battle Bush chose not to intervene on behalf of the rebels. He abandoned Many of them to their deaths and vitiated much of whatever political gain the . Had achieved by Victory in Kuwait. That decision however forced by ultimate circumstance May deserve the criticism it has received. Some a who nearly canonized president Bush for winning a great Victory in the Gulf War now rebuke him severely for not intervening to help those he incited to revolt. But this criticism puts the cart before the horse. The greater opprobrium is due a confused presidential strategy that allowed military Victory to bring an unwanted undesirable result a an internal iraqi Bloodbath actually encouraged by George Bush a military strategy and inflated rhetoric. In reality the Choice facing those who wanted War in january including the president was Between the Conquest and occupation of Iraq and something like the terrible mess now shaming the nation.  have been and was foreseen. So perhaps those who opposed either consequence were not after All so lacking in responsibility. \ a a a a a. C the new York times Leslie h. Gel Bush needs to seize the moment in the Gulf the wrong Man James Baker flew off to the Middle East saturday because the right Man George Bush is not nearly ready to go. Secretary of state Baker does not have the clout to break Down the Granite like stalemate Between arabs and israelis president Bush might. Bush is the most feared . President Ever in Israel and the most admired Ever among arabs. The israelis know he does not need jewish support for re election. The arabs know they owe him for defeating Iraq. After his Triumph in the persian Gulf War Bush must feel like Superman. But he lies immobilized like Gulliver bound by his dread of Middle East lilliputian capable of sapping All his Powers. He appears to be afraid of putting his enormous political capital and himself at any risk a even though All his aides say he a convinced that the moment to strike for peace is now. In a Way Bush is As much a victim of his Mideast negotiating strategy As of his political caution. That strategy posits two tracks. Track one asks Tor Confidence building measures Between Arab states and Israel. For example the arabs lift their economic Boycott against Israel and Israel reopens palestinian universities. Track two seeks israeli palestinian talks with the goal of trading israeli occupied land for peace. The strategy looks like the old and sound incrementalism plan. But it is in essence a Micro incrementalism approach. It Calls for tiny Steps and such Steps will take a lot of time to produce momentum. By then Bush a Victory Toga will be frayed. Strategy is at Odds with Power. Bush a Power is at its Peak now. But the strategy does not Call on him to use it until later perhaps Long after the a moment of Opportunity has passed. Nonetheless guided by this strategy Bush dispatched Baker to the Mideast a month ago. He was armed with questions to test the strategy. The Secretary returned with the Good news that All the parties saw the wars aftermath As an a a Opportunity for peace. The White House soon put out the word that Bush would Don his Superman Cape and Fly to the Mideast. Then Bush realized that no one actually had Given Baker even a modest Concrete Concession. A it began to Dawn on the White House that possibly the War had not altered Arab israeli animosity. Perhaps officials also sensed that Bush s heroes Lap around the Region might become an embarrassing procession of questions about Arab israeli negotiations. So White House officials shelved the tour and waited for the arabs and israelis to answer the Baker questions. And they waited. And they received Mideast visitors. And whatever these visitors said privately their leaders Back Home were hardening their Public positions. A there is clearly a danger of losing the moment a a key administration official opined. A if we done to get action soon the Middle East states will revert to form a thus was conceived the present Baker journey. Margaret Tutwiler the state department spokeswoman launched it with these uplifting words a so i would if i was going to characterize it say this is yet another step in his step by step  administration officials Are guarding the contents of bakery a Brief with titillating discretion Here Sall they will say he will press for answers to his earlier questions. He might sketch out some sort of regional conference to trigger bilateral Arab israeli talks. He will not put pressure on anyone. He will have some ideas about a Trade offs Quot and possible . Guarantees of  he will speak about Bush a commitment and impatience. As for now however Bush will remain firmly planted in the far background. His advisers agree that Baker must first line up the pieces of peace before the president is wheeled into action. A we have to have a better sense if talks will work before taking them to the next level a a key official explained. Maybe. But the 1978 peace Between Israel and Egypt Points to the opposite course of action. Jimmy Carter generally no great shakes As a Leader knew what to do then. He took the talks right up to his level and put himself directly on the firing line at Camp David. This remains the Only successful Model for a Mideast peace. 1 a c the new York times ,