European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - November 28, 1993, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Terv Ned directly rather than working through pow Ell. In a conference Call to Schwarzkopf with the chairman also on the line the Secretary asked the cinc to make the Case for postponement. The air Campaign had lasted More than a month with remarkable Success. Schwarzkopf had been Given everything he asked for More in fact than he had asked for. An enormous army was poised to strike. Norm Cheney said pointedly Tell me your reasons for wanting an additional delay. Schwarzkopf believed As he later acknowledged in his memoirs that an iraqi withdrawal would mean an Allied Victory without further Allied casual tics. He still feared that the coalition could lose 5,000 dead and wounded in just the first two Days of the ground War. Time is on our Side he told the Secre tary and chairman. But in Cheney s View allowing the enemy army to escape at this Point would be a strategic Blunder. The purpose of the War was not Only to liberate Kuwait but also to destroy Iraq s offensive capability. Hearing no persuasive reasons for delay Cheney urged Schwarzkopf to wrap it  Powell subsequently placed another phone Call to Riyadh from his office. Norm he began you be got to give me some Good stuff on this one because i Don t really understand  to Powell s Surprise Schwarzkopf exploded. What if we attack on the 24th and the iraqis counterattack and we take a lot of casualties because we Don t have adequate air support in a bellowing rage the cinc accused Powell of political expediency and timidity in refusing to confront Bush and Cheney. My responsibility is the lives of my sol Diers he added. This is All  Powell had prided himself on ignoring Schwarz Kopf s occasional effrontery but this went beyond the Pale. The suggestion that Only the theater com Mander was concerned about american lives infuriated the chairman. With a Roar that filled his of fice he lashed out. Wait a minute buddy Don t you patronize me Don t pull that on me that we Don t care about  As abruptly As it began the storm subsided sometimes i feel like i m in a Vise like my head is being squeezed in a Vise Schwarzkopf pleaded his voice unsteady. Maybe i m losing  Powell paused for a moment it was important to re establish some equilibrium to recapture what he thought of As the usual Colin Norm  we need to take a Little time on this the chairman told himself. It will work out left Cool it Norm Powell said you know that at the end of the Day we will do what you want i will make any recommendations necessary for you to do what you soldiers of the 101st airborne Dir establish position inside Iraq on feb. 25, Day 2 of the ground War. A . Soldier meets jubilant residents of Kuwait City on feb. 27, the Day it was liberated from Iraq. Want. But of this one you be got to give me some help As to Why you think we should change the Date. But Well support you. We always have. I always  a few hours later Schwarzkopf called Back. Good news he told Powell. The weather forecast looked better. Boomer and the marines would be ready. Four . On the 24th looked like a Good time to launch the attack after All. Epilogue four Days later it was Over. Yet despite the rela Tive ease with which coalition ground forces rolled up the iraqi army Schwarzkopf spent a Good portion of those four Days in a fury at the deliberate Pace of his main attack Force the . Army s Vii corps. He subsequently threatened to relieve both it Gen. Yeosock the senior army commander and it. Gen. Franks commander of Vii corps. Having spent his entire professional life preparing for a titanic clash of huge armies he seemed enraged at the Prospect of decisive Victory slipping through his fingers. At the end however when asked by Powell and Bush whether he wanted the attack to continue. Schwarzkopf said no. He had he believed accomplished his Mission As summarized by the president in his nationally televised announcement of a cease fire Kuwait is liberated. Iraq s army is Defeated. Our military objectives Are met.". In Schwarzkopf the nation rediscovered the pleas ure of adoring a military hero. For Many months after the War the cinc seemed ubiquitous appear ing at the Kentucky Derby at the Indianapolis 500. On Capitol Hill in parades on bubblegum cards. What next to conquer asked an electronic Mes Sage on the scoreboard at Tampa stadium during one Giddy Celebration. Mentioned As a possible army chief of staff or even for five Star rank he would choose instead to retire after 35 Yean of serv ice becoming Rich and Ever More famous. Yet history must draw Back a bit. Schwarzkopf s generalship not unlike the War itself was hardly unblemished. He had at first grossly misjudged the time and forces needed to expel the iraqi invaders from Kuwait. His overestimation of the enemy s size and capability persisted to the last shot and beyond. His imprint on the Allied air Campaign was virtually nil other than to insist on an Early thumping of iraqi ground forces. Alter american pilots inadvertently lulled More than 200 civilians sheltered in what was believed to be a military command Post much of the strategic targeting authority was tugged from his hands by his superiors in Washington. He had stubbornly resisted turning his attention to the Only iraqi gambit that could have threatened him strategically the scud missile attacks against Israel. In the end Allied Success was less a reflection of any particular brilliance in the War plan than of the Stellar compe tence of Schwarzkopf s lieutenants in executing it a contribution at times acknowledged with stingy reluctance. Nevertheless the Man had risen to the task. He had unified the coalition forces and kept them uni fied. He had generally encouraged initiative arid intrepidity among his subordinate commanders. His tactical assessments in declining for example to launch an amphibious attack proved sound. He had projected an image of strength and resolve. He brought Home alive far More of his soldiers than even the most optimistic strategists in Washington had dared Hope. He had won. Norman Schwarzkopf had earned his due. Re Csc Alanton � Washington Post Start War tar now Bawd in Berlin.  Sartor i Post. Thai article  by the pol from Cudo the Jenft Jurf Story Oft i Ponlan Gulf War and appeared in the Washington Post Magazine on sept 26. The general s goodbye to saudi on april 20,1991. November 23.1993 sunday Page 11