European Stars and Stripes (Newspaper) - November 28, 1993, Darmstadt, Hesse A a a map a Day into the air War airmen reload harm air to surface missiles to an fi5 Eagle in saudi Arabia. Been occupied by eager Anvil now disbanded. Security teams frequently swept the chamber for listening devices All working papers were locked in a vault at night with a guard posted. Schwarzkopf initially limited to 10 the number of officers Quot read into Quot the top secret operation. Even the saudis remained ignorant of the planning operation. For two weeks Joe Purvis and his team pondered the daunting task of ousting an iraqi army of occupation a which would grow . Intelligence reported to nearly half a million a it with an Allied Force half its size. In Southern Kuwait the iraqis had pm placed hundreds of artillery tubes hundreds of thou Sands of mines and a Warren of trenches and barbed wire worthy of Verdun including fire ditches filled with flammable Oil. Yet iraqi generals appeared determined to defend vast tracts of Barren desert a strategy As Daft As Quot a Sailor fighting for a wave or an airman for a Cloud Quot in the words of maj. Gen. Rupert Smith a British division commander. The Sams group considered sweeping West of the fortifications in a flanking Man Euver similar to Guderian a Panzer attack through the ardennes toward the English Channel in May 1940 and Rommel s run around the British at Al Gazala two years later. . Army doctrine called for attacking an enemy both deep behind his lines and at the Point of greatest vulnerability. If the iraqis expected an assault through Southern Kuwait doctrine and common sense suggested the attackers veer around the Teeth of t he defences. Yet in Purvis View several factors militated against attacking West of the Wadi Al Batin the dry riverbed that angled from Southwest to Northeast to Mark the Western Border Between Kuwait and Iraq. Terrain in that sector of Iraq was Terra incognito. Was the desert Quot Traff Cable a capable of supporting the thousands of tanks trucks and other vehicles needed in Allied attack satellite photos bedouin reports even historical records from British expeditions in world War 1, were inconclusive. A single armoured division in heavy combat could bum half a million Gallons of fuel a Day and shoot 5,000 tons of ammunition an inability to drive fuel or ammo trucks into Iraq would be disastrous. Equally troubling a flank attack would require virtually All of the available Allied ground forces leaving no Reserve. In the War with Iran Iraq had displayed the ability to counterattack quickly moving armoured divisions a Hundred Kilometres in a Day. If the american Force was Cut off and reduced to a fighting withdrawal the military and political Conse quinces would be horrific. Purvis concluded hat gambling on a flank attack was too risky without More combat and logistics Power. On oct. 6, Purvis presented Schwarzkopf with several options. The Best course he suggested was to attack at night through Western Kuwait about 40 Miles East of the Wadi Al Batin. The Border from the persian Gulf to the Wadi stretched 130 Miles Saddam a forces could not be equally Strong everywhere and this sector appeared less fortified than the kuwaiti Boot Heel. The Allied spearhead would drive toward the High ground above Mutala pass West of Kuwait Bay then Cut the four Lane Highway leading from the kuwaiti capital to Basra. With Luck the Republican guard divisions Laa gered North or the kuwaiti Border would Roll South to Blunt the attack exposing themselves to Allied air Power. If those three elite divisions were demolished Purvis believed the rest of iraqis army would be Likely to capitulate. If the Battle went badly the americans could dig in and fight or Retreat South without risk of being trapped and decimated. Schwarzkopf stood at the map As Purvis spoke his nose just inches from the thick Black arrows. He agreed with Purvis that a flanking attack to the West was imprudent Given the forces at hand. Like Many officers of his generation the c1nc was wary of underestimating the enemy. In Korea Vietnam even in Grenada where Schwarzkopf had been the senior ground commander american planners had underrated the foe with results ranging from unfortunate to calamitous. A do you think this will work a he asked Purvis. A a its very High risk a Purvis replied to May work a a what would it take to guarantee Success a a another corps a Purvis answered promptly. Two or More divisions make up a corps. The sole corps on hand