European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - November 28, 1993, Darmstadt, Hesse                                Crusade continue from Page 9 statements like  Powell prudently kept the source to himself. Cheney hoping to galvanize Riyadh into More innovative thinking began pushing a scheme to attack Iraq in the far West near the scud launch Sites known As 11-2 and h-3. The Golden word Inchon Macarthur s famed amphibious attack behind enemy lines in Korea cropped up with frequency As the Pentagon groped for a More audacious plan. Schwarzkopf railed at Washington s discontent. There is no damned Inchon he thundered slam Ming his fist on the table and somebody ought to come out Here so i can show them there is no damned Inchon somebody did. Colin Powell flew to Riyadh on oct. 21. For two Days he peppered Schwarzkopf and Purvis with questions. Most of the discussion Cen tired on the one corps concept but Purvis also showed the chairman his group s recent work on a two corps attack. Rather than a strike through Kuwait the two corps plan called for an attack into Iraq just West of the Wadi at Batin Angling toward but not through the Republican guard divisions South of the euphrates Valley. Because the Sams team could not agree on a definition of destroy the initial purpose of the attack was to defeat the guard. A Defeated enemy was defined As no longer capable of putting larger than a brigade sized Force against us  the Day before Powell s arrival however Schwarzkopf amended the plan. I want you to draw an Arrow through the Republican guard he told Purvis. If we get two corps up there and we re still organized As a coherent Force Well take that mass and destroy  the guard the cinc subsequently decreed was to be obliterated As a military organization in the sort of titanic clash Clausewitz had called die sch ache the Bat the. Out Powell considered this rendition of the two corps scheme still too conventional although in tended to outflank the enemy the attack Lay too close to the Wudi where Iraq would expect the Allied thrust he plan failed to exploit what Powell called the american mobility differential the agility Pur chased at staggering expense with Lal tanks Bradley fighting vehicles and a huge Fleet of helicopters. Several proposals drafted by the joint chiefs staff went so far As to suggest a Marine corps attack from Jordan or a strike from Syria and Southern tur key the chairman agreed however with the Neces sity of a second corps. Tell me what you need he instructed Schwarzkopf. If we go to War we will not do this  on returning to Washington Powell advocated Al most a doubling of the american deployment. For a truly intrepid flanking attack from the West the chairman argued Schwarzkopf needed Many More troops. Cheney readily agreed having come to the same conclusion. On oct. 31, Bush concurred Al though the decision was kept secret until nov. 8, after the National elections that week. Gentlemen the commander in chief Riyadh was braced for War. Masking tape Cross hatched the smoked windows of apartment houses and government offices. Saudi soldiers on Street Cor ners crouched inside their sandbag bunkers alternately fingering worry beads and the triggers of their machine guns. In the Royal Palace King fahd waited with the appropriate anxiety of a Monarch whose throne has just been tossed on the gaming table. He had Learned of the imminent Allied attack from his Nephew and ambassador to the United states Prince Bandar bin Sultan who called from Washington with a coded message our old Friend Suleiman is com ing at 9 o clock this evening. He s sick and i la ship him out and hell get there at 9," As fahd and ban Dar had arranged the King added six to the hour to calculate a hour 3 . At Midnight fahd mustered his closest ministers not an unusual summons for the nocturnal saudis and commanded that no one leave his sight until Che first bombs fell. Yet the Center of the kingdom this night was not the Palace but a cramped Bunker barely bigger than a Tennis court 40 feet beneath the Concrete fortress of the ministry of defense and aviation. The select few authorized to enter Rode an elevator Down three president Bash with saudi troops in november "90. Flights passed through two checkpoints and several steel vault doors then walked Down a fourth flight to the fluorescent netherworld of Schwarzkopf s War room. It was sparsely furnished stripped to fighting trim. Maps papered the four Walls. A pair of television monitors linked by closed circuit to the operations Center next door listed significant intelligence or combat actions under Way. Three clocks told the hour in Riyadh Washington and Greenwich known As Zulu time. Staff officers manned a Horseshoe arrangement of desks behind a