European Stars And Stripes (Newspaper) - January 18, 1989, Darmstadt, Hesse                                9onirs by Serge Schmemann new York times in the nearly three weeks since West German companies were accused of helping to outfit suspect chemical Plant in Libya West German officials have gone from a petulant defensiveness to the surprising admission that they knew All about it Long before the americans told them of their concerns. In so doing Bonn displayed the Complex anxieties of a nation whose economic and military Power has outstripped the revival of its self Confidence. It also disclosed a new spreading sense of annoyance with nato an Alliance whose Many impositions and demands no longer seem justified to Many germans by the level of threat from the East they now perceive. After the admission even germans were struck by the quickness with which Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Many of his countrymen had indignantly lashed out at a Media Campaign in the United states though the Chancellor s aides knew better and Kohl might have foreseen the political risk Given the information he had. As one West German commentator suggested Kohl really did seem to lose his temper or his nerve. As is now Clear this was not because he assumed Imhausen Cherie a Mph the German company that has been the focus of the uproar to be innocent. More Likely Kohl like Many germans assumed that Washington had leaked the Story to Embarrass and put pressure on him and his government. Some commentators have surmised that the americans May have expected foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher to Challenge them at last week s chemical weapons conference in Paris and decided to put him in the Dock instead. In any Case Kohl apparently considered the disclosure unfair. He evidently Felt that he had done All he could after president Reagan had told him of the . Suspicions about the libyan Plant at a meeting in Washington nov. 15. The Chancellor had started Clandestine investigations and finally initiated Steps to revise West Germany s lax Export Laws and regulations which the americans had sought for Many years. In ordering the new Export controls Kohl thought he was tacitly accepting the Long standing . Charges at the Cost of opening himself up to a barrage of political accusations from the opposition on West Germany s secret sales of nuclear equipment and arms. Kohl also stood to take on the Power Export lobby which was irritated by previous . Efforts to curtail German High technology exports to Eastern Europe. The leaks moreover forced the government to disclose its Clandestine investigation and to order a Public inquiry by finance authorities immediately knowing that it would turn up nothing. The repeated insistence by Kohl s spokesman that the americans had not provided evidence that stood up in court reflected in part the memory that the last time Bonn had acted on . Information in 1984 against Karl Kolb co., which Washington said was involved in building a Gas Plant in Iraq the company sued the government and won. Beyond the political problems was the emotional effect that the charge of producing Poison gases had on a nation that initiated their use in world War i and which the nazis extended to genocidal practice in the 1940s. The invocation of Auschwitz in a new York times column one widely quoted and commented on Odid into you in 6lobmsupi�cy a Emu  investment a ? does not explain Why he did not react when his own intelligence service told him at least As Early As last August months before he met with Reagan that Imhausen and other German companies were involved in the Plant. It was Only after the Reagan meeting that Bonn took Concrete action and it was Only after information about German intelligence findings was leaked that the government spokesman acknowledged it. According to american critics the pattern was typical of a resistance to taking any action against exporters even when they were conclusively identified As having sold weapons and sensitive technology outside nato. Although the germans have differed with the americans on what should not be exported to Eastern Europe the broader problem of strategic exports has been prominently explored in the West German press As Well especially after disclosures of West German sales of heavy water a substance critical to nuclear plants to Pakistan and India. Yet until the libyan affair Kohl s administration had been reluctant to take Steps either against exporters or to tighten up its Laws. An investigation of German companies that helped build chemical weapons plants in Iraq is still dragging on and other inquiries have been dropped for Lack of evidence. Among the reasons that have been explored in the press and among diplomats one explanation often broached is that the germans Are wary because of the nation s history to accept the responsibilities and hard realities that come with the economic Power they have accumulated since the War. For the government to admit that its merchants were exporting dangerous weapons would be to admit traits and activities to which the German nation would presumably prefer to ignore. This week the West German government finally conceded that the libyan chemical Plant built with the Aid of German companies is equipped to make Poison Gas. It was the first Public sign that Bonn had accepted Washington s View that the rata Plant near Tripoli was meant to make chemical weapons the economic importance of West German exporters has also made it difficult for the government to control them. There is the technical Challenge of checking the 1.4 million items that Are exported each month. It is not Clear yet whether the Bonn government will finally find any evidence that it can use against Imhausen or other exporters in court. Its spokesman s insistence that the government still has no such evidence suggests that it May not. To Many diplomats however what May be most important is that it has finally acknowledged the weakness in its Export Laws and that Kohl and Genscher seem determined to resolve the problem. Kohl said last weekend that he hoped to have a package ready for parliament to enact by easter. Wednesday january 18, 1989 the stars and stripes Page 13 jabbed straight to the germans greatest angst adding an emotional tinge to an already sensitive affair. In the column which appeared Jan. 4 in the stars and stripes William Safire wrote one might think that this generation of germans aware of the guilt of their fathers in the gassing of millions of innocents not so Long ago would be particularly sensitive to the Prospect of complicity in the murder by Gas of civilians by a terrorist state  when confronted with the american charges the Bonn government s reaction was to lash out. The scene for the dispute however had been set before the leaked report. It broke at a time when friction had been steadily building in american German relations a friction that neither Washington nor Bonn has figured out How to Deal with. At its Core is a fundamental difference on the future of the Western Alliance and the spreading sense in West Germany that the Burden of Allied armies and the constraints that come with it Are no longer justified at current Levels by the threat from the East. In West Germany it has taken the forms of growing resistance to Low level training flights by nato aircraft by demands for Quick action on reducing conventional arms and by resistance to the modernization of nato Battlefield nuclear weapons. The stance one commentator suggested was that the Days of jumping when the americans snapped their fingers were Over. Kohl and his government Are Likely to come under considerable pressure in coming weeks and months As they try to juggle Allied demands and Domestic resistance. So when the libyan affair surfaced before the West German press began turning up its own evidence the Public was primed to turn on the americans and Kohl was ready to assume that the americans were applying unfair pressure. Yet to explain Why Kohl reacted As he did to the leak