the army s xviii airborne comprised four divisions but Only two were armed with heavy tanks. Schwarzkopf nodded. A i three Days later Purvis flew to Washington with Glosson maj Rick Francona an intelligence officer and Bob Johnston the Cen com chief of staff. President Bush and his advisers wanted to review Schwarzkopf plans for both the air and ground attacks. Hie abrupt request to show a ground offensive plan irritated the Cine who Felt whips wed Between Colin Powell a desire to hold Down the num Ber of troops deployed in desert shield and the need to draft an adequate offence. Quot goddammit a Schwarzkopf told Powell Over the phone a i told you Over and Over again we can to get there from but Powell in Sis cd. The White House Quot is on my Back a he explained. Quot they want to see what we can before Purvis and his team left Riyadh the cinc gave them several last minute instructions. Show them the proposal Schwarzkopf said but make the Point that for us to feel confident of Victory we need an additional corps. A we Don t bullshit the president Quot he added. Any officer offering a personal opinion in Washington would be relieved and sent Home in disgrace. On wednesday oct. 10, the briefing was delivered first to the joint chiefs Cheney and undersecretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz in the tank the chiefs secure conference room in the Pentagon. Schwarzkopf team repeated the performance on thursday for Bush vice president Dan Quayle Deputy National Security adviser Robert Gates and scowcroft in the White House situation room. On both occasions Glosson a review of the air Campaign Drew few critical comments. But Purvis presentation of the ground attack a dubbed the one corps concept a made military officers and civilians alike uncomfortable. Scowcroft was particularly pointed in his questioning. Quot Why straight up the Middle Quot he asked. Quot Why done to you go around a Quot logistics a Powell replied. A we done to have enough Force to go around Quot Johnston hashed two final View graphs labelled a a cinch a assessment one noted a planning Silil in conceptual to a go around a Schwarzkopf needed an additional corps. The four officers flew Back to Riyadh believing that they had adequately conveyed Schwarzkopf message. In truth they had not. Schwarzkopf desire for More forces was vaguely understood but not the purpose those additional troops would serve. To Cheney the idea was simply Quot a bad Wolfowitz came away convinced that another corps would be used to reinforce failure in a frontal assault. Scow Croft was particularly appalled at a scheme he considered unimaginative even Foolhardy he vectored Cheney for More creative alternatives. Although Schwarzkopf scheme was soon caricatured in Washington As moronic it represented a reasonable attempt to make do with the forces available should Bush order an offensive in the next two months. Schwarzkopf and Purvis had carefully considered a one corps flanking attack a both recognized the Appeal of a grand sweep to the West a but rejected it for sound military reasons. If the cinc and his men had failed to convey those reasons they nevertheless displayed courage in resisting the Appeal of a More flamboyant plan that ran counter to their judgment. Yet in the White House and some Corners of the Pentagon the suspicion took Root that the cinch a plea for More troops was simply the delaying tactic of a general hesitant to fight. Schwarzkopf Effort was dismissed by scowcroft and others in the National Security Council with a Curt Quot thank you general Mcclellan a a snide allusion to Lincoln a reluctant commander of the army of the Potomac. And the one corps concept came to be known by the cruelly Clever parody of a Nursery rhyme hey diddle diddle straight up the Middle. It took but two Days for Cen com to realize How badly the presentations in Washington had been received. Quot Well a Powell told Schwarzkopf on the phone a a nobody a very Happy with your ground Campaign a a it a not my ground Campaign plan a the cinc replied heatedly. A i told you that. This is not what in a. when Powell mentioned the Mcclellan gibe Schwarzkopf grew even angrier. A Tell me who said that Quot he demanded. Quot ill Call the son of a Bitch on the phone right now and explain the difference Between me and Mcclellan if they re so stupid. If these Guys arc advising the president of the United slates they ought to know better than to make flip. Continued on pare it Brent scowcroft november 28, 1933 sunday Page 3