rectangular table where the senior american commanders sat. Calvin Waller leaned Back in his Brown leather chair slightly smaller than Schwarzkopf s Black leather throne now vacant on his immediate. Left. The cinc was never one to bungle an Entrance Waller knew. He would be Here in due time Proba Bly with a flourish befitting the occasion. Other offi cers began to enter the room each bringing a fresh charge of tension. Waller had no doubt that the Al lies would win but at what Cost he considered losses of 10 to 20 Allied aircraft Likely in the course of the night others feared 50. Waller again scanned operations order 91-001dated 17 january 1991. Allied objectives in the com ing War had been boiled Down to a single sentence attack iraqi political military leadership and com Mand and control gain and maintain air superiority sever iraqi Supply lines destroy chemical biological Cheney Powell and . Troops in december 90. And nuclear capability destroy Republican guard forces in the kuwaiti theater liberate  there it was in 34 words. Unlike Vietnam the mis Sion was succinct tangible and limited precisely the qualities demanded by the military of their civil Ian masters for 20 years. If things went awry this time Waller knew no one in uniform would be a Leto blame the country s political leaders for ambiguous  War room door swung open. Gentlemen someone announced the commander in  Schwarzkopf entered jaw set eyes Bright with Emo Tion. Waller and the other officers came to their feet. As the men fell silent the cinc moved to the front of the room and nodded to the chaplain col. David Peterson. Heads were bowed eyes pinched shut. Our father Peterson began on this awesome and humbling occasion we Are grateful for the privilege of turning to you our Sovereign and almighty god. We believe that in accordance with the teach ing of your word and revelation we Are on a just and righteous  drawing from the psalmist the chaplain prayed for the souls of those about to die then asked for a Quick and decisive Victory. Your word informs us that men prepare for Battle and we have. But Victory rests with the lord. Therefore we commit our ways to you and wait upon the lord. In the name of the Prince of peace we Pray.  amen the officers echoed Many with a catch in their voices. Then Schwarzkopf read his message to his troops nine sentences addressed to the soldiers sailors airmen and marines of the United states Centra command and ending. Our cause is just. Now you must be the Thunder and lightning of desert  god be with you your loved ones at Home and our  finally Schwarzkopf s aide produced a portable cassette recorder and punched the play Button. The room filled with the cloying warble of Lee Green Wood s cod bless the .a., which already had be come the unofficial Anthem of the american expeditionary Force. As the last strains died away Schwarzkopf looked around. Of gentlemen he said brusquely let s go to  sometimes i feel like my Heads being squeezed in a Vise Colin Powell had worried that allowing the Start of the ground offensive to slip from feb. 21 to the 24th would encourage requests for further delays. That concern now proved Well founded. As the third week of february slipped past Schwarzkopf appeared reluctant to press ahead with the attack As scheduled. Phone conversations Between chairman and cinc regarding a Day became Ever More intense. Schwarzkopf not Only wanted time for the marines and the army divisions to position themselves but he also had promised it. Gen. Walter Boomer the Marine commander 72 hours of fair skies in order to guarantee Allied air cover. Powell found himself caught in the Middle. Bush scowcroft and others in the civilian leadership were eager to bring the War to a Quick finish. If Saddam were to feign a withdrawal or actually begin to pull out of Kuwait such a move the White House feared would crack the coalition. Powell wanted Schwarz Kopf to be comfortable with his timetable but the chairman saw Little reason not to launch the attack on the 24th or even earlier. Yet when he pressed Schwarzkopf to consider advancing the schedule by a Day or two the cinc dug in his heels. Citing meteorological predictions of foul weather on the 24th and 25th, Schwarzkopf pro posed instead that the attack be postponed a couple of Days More. Powell relayed the request to Cheney. Norm s under a lot of  the chairman explained. He knows he s going to go. He wants to go but he s trying to be considerate of what his commanders want he s worried about the weather and he s a Little High Strung right  Colin you re making it hard Cheney said barely concealing his exasperation. There s a limit. What reason do i give the president for virtually the first time in the War Cheney in Page 10 sunday november 28, 1993