European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - November 28, 1993, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Crusade Schwarzkopf wanted b 52s to hit iraqi troops from hour  this bomber lifts off rom Raf Fairford England on feb. 10 on the Way to the War tone. Continued from Page 7 headed an air Force planning cell called Check mate. Two Days later Warden presented Schwarz Kopf with the rough outlines of an attack plan that stressed leaping Over Iraq s Field army to strike at the enemy s leadership electrical and Petroleum facilities and other vital centers of  Warden s plan was modified repeatedly during the next five months but the Basic blueprint survived. Schwarzkopf left virtually All details of the scheme to his air commanders particularly it. Gen. Charles a. Horner and Brig. Gen. Buster Glosson As Well As Glosson s Deputy it. Col. David a. Deptula. On Jan. 15, less than 48 hours before the War began Schwarzkopf accepted an invitation from Glosson to visit his strike planners in the basement of the Royal saudi air Force Headquarters. Glosson wanted the cinc to  a few hands slap a few backs and Buck up morale before the Long ordeal that would begin when the first bombs fell on Baghdad. Schwarzkopf complied admirably. The air thick ened with camaraderie. Toward the end of his tour the cinc stood before a map with Glos son and Horner As Dep Tula explained these Quence of attacks scheduled in the first hours of the War. Some 20 other officers Lin gered in the Back ground watching their commander in chief. Why Schwarzkopf Charles Homer suddenly interjected arc we not bombing the Republican guard with b 52s?" Deptula Clad in his Olive drab flight suit hesitated before pointing out that the Taw Alkana div and other guard units would indeed be bombed by b-52s on the night of Jan. 17-18, about 18 hours into the Campaign. Subsequent raids had been scheduled against the guard s Hammurabi and Medina Divi  jumped in. Sir because of the threat from surface to air missiles we never planned to bomb them until we be had a Chance during the first Day to work Over All those Sa-6s and Sa-2s and a 3s with our f-l6s and f/a-l8s." Glosson was aware of the cinc s fondness for b-52s like Many senior army officers he had seen the devastating consequences of arc Light strikes in Vietnam. Glosson also knew of Schwarzkopf s preoccupation with the Republican guard. Since late summer Schwarzkopf had directed that the guard be attacked Early and often during the air War. The cinc had often stressed that no Allied ground offensive would be launched until coalition bombers had reduced iraqi forces by at least 50 percent. Now he flushed As he loomed Over Glosson. The Bonhomie vanished. You be lied to me he barked. Sir Glosson snapped Back. I be never lied to you.  other officers in the room exchanged glances the cinch voice Rose. I said i wanted them bombed from hour one and that s what i want you people have been misleading me. You re not follow ing orders. You re not doing what i told you to  Homer stepped in. We Don t have enough sorties to do it All. I Schwarzkopf Cut him off. Goddammit if you can t follow my orders i la find somebody who can you Tell me How Many b-52 air Crew members you re willing to lose Glosson heatedly demanded and i la Tell you How Many we can put in there. You Tell me How Many you re willing to have  goddammit Buster i be never been willing to have someone die  that s the Issue Glosson  Don t want to Dis cuss it anymore Schwarzkopf said turn ing away. Well Glosson began. I Don t want to Dis cuss it anymore for a moment the four men stood As if in tableau. Homer assumed that Glosson would be ordered from a the theater for Imerti Buster Glossa Nence. Deptula astonished at the cinch tirade began calculating the chaos that would result from an abrupt reconfiguration of the first night s attack. Schwarzkopf stalked from the room and up to Homer s office on the third floor trailed by the two air Force generals. When the door was closed he jabbed his Finger at them. Don t either one of you Ever again confront me like that in front of people. Goddammit the Guys we re going to have to fight Are the Republican guard. We be got the b-52s and we want to Start pounding them right  the color drained from his face and his voice softened. I m under a lot of pressure. You Don t understand How much pressure i m  Homer eyed the cinc curiously. Give me a break he said to himself. Glosson began to reply then thought better of it. We put the entire air Campaign together by ourselves he thought with no help from you. Those Are our pilots who Are going out to die and you have the Gall to talk to us about pres sure Norman Schwarzkopf was a terrestrial creature. For nearly 40 years since entering West Point As a 17-year-old plebe and on through company Battal Ion brigade division and corps command his professional life had revolved around the clash of ground armies. His heroes Grant Sherman Creighton Abrams were All As he fondly called them Muddy Boot  he had never believed strategic air Power Likely to roust Saddam Hussein s army from Kuwait without the knockout blow of a ground attack. Although he accepted the centers of Gravity Laid out by John Warden and sub sequently incorporated into the air Campaign his own focus was on Iraq s army particularly the re publican guard s three heavily armoured divisions which he sometimes referred to As the Center of  in this he echoed Colin Powell. There is no damned Inchon throughout the fall Schwarzkopf stressed the importance of demolishing the Republican guard. He personally dictated the Mission of his main ground attack Force attack deep to destroy Republican guard armoured mechanized  but precisely where How and when the ground offensive should be launched remained a Puzzle. A Cen com plan Ning team code named eager Anvil initially concluded that liberating Kuwait can t be done since the forces on hand were intended primarily to de fend the saudi Peninsula. Schwarzkopf knew As Wellas Powell or Cheney that a liberation of Kuwait at the Cost of thousands of american lives would be pyrrhic Victory with dreadful political repercussions. And the history of armoured attacks in the 20th Cen Tury was not reassuring even the nazi invasion of Poland in 1939 a Blitzkrieg against a surprised and technologically inferior foe had resulted in 45,000 German casualties. In mid september four army officers arrived i Riyadh to help Schwarzkopf draft a plan to drive Iraq from Kuwait. Led by a former helicopter Pilot turned armoured officer it. Col. Joseph h. Purvis the quartet came from the school of advanced Mili tary studies at fort Leavenworth Kan. Sams graduates were known informally and at first Derisi vely As Jedi knights after heroic characters from the movie Star wan. Steeped in military history doctrine and strategy the Sams Jedi served As a kind of brain Trust within the army. They embrace the same unofficial motto As the German general staff be More than you appear to  on sept. 18 at 6 p.m., Schwarzkopf summoned the four men to his office where he propped a Small map of Kuwait against the Couch. Assume a ground attack will follow an air  he said. Tell me the Best Way to drive Iraq out of Kuwait Given the forces we have  under the Guise of a Leavenworth team studying desert warfare they moved into a Small vault in the ministry of defense and aviation basement that had Page 8 sunday november 28.1